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ABSTRACT 
THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT 
OF THE FUNCTION OF CRIME INVESTIGATION AND 
DETECTION 
IN THE BRITISH POLICE SERVICE 
by Lawrence T. Roach QPM B. Sc. (Econ. ) 
In this thesis the process by which crime investigation, detection and prosecution 
became an integral function of the British police service is analysed through an 
examination of public records, contemporary papers and documents, and by 
reference to the literature on policing. The impact of the adoption of that 
function on the role, organisation and management of modem British policing is 
then assessed. 
It is established that at its foundation by Robert Peel's Metropolitan Police Act of 
1829, the British professional police service was intended to be a purely 
preventive and protective body of uniformed patrolling constables. The function 
of crime investigation, detection and criminal prosecution was then subsequently 
added to its responsibilities by government using administrative rather than any 
democratic or legislative means, thus creating the present dual crime prevention 
and crime detection role of the police. 
Major recurrent problems experienced by the modem British police service are 
identified as arising from that change in its original functions and purposes, and 
proposals for action to resolve them are set out. 
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Introduction 
If it is the role of the police service to prevent crime and detect criminal offenders, 
as both the British public and their politicians firmly believe and as its leaders 
accept, why has it not long ago been disbanded or replaced by something more 
effective? 
In 1970 there were some 97,000 police officers in England and Wales. By 2000 
that figure was 26% higher at 124,000' while expenditure on policing had 
increased nearly six-fold, from ;E1,400 million' to E7,952 million? Yetinthat 
same period of rapid growth in the resources devoted to policing, offences in the 
categories most likely to create fear of crime in the minds of the public (theft of 
and from vehicles, burglary in dwelling and robbery) almost trebled, from 
520,162 to 1,535,059.4 Having failed so grossly, why is the police service still 
with us? 
This research challenges basic assumptions about the role and purposes of the 
police service and what it can be expected to achieve. Original public records 
and contemporary documents show that, contrary to common belief, the British 
police service began as a purely protective and preventive uniformed patrolling 
force with no responsibility for levels of crime. Plain clothes detectives 
investigating crime and employed to identify, detect and prosecute criminals 
(criminal investigation departments or CIDs) are a later, and improperly instituted, 
addition to British policing. 
In the light of that finding the present role, organisation and structure of the police 
service is examined to show that the addition of a detective function is a major 
cause of its failure to have any sustained impact on levels of crime, and is the 
source of some of its more intractable problems. How that conclusion is reached 
and justified, and what needs to be done to restore policing to its proper place in 
our criminal justice system is the subject matter of this thesis 
Background 
Government, Parliament and the great mass of the British public take the 
existence, present duties, and activities of the full-time, paid, professional, police 
I Home Office www. statistics. gov. uklExpodatalSpreadsheetsID3574. xls 
2 Home Office Circular 114/1983 paragraph 2 
3 Home Office Annual Report 2000/2001 Section 6, Financial Tables 8 and 9 
4 op. cit ID4853. xIs 
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officer for granted. The media and other institutions that market and distribute 
information and commentary about social issues and events are equally 
unquestioning. Politicians, press and public are alike prone to criticise their 
police service, and to subject it to verbal and even occasionally physical attack. 
But rarely, if ever, is its history and development, or its place as a vital element in 
the health and stability of society seriously questioned or challenged. The British 
public and the politicians who represent them, and the overwhelming majority of 
those academics and commentators who have an interest in policing, simply 
assume that the modem police service has always taken its present form and had 
its present responsibilities. Indeed, there is a tendency to believe that the direct 
alternative is anarchy and the collapse of civilisation. Yet it has not always been 
so and the change has been relatively recent. 
Origins of professional policing 
Up to and even beyond the 1830's the people themselves were responsible for the 
tasks and functions now reserved to the profession of policing. ' Alfred, and his 
Saxon and Viking successors, moulded the old Saxon society into something 
peculiarly diverse and English. Under a surface of complexity its system of 
peacekeeping and law enforcement was essentially direct local and based on 
simple principles. Frankpledge bound the head of each family to be responsible 
for the good conduct of the others. Families (tythes) grouped together in tens 
(decennaries) to elect one of their number to represent and have authority over 
them. ' Ten decermaries made a hundred with responsibility to hold regular courts 
7 
to deal with local disputes and delinquencies. A sheriff had the power in each 
county to hold an annual court to renew the frankpledge of the hundreds. That 
court also examined and settled disputes and feuds, as well as the more serious 
crimes and breaches of the peace of the shire. The sheriff had authority to raise 
the whole county in the pursuit of delinquents where necessary (the posse 
comitas), and acted as the Kings representative in enforcing his laws and in 
keeping the peace of the county. ' 
William the Bastard inherited this sound system of law enforcement and 
peacekeeping when he replaced the rulers of England after 1066. He was wise 
enough to try to preserve its best features. ' However, his imposition of a 
5 Reith, C (1948) page 1 
6 ibid page 2 
7 ibid page 3 
8 Tobias, J. J. (1970 page 16, coL 1 
9 Reith, C (1943) page 14 
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controlling Norman elite on a system that was in essence the outcome of a long 
and often bitter battle to agree a peace between Saxon and Viking equals, created 
formidable problems. " The fragile stability of Saxon society depended on the 
principle of collective responsibility for peace and good order coupled with a 
broad consensus on the legitimacy of the rule of their Kings. The Conquest cut 
through that delicate balance, dividing England between those who ruled and 
those who now had to obey. There could be no reconciling their interests and no 
unity between them. As the Deputy Keeper of Records at the Tower of London 
noted in the nineteenth century; 
'Notwithstanding the ordinances of the Norman kings to insure the 
conservancy of the peace through the medium of free pledges, it is evident 
that those laws were disregarded by the Saxons as well as the Normans; for 
how could it be reasonably expected that people so diametrically opposed to, 
and entertaining so thorough a dislike for each other, would cordially unite in 
common offices of friendship, or even of mutual intercourse? "' 
The social division and enmity created by the Conquest destroyed the communal 
unity on which Saxon peacekeeping and law enforcement had been built. No 
longer was there broad agreement about who, or what should be condemned or 
punished. Or what was or was not to be regarded as a 'crime' and therefore 
subject to the rigours of the law. Such matters no longer depended solely on 
precedent and local opinion. They were now also to be judged by what best 
reinforced the King's authority over his subjects. 
The structure and form of peacekeeping and criminal justice in England 
underwent drastic change, with King's officers appointed to enforce his laws and 
protect his interests overlaying and distorting the Saxon system of freely elected 
citizens responsible for the behaviour of their neighbours. '2 But elements of the 
old structures and customs persisted, and the idea of local responsibility for local 
delinquency never quite disappeared. " The system of frankpledge fell rapidly 
into disuse, principally because the Norman lords and clergy were exempt from 
it. "' The head of the decennary and the Sheriff did not, however, share the 
demise of the pledge system. They gradually shifted in character from being 
10 Critchley, T. A. (1978) page 3 
It Report of the Royal Commission on the Establishment of an Efficient Constabulary Force (1839) 
Parliamentary Papers (169) vol XIX ](1839) Appendix no. 4 page 191 
12 Critchley, T. A., op cit, page 16 
13 ibid page 4 
14 Report of the Royal Commission etc., op cit, Appendix 4 page 192 
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purely local administrators and representatives of the community to take on many 
of the characteristics and duties of royally appointed officers. They became 
much more concerned with the enforcement of the King's edicts and the 
punishment of offenders and delinquents, although they retained an overall 
responsibility for the maintenance of the peace in the county. 's 
ConstabIes and Justices 
By 1285 the functionaries that had emerged from the intermingling of the Saxon 
pledge system with the enforcement of the King's laws included officials 
described as 'constables'. These officers held a highly regarded place as King's 
officers in their local community despite retaining many of the characteristics of 
the Saxon head of decennary. They were not appointed by the King's 
representatives in the county but were still selected or elected by parishioners 
from amongst themselves in the Saxon tradition. As such they were, and 
remained, an integral part of the local community. " 
Up to and beyond the establishment of the professional police service in the 
nineteenth century, locally convened courts (hundred courts and courts leet) also 
continued to meet throughout the realm. These courts either selected or approved 
the appointment of constables to keep the peace in the old tradition, and dealt with 
minor delinquency and local administration. " Sheriffs meanwhile evolved in a 
different direction, becoming increasingly concerned with the maintenance of the 
King's authority in the county and, as the judicial system refined and developed, 
with more ceremonial and representative functions. " 
The post-Conquest tension between local loyalties and central power was a 
persistent threat to peacekeeping and to the King's rule, always able to bring both 
to the edge of collapse. In an attempt to impose some order on an increasingly 
fissiparous system, knights and other officers appointed by the King's 
commission were regularly despatched to the counties and localities to try to 
restore the peace and proper observance of his laws. "' In the Justices of the Peace 
Act of 13 61 (34Edw. 111, c. 1) the practice was formalised by the appointment of 
permanent justices of the peace who took up the main burden of local crime 
prevention, detection and punishment as well as peacekeeping in the King's name. 
Locally elected constables were drawn, if only reluctantly, into assisting the 
Is Critchley, T. A., op cit. page 5 
16 ibid 
17 ibid pages 12-13 
18 Stead, P. J. (1985)pages9-10 
19 Critchley, T. A., op cit. page 8 
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justices in that work . 
20 For that purpose the practice developed of requiring 
constables to take an oath of office before the Justice, to serve not only as 
representatives of their community, but also as King's officers in the conservancy 
of the peace in their local ity. 21 
The relationship between justices and other peacekeeping officials, particularly 
local constables, is a particular focus of this research. The Statute of Winchester 
of 1285 (13Edw. 1 cap 6) contained many radical innovations. Among them was a 
provision to ensure that every citizen between the ages of 15 and 40 kept arms in 
his house to enable him to do his part in peacekeeping and crime prevention 
should need arise. Local constables were given the power to enter the homes of 
citizens to inspect such arms. 22 They were required by the Act to 'present' the 
names of defaulters to the local justices for punishment of any neglect. Thisis 
probably the earliest formal example of the relationship between the Norman 
appointed justice and the Saxon elected constable which was to become an 
enduring feature of the developing English criminal justice system. 
The Statute of Winchester also contained provisions to establish a system of 
nightly 'watch and ward' in towns. " Rate-paying inhabitants manned the watch 
on a rota system directly derived from the Saxon tradition. The purpose was to 
control the movement of itinerant criminals and other miscreants. The watch did 
not replace, but rather supplemented, the work of local constables, who continued 
to provide crime prevention and deterrence in both towns and rural areas. 
Serious offenders fleeing the watch or local constables still aroused the whole 
county under the old systems of the 'posse comitas' and 'hue and cry'. " 
Successive monarchs and then their parliaments grafted new functions and 
responsibilities on the watch/constable/justice/sheriff system as social and 
economic development imposed ever greater pressures on the peace and order of 
the realm. But the ancient Saxon principle of collective responsibility for local 
peace and good order survived, despite many changes. 
The division of labour between the constable and the justice also remained clear. 
It was for the constable to support and oversee the 'watch and ward' of his 
citizens, to quell disorders and riotous behaviour, and to detain anyone found in 
breach of the peace in his locality. Constables did not have the sole right, nor any 
20 Kcnt, J. R. (1986)pages55-56 
21 ibid page 67 
22 Critchley, T. A, op cit. page 6 23 ibid 
24 ibid pages 11-12 
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special responsibility, to bring misconduct and criminal offences before the 
courts. That duty still rested with individual aggrieved citizens who, for that 
purpose, had direct recourse to the justices. " All citizens had a duty to prosecute 
miscreants who did them harm, and the right to bring complaints to the justices 
forthatpurpose. The early English criminal justice system laid prime 
responsibility for the prevention and suppression of crime and for the detention 
and prosecution of known offenders against the criminal law, firmly on 
individuals and their communities. "' Only where that first line of defence failed 
did it charge the justices with inquiry into reports of crime, and with responsibility 
for the identification, detection and pursuit of criminals and other offenders who 
had escaped the local community and their constable. 
A Royal Commission sitting in 1839, reviewing the development of policing 
arrangements in England and Wales, reported that: 
'It will be found that the function of inquiry was shared as a principle of the 
action of the whole executive agency for the preservation of the peace. It 
is specified in those of the later commissions of the justices of the peace, 
which invested them with the distinct functions of conservators of the peace 
and charged them to inquire diligently respecting offences committed; 
implying functions, like those of the coroner, of inquiry on the occurrence 
of an infraction of the law, i. e. inquiry before the offender is ascertained or 
apprehended, as well as thejudicial functions of hearing and determining 
on the sufficiency of the evidence. 927 
In common law it was the duty of the constable and his community to maintain 
the peace and prevent offences in their locality. They were also jointly 
responsible for the 'quick and fresh pursuit"' of offenders and for raising an 
immediate 'hue and cry' where the miscreants escaped them. 29 It was then left to 
the justices to identify, seek out and prosecute criminals who had escaped that 
instant pursuit. Whether the miscreant was apprehended by the community or 
subsequently detected by the justice, it was still for the victim of the crime to 
prosecute him, and to present him before the justices for that purpose. " Inthat 
process neither the local constable nor any other representative of the community 
25 ibid page 7 
26 Royal Commission etc., op cit. page 93 para. 106 
27 ibid. para. 103 pages 91 to 92 
29 ibid. para. 105 page 92 
29 Critchley, T. A., op cit. page 7 
30 Royal Commission etc., op cit. page 97para. 119 
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had any special or specific role. The evolution of the office of constable after the 
Conquest, and his growing peacekeeping and instant pursuit responsibilities, did 
not absolve individual citizens from their ancient responsibility for the good 
conduct of their neighbours. The same 1839 Royal Commission reported the 
Elizabethan, Sir Thomas Smith, as saying, in praise of his own time, that: 
'The parish which doth not his dutie, but letteth, by their negligence, the 
theife to depart, doth not only pay a fine to the King, but must repay to the 
party robbed his damages. So that every Englishman is a serjeant to take 
the theife, and who sheweth negligence therein do not only incurre evil 
opinion therefore, but hardly shall escape punishment. "' 
Despite having been elected by his peers, and having no greater actual obligation 
in law than his neighbours to keep the peace in his community, the constable 
nevertheless ranked high in the social order. The same Elizabethan writer reports 
that he was given an importance equal to that of the justices. " 
But not for long. The 1839 Royal Commission, commenting on the sorry state of 
the constables and watchmen in its own time, observed that: 
'We apprehend that the office of constable must have very early fallen into 
inferior hands, from the difficulty of finding in the poorer and less populous 
districts a sufficient number of persons qualified or inclined to perform the 
duties. 
As society advanced, the duties themselves became more heavy and 
complex. The grounds of complaint made by ... [earlier commentators] ... of 
the increase of the statutes, with the execution of which the constable as 
well as the justice of the peace is charged, are enormously enlarged in 
these ... [nineteenth century]... times, when the statutory enactments of one 
year equal the whole of the statutory enactments of two or three centuries 
preceding that in which the complaint was made. $33 
As a consequence, 'When persons who may be considered qualified in respect of 
station are chosen [to hold the office of constable] they almost all pay for 
substitutes, and avoid serving. ""' 
31 ibid. page. 93, para 106 
32 ibid. para. III 
33 ibid. page 108, para. 134 
34 ibid. page 109, para. 135 
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The decline in the quality of constables paralleled a fall in the standards and 
reputation of the watchmen who were paid substitutes for the ratepayers required 
to keep night-time watch and ward in the towns. The latter became figures of 
ridicule while the former, regretfully, became associated with drunkenness, 
indolence and even corruption, in the enforcement of the law. So serious did the 
problem become" that the justices (or magistrates, who were the permanent, paid 
justices in the towns) took matters into their own hands. They despaired of the 
locally elected constables, and began to appoint their own officers to act under 
their authority to 'inquire' into crimes and offences within their districts. "' These 
new additions to the forces of law and order were swom as constables by the 
magistrates to equip them with all the common law powers of that ancient office, 
but they were not selected or elected by the local community. The magistrate's 
officers were his agents rather than representatives of their fellow citizens, and 
they were employed to assist the magistrate in his crime detection and prosecution 
work . 
37 
The most famous of those magistrate's officers were undoubtedly those appointed 
by the Bow Street Magistrates, Henry, and (later) John, Fielding, in London after 
1750. Their appearance marks the start of modem British professional policing. 
Bow Street Runners and Patroles, 
In 1750 Henry Fielding recruited six Westminster householders to serve as 
regular, paid, constables to assist him in his work as Chief Magistrate at Bow 
38 Street. Success came quickly to 'Mr. Fielding's people', as they became 
known, and they removed a number of notorious criminal gangs from the streets 
31 
of London. In time they evolved to become the famous (and later, infamous) 
Bow Street Runners under the guidance of John (later 'Sir John') Fielding, the 
'blind beak' of Bow Street. John Fielding succeeded to the Chief Magistrate's 
post on the retirement of his half-brother on grounds of ill-health in 1754.4' The 
plain clothes Bow Street Runners, and their uniformed 'Patrole' colleagues, 
developed a national reputation and significance in the effort to control crime and 
disorder in early industrial England. Contemporary commentators were careful 
to distinguish between the Runners and Patroles, who were swom as constables 
35 Reith, C. (1943) page 16 
36 Heron, F. E. page 1 
37 Maguire, et al (2002) page 212 and Browne, D. G. (1956) page 2 7128 
38 Armitage, G. (1935)page 47 
39 Browne, D. G. op cit. page 28 
40 Armitage, G. op cit. page 60 and ibid page 29 
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by their magistrate employers, and the local and parish constables who continued 
to patrol the capital. The former were generally termed 'officers' while the latter 
continued to be called 'constables'. The distinction was important at the time and 
the practice will be followed, so far as is possible, in this account of my research. 
The Runners provided a model for others to follow. Police Offices along the 
lines developed by the Fieldings sprang up across London, and then spread to 
other cities following the passage of the Middlesex Justices Act of 1792 (3 Geo III 
cap 53). "' However, Parliament was never quite convinced of the propriety of 
this development in the English criminal justice system. The Police Offices Act, 
as it came to be called, always had a time limit on its operation. At regular 
intervals it returned to Parliament for review and renewal. 
Fielding's innovations spread throughout the nation 42 but their influence on the 
criminal justice system was evolutionary not revolutionary. The Fieldings 
did not 
reshape or reform the system. They merely added yet another layer to the 
incoherent structure of parish constables, watchmen, courts leet, private watch 
associations, bailiffs, sheriff s men, beadles and the host of other petty officials 
and placemen that had emerged from the various local and national attempts to 
combat the seemingly inexorable and unpredictable growth of crime, disruption 
and disorder in British society. 
Since Henry Fielding's action in employing officers and so creating the Bow 
Street Runners did not directly depart from the line of development of policing 
from its Saxon and Norman origins the innovation enjoyed general, if 
occasionally grudging, acceptance. " By Fielding's time the justices had a long 
tradition of relying on locally elected or selected constables to assist them in their 
work. 44 His Runners did no more than formalise that arrangement in the person 
of the full-time, paid, magistrates' officer. 
Under the Police Office system the magistrates remained wholly responsible in 
law for the conduct and actions of their officers. " In time, the Fielding's and 
their successors and imitators began to publish lists of wanted criminals and 
circulated descriptions of fleeing felons. "" They thus firmly established 
themselves as the founders and predecessors of the intelligence systems and 
41 Browne, D. G. op cit. page 45 
42 Tobias, J. J. (1970) page 34 
43 Browne, D. G. op cit. page 47 
44 Hart, J. M. (195 1) page 23 
45 Radzinowicz, Sir L (1956) page 12 7 
46 Stead, P. J. (1985)page 25 
Introduction 10 
criminal records departments that are now so much a part of all modem police 
services. 
Police offices on the Bow Street model had their successes, and they continued to 
attract a strong body of support even after their limitations were exposed. 
inevitably however, they soon became part of the muddled, localised system of 
crime control that failed, in the minds of both public and politicians, to bring 
peace and order to the lives of ordinary people. The full onset of industrialisation 
and urbanisation finally overwhelmed these increasingly ramshackle 
arrangements. "' A dramatic increase in the geographic and social mobility of the 
British scattered the stable communities of like minded citizens, equally willing to 
support each other and their elected constable or watchman, that was the 
foundation of Saxon peacekeeping and crime suppression. 
The new industrial towns in particular became increasingly uncontrollable and a 
haven for criminal communities. 
'Manchester's 40,000 people in 1770 were 187,000 by 1821; Leeds, 
Sheffield and Birmingham all doubled in thirty years. Outside these great 
concentrations the whole face of the country altered. In the century ending 
1821, for all practical purposes, all that was left of its medieval common- 
fields and commons was enclosed, or some 6 million acres. "" 
In truth, 'We have, then, a people fundamentally changed in spirit but enclosed in 
an ancient government frame. "' 
Between 1805 and 1817 the number of committals to prison and executions 
ordered by the courts in England and Wales rose from just under 4,000 to more 
than 30,000 per year. 'O Drastic reform in peacekeeping, and in crime prevention 
and detection, was deemed necessary to avoid social breakdown. That was a real 
possibility at the time of revolutionary events unfolding on the Continent. From 
that impetus the modern British professional police service was bom. 
The New Police 
The starting point of my thesis is here; at the point of the emergence of a full-time 
professional police service from the collapse of the uncomfortable amalgam of 
Saxon self-regulation with Norman views on kingship, under the enormous 
47 Reith, C. (1943) page 15 
48 Feiling, Sir K. (1950) page 798 
49 ibid page 797 
50 Report of the Royal Commission etc., op. cit. Appendix no. I 
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pressures of social change and industrialisation. I begin with a re-examination of 
the establishment and development of the London Metropolitan Police Force since 
that was the progenitor and model for the modem police service in mainland 
Britain. I then move on to look at the issue most clearly connected with the 
police in the modem mind. That is, how those new arrangements dealt with, and 
continue to address, the problem of the control and suppression of crime and 
criminality in an increasingly urban, democratic and industrialised society. I 
conclude with an assessment of the effect of the involvement of the professional 
police in the attempt to suppress crime, and on the consequences of that 
development for policing and the criminal justice system. 
The emergence of the London 'Bobby' and the equally, or perhaps even more, 
famous Scotland Yard detective, as the twin bastions of the security of the citizen 
and the bafflement of wrong-doers in British society is, by any standards, a major 
event in the history of the nation Arguably, it has had an impact throughout the 
Western world. This work has its origins in a retired insider's opinion that its 
deep significance has not yet had the rigorous, critical attention its importance 
deserves. 
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2 
Sources and Methods 
I begin with an examination of the history of British professional policing. The 
sources used are principally those documents and other contemporary material 
now preserved in the public record, supplemented by the literature on policing. 
From that research I draw new conclusions about the origins and early 
development of present-day policing and frame proposals for its reform designed 
to improve its performance and to resolve some of its major problems. Clearly, 
the methods used will need to link the history and development of British policing 
to the solution of its present problems; that is, draw together and find common 
ground between the contributions of historians and social scientists to this field. 
I start with a short r6sum6 of the difficulties faced by my research, both practical 
and in using historical sources for these purposes. I then discuss the views of 
historians on the value and utility of a study of history as a means to find solutions 
to present-day problems, and show that there is considerable divergence among 
them on that issue, with the generality regarding my purposes as lying somewhere 
between controversial and impossible on any reasonable scale of feasibility. 
Next, I consider the views of those social scientists interested in policing as a 
social institution to show that there is no consensus among them on how the 
objective I have set myself might best be achieved. Finally, I set out my solution 
to these problems, giving the reasoning that led me to it. 
Practical difficulties 
In 1943 Charles Reith, a prolific and widely respected writer on British policing, 
said, 
'In the records of the nations there is, surely, no more curious phenomenon 
than the neglect by British historians of the study of their police ... it is 
possible to examine thousands of volumes of history, biography and 
memoirs ... without finding, at best, more than a cursory statement of the 
fact and date of police establishment. Writers on the subject of legal and 
constitutional history are equally unimaginative. ' 
In a footnote he adds, 'Even more deplorable than the silence of historians on this 
subject is the absurdity of their occasional misstatements. " 
I Reith (1943) page 31 
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His view of the neglected condition of British policing history is supported by Sir 
John Moylan, a high (Assistant Under-Secretary of State) Home Office official 
who, during his long and distinguished career in government, held the important 
and influential post of Receiver for the London Metropolitan Police from 1919 to 
1945. Speaking as someone with a wide experience of and long intimate contact 
with British professional policing, be said in 1946; 
'The detailed story of the difficulties which the new police had to surmount 
in their first ten years has been told for the first time by Charles Reith in 
[his 1943] 'British Police and the Democratic Ideal. " 
Reith's view has been more recently and authoritatively confirmed by Sir Robert 
Mark, Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police from 1972 to 1977, who 
said, 
'there is scarcely a single book in Great Britain dealing with the police 
,3 
which can be said to be worth serious consideration. 
In addition, in the Guide to the Public Records Office it is noted that, 'no 
calendars of Home Office papers later than 1775 have ever been published. "' 
Taken together these comments give some indication of the practical difficulties I 
faced. My research discovered few authoritative sources of enquiry into, or 
analysis of, the origins and development of British policing. It also revealed that 
the records of government relating to an event' so important, so significant and so 
far-reaching in its consequences for the nation" are not collated in any form that 
will aid research. 
Sources 
In these circumstances a deliberate decision was made to return to what Arthur 
Marwick calls 'primary sources', i. e. those sources 'that come into existence 
during the actual period which the historian is studying" rather than to place 
reliance on 'secondary sources' or 'those accounts written later by historians 
looking back upon a period in the past! Two main sources have therefore been 
used. First and principally, reference is made to the original working documents 
and other material produced by the civil servants and other public officials 
2 Moylan (1946) page 3 
3 Critchley, T. A. (1978) Foreword 
4 Public Records Office ZBox 2 Introduction pps. 1-2 
5 Reith (1943) op cit 
6 Marwick (1989) page 199 
7 ibid. 
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engaged in the creation and establishment of the British professional police 
service, and now stored in the Public Records Office (PRO) at Kew in London 
(now renamed the National Archive). Secondly, contemporaneous 
Parliamentary papers relating to these events have been examined, using copies 
also available at the PRO. Only marginally are these principal primary sources 
supplemented by reference to other contemporary material, e. g. newspapers, 
hand-bills, and the like, and then to subsequent, secondary commentary by 
historians and other writers. 
Public and Parliamentary papers 
The main sources used are therefore those created in the nineteenth century by 
public officers and other officials acting in the course of their day-to-day duties, 
and for their own purposes as they saw them. There is no reason either to 
suppose or expect that they had the needs, interests or concerns of future 
researchers into the history of policing in mind as they worked. Hence, whilethe 
context of this research mayjustify recourse to original material, its use raises 
other problems and difficulties. 
The documents examined at the PRO deal with events more than a century and a 
half ago and have been in storage, with varying degrees of success, for more than 
a hundred years. Understandably, some of them are close to disintegration from 
mere age, and most are now in very fragile condition. Many were found to be 
jumbled, damaged and even incomplete as a result of sometimes careless 
handling. 
In addition, the material examined dates from well before any application of 
technology to personal communication. The documents and other papers are 
almost entirely handwritten, those intended for private circulation, as most were, 
being recorded in the writer's informal hand rather than the more readily readable 
copperplate reserved for public papers. Matters of considerable importance are 
often discussed by means of hastily scribbled notes between people familiar with 
each others business hand, and using the written colloquialisms and linguistic 
mannerisms of the day. Deciphering them has sometimes been as much art as 
science. 
The fundamental problem with the use of these original, working documents for 
the purposes of research is however, that by no means all official papers find their 
way into the Public Records Office. Every Government department had (and 
has) a system of archiving documents no longer in active use, and a policy for 
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deciding when and how to activate it. Such policies and practices are subject to 
constant review and revision, not all of which is fully recorded for the benefit of 
posterity. And even if such alterations in policy are included in departmental 
records the relevant documents describing disposal policies and alterations to 
them are not necessarily or regularly among those selected to be sent for 
permanent storage. 
In general then, the system that has produced the mass of documents and other 
material now held in the Public Records Off ice is simple enough in principle but 
far from ideal from a research viewpoint. It begins when official papers reach the 
stage at which they are no longer considered to be of value to the government 
department(s) in which they were created. At that point they are sorted into one 
of two basic categories; those which, for various (and varying) reasons, are to be 
sent for permanent retention, and others that are to be destroyed forthwith. 
Those to be retained may then be subject to additional filtering processes in which 
(then) current perceptions of sensitivity, secrecy, importance, etc. may be applied, 
and some material removed, creating otherwise inexplicable gaps and 
discontinuities in the papers that eventually arrive at the PRO. The difficulties in 
drawing reliable conclusions about the course and nature of past events from such 
material as happens to be found in the Public Records Off ice are obvious; are 
recognised by this research, and are more broadly discussed later in this chapter. 
The position with Parliamentary Papers is somewhat different. Politicians have a 
generally high opinion of the importance of what they say and do. What occurs 
in Parliament is therefore usually fully recorded, and in some detail, which creates 
its own problem - that of sheer volume and its corollary of sorting wheat from 
chaff. The chief difficulty for researchers however, is that Parliamentary records 
tend to be classified and filed primarily in the date sequence in which they were 
created rather than by topic or subject. Following a thread of social or political 
development through the records of Parliament over time, which is a common 
task for researchers and commentators, can therefore present wearisome 
difficulties. Nevertheless the virtues of comprehensiveness and completeness are 
sometimes inestimable. 
British Library Newspaper Library 
The content of the British Library Newspaper Library at Colindale in London 
unavoidably combines the difficulties for research found in the material held at 
the Public Record Office and Parliamentary Papers. The Newspaper Library is 
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simply massive in volume and almost entirely catalogued by date. Titles of 
papers and publications are listed, but only those titles that are physically present 
in the collection are catalogued rather than all those published, and then only 
those issues of those titles that have actually been found and preserved. The 
result is an erratic and incomplete patchwork of newspapers and periodicals of 
truly intimidating size which can be of great value and interest only if a specific 
issue or event and a short period of time are the research parameters. 
Otherwise the difficulties are immense, especially if, as is also the case with 
Parliamentary Papers, the interest is in a continuing social problem, trend or 
process. Helpfully, the London 'Times' has a separate and very useful subject 
index, but it is compiled on an annual basis leading to a troublesome process of 
listing and sifting entries across a number of separate volumes if any subject is to 
be examined over more than a year or two. Additional difficulties are caused by 
the journalistic habit of reclassifying an issue as it develops. Acolumnist's 
gossip can metamorphose through a newsworthy scandal into a full-scale political 
crisis, its description and position in the format of a broad-sheet, and hence its 
place in the subsequent annual index, sometimes changing almost daily in the 
process. However, if a reference to a subject or issue in 'The Times' can be found 
it often gives the true flavour of, or a new perspective on, a long-forgotten 
controversy, as well as a valuable pointer to other contemporary publications. 
The risks of history 
In any event and whatever sorts of original material, papers or documents are 
chosen for research, reliance on contemporary records has its own well- 
recognised and inherent dangers. The unpredictable effect of fortuity in what 
does, or does not, survive from the record of the past is always a factor in drawing 
conclusions about historical events, and has already been identified as a particular 
problem for this research. In addition, researchers are bound to have to rely not 
only on what chance provides, but also on that often small section of those 
involved in the events under review who have the habit, inclination or 
responsibility to record what they do, say or see. Their memory, opinions and 
views may be preserved while that of other less well-informed or perhaps less 
literate participants, which may or may not be of greater significance, are simply 
not available. 
But even where the researcher can be confident of the validity and significance of 
a contemporary record he is still faced by a subtle and awkward problem in 
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drawing conclusions about the nature and meaning of the events described, and 
one that applies particularly to this study; that of 'present-mindedness' 
(Commager, 1965). When we look at past events we do so with our present 
eyes. We tend to judge and interpret past actions and decisions from our own 
standpoint rather than from that of the participants! More importantly, we 
cannot do other than to look at the past in the light of our present knowledge of it. 
We often have a range of received opinion on how the events we are looking at 
progressed and turned out and what their consequences were, information and 
conclusions which were not, and could not have been, available to the 
participants. 
Our difficulties in seeing events through the eyes of the participants and our 
privileged knowledge of the outcome of the actions and decisions we are 
considering inevitably colours our interpretation of them, leading, among other 
errors, to a very real danger of 'a post hoc [, ergo) prompter hoc attitude toward 
history', ' a problem of particular relevance to this research. My long involvement 
in the practice of policing, which has been so great an advantage in other aspects 
of my work, is a potent source of potential error in this respect. I have had 
constantly to be on guard against 'present-mindedness' in reaching my 
interpretations and conclusions. In that endeavour, I am especially grateful for 
the support and guidance of my supervisors. 
Particular care in the use of contemporary sources has also been necessary in this 
research because the actions and decisions most closely examined; that is, the 
creation and establishment of the British professional police service in the early 
and mid-nineteenth century, aroused passionate social and political opposition at 
the time. Indeed, four Parliamentary attempts between 1793 and 1822 to 
introduce a disciplined, paid, professional police force into the British criminal 
justice system foundered on formidable reefs of public outrage and vehement 
vested interest. It is unsurprising therefore, that such records and documents as 
are now available for research, even those produced at the time by the most 
detached and dedicated of public servants, were found to reflect the political and 
social sensitivity of the subject matter as well as the prejudices and biases of their 
authors. Both special pleading and partisan political attitudes are detectable in the 
public records examined, and they have had to be treated accordingly. 
8 Collingwood, R. G. (1946) and others 
9 Commager, (1965) page 46 
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Literature on policing 
My primary research decision to return to original sources was reinforced and 
amply justified by an almost immediate discovery. I found that the original 
purpose of professional policing is wrongly stated, widely and authoritatively, in 
the literature on the British police. The definition used, known to generations of 
policing professionals as the 'Primary Objects', is incorrectly attributed to one of 
founding fathers of the modem police service, Richard Mayne. Further, my 
research has now shown that the sentiments expressed in the statement are 
contrary to the quoted source's own publicly recorded views on the issue of the 
purposes of policing. The origins and effects of that double error, together with 
the provenance of the 'Primary Objects', are fully explored in this thesis. 
A consequence of that discovery is that only after, and not before, my analysis of 
original and contemporary records was well advanced was reference made to 
authors and commentators on the history of British policing. Such recourse to 
academic literature and comment then found it, regrettably, to be largely 
unhelpful if not, as Reith predicted, occasionally positively misleading. 
Libraries 
Dealing with the literature on policing posed its own problems. As a part-time 
research student working from home some 100 miles from campus I have, of 
necessity, had to make use of library facilities beyond that provided by my own 
University. In addition to the Pilkington Library at Loughborough, those visited 
with the help of my supervisors and the kind permission of the appropriate 
authorities were; the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the 
London School of Economics (LSE); the Learning Resource Centre at the 
University of Hertfordshire, and the British Library in Euston Road, London, 
where I was granted a Reader's ticket. 
The three University libraries provided a solid base for the sociological aspects of 
my research and for the discussion of the present problems of policing. The 
British Library's comprehensive computerised cataloguing system immediately 
produced some useful support for Reith's complaint that the history of British 
policing is a much neglected subject. A search of the reference material in the 
computer catalogue on the word 'police' produced no less that 10,242 entries. 
Refined to 'metropolitan police' 367 entries remained. Further narrowingto 
$metropolitan police, history' reduces the number to a mere 75, of which only 37 
could make any claim to deal with the origins and development of that 
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organisation, which is the principal subject of the historical part of my research. I 
am informed by my calculator that these figures show that only 0.36% of the 
literature in the British Library on policing relates to the early history and 
development of that most important element of our criminal justice system. My 
hope is that this work may add at least a little to that meagre store. 
Uses of history - the historians view. 
Beyond the risks of error or omission, the broader issue of what reliance can be 
put on even the most accurate and complete record of, or commentary on, the past 
has long been debated. On the one hand a considerable body of historians follow 
what has been described as the 'established professional practice ... of reason and 
rationality ... applied to the 
historical sources"' For this group, 'in the main the 
notion of historical research implies research in primary source material ... without 
primary sources there is no history. "' This 'establishment' school accepts that 
'what is crucial to historical study is the nature of evidence ... This evidence is to 
be found in the sources, relics and traces left by the past. "' 
On the other hand it has been argued that both the historian and his sources are 
necessarily products of the society they inhabit and that therefore, 'The belief in a 
hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the 
interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which is very hard 
toeradicate'. " This' subjectivist' school hold that 'The history we read ... though 
based on facts, is, strictly speaking, not factual at all, but a series of accepted 
judgements. "' 
Both schools of thought accept that the concept of 'facts' in historical research is a 
contentious and ultimately irresolvable issue; a view few would dispute. After 
all, we can never revisit the past in order to check our interpretation of it. Even 
the outcome of historical events is subject to the same caveat as any examination 
of the literature of history will quickly show. Indeed, an inability to test 
interpretations in any objective way is commonly said to distinguish history from 
the natural sciences. The debate among historians is therefore not about whether 
indisputable historical facts do or do not exist, but rather how we should approach 
to Munslow, A. (2002) Where Does History Come From in History Today, VoL 52,3 March 20OZ 
page 18 
11 Marwick, A. (1989) page 199 
12 ibid. page 380 at 4. 
13 Carr, E. H. (1986) page 2 
14 Barraclough, G. (1955) page 14 
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whatever evidence and information we have about the past and what use we can 
make of it. 
Using the already quoted examples, Carr, a principal representative of the 
subjectivist view that 'History ... is a social process, 
in which individuals are 
engaged as social beings', " regards the dual function of historical research as, 'To 
enable man to understand the society of the past and to increase his mastery over 
the society of the present. "' Carr and those who share his opinion therefore 
agree with Lord Acton's remark that, 'History properly so-called can be written 
only by those who find and accept a sense of direction in history itself "' In this 
view it is both possible and appropriate to draw broad generalisations about the 
past nature and future direction of human progress from a study of history. 
By contrast Arthur Marwick well expresses the 'established' view that historical 
research can only be 'an interpretation of the past, one in which a serious effort 
has been made to filter out myth and fable, to ... open up the past, to make the 
past ... known and comprehensible. 
"" Marwick's belief is therefore, that 'there are 
no general laws, is no over-arching theory, in history"' and hence that 'History is 
a very poor predictor of future developments and future events. "" Indeed, and to 
illustrate the breadth and depth of the dispute about the uses of history, a 'post- 
modernist' school of historians " take a separate and extreme line on these 
matters, arguing that since 'History can never reconstruct the past as it actually 
was' its content is (relatively) unimportant and therefore, 'historians ... 
[should 
place] ... 
form (the historical representation of 'history) as prior to content (the 
reality of 'the past')'. " For historians of this school, style and manner of 
presentation is an essence of history which evidence and content can only 
supplement. 
The problem is that none of these views precisely meets the needs of this research 
which seeks to discover whether a connection can be made between the history of 
the development of the British police service and its present problems. Clearly, 
any research method adopted for that purpose will not only need to accommodate 
the divergent views of Carr and Marwick and the post-modernists'rejection of 
is Carr, E. H. (1986) page 49 
16 ibid. 
17 Carr, op cit. page 126 
18 Marwick, A. (1989) page 3 
19 Marwick, op cit. page 380 at 3 
20 Evans, R, in Carr, op cit. Introduction, page xxiv 
21 e. g. Hayden White, Richard Rorty, Keith Jenkins and others. 
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both, but must also provide a link between historical analysis and the solution of 
current social problems. 
The methodological challenge is thus that set out at the beginning of this chapter; 
to draw together and find common ground between the study of history and the 
present methods of the social sciences. Fortunately, a review of the current views 
of historians allows a cautious first step to be taken in that direction by adopting 
Marwick's view that 'both historians and scientists are concerned with 
discovery ... involving rigorous checks of evidence and conclusions. 
"' That step 
is possible because, while it amounts to a rejection of the post-modemist 
approach, it does not totally dismiss Carr's views on the predictive value of 
history, even though his stated purpose was to 'answer ... the foolish remarks of 
Popper, Isaiah Berlin etc. about history' and 'in the name of reason' to reject their 
'[scientific] way of doing things. 924 
The first stage in finding a solution to my methodological difficulties is therefore 
completed by a decision to recognise and accept the common ground between the 
historian and the scientist identified by Marwick, and adopt his evidence and 
outcomes-based approach to the history of the development of British policing. 
On that base, I then propose to examine the Carr-style question of what 
consequences, if any, its history has had for the current organisation, structures, 
culture and behaviour of the professional police service. 
Sociological methods 
Given that decision the next phase in my methodological inquiry must be to 
identify suitable and compatible methods from among those in use by sociologists 
interested in policing. That will encompass a review of the sociological field of 
policing and the research domain in which it can be included; that of organisation 
studies. 
Sociology of policing 
Professor P. A. J. Waddington is both widely experienced in the practice of 
policing and a well-respected and significant British contributor to the sociology 
of the police. He has however, been less than complimentary about the methods 
and approach of others at work in his field. He has said that sociologists 
constantly claim that, 'The police are unfair, they enforce the law partially, 
discriminate against those of low status, violate civil rights, create rather than 
23 Marwick, op citpage 152 at 10 
24 Evans, op cit. page xix 
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prevent crime and are the unwitting dupes, if not the willing accomplices, of 
capitalist oppression. Such is the dominant image of the police which 
sociologists present as fact established by research. "' He adds that, 'In fact, most 
sociologists have not bothered to examine how and why the police act as they 
do ... for many sociologists the aim 
is not to understand the police but to bring 
them into disrepute. "" 
The latter part of Professor Waddington's comments on his sociological 
colleagues is of particular interest. It shows that the sociology of the police, as it 
is commonly practised, has characteristics in common with the study of history. 
Professor Waddington clearly considers that a major (or the) purpose of social 
research in his field is the anthropological objective of 'understanding' policing, 
i. e. to observe, describe and report policing activity with the object of informing 
both the researcher and his readers. In this view of his subject matter 
Waddington is supported by Sir Karl R. Popper whose broader opinion is that, 
'Today ... sociology has resigned 
itself more and more to becoming one element 
within social anthropology; that is, the social anthropology of a very specific 
form 
of society - of the highly industrialised Western 
European. "' and that, 'The 
former theoretical sociologist ... must be 
happy to find employment as a 
fieldworker ... his 
function is to observe and describe the totems and taboos of the 
white natives of the Western European countries and of the United States. 
"" 
Using Popper's social anthropological perspective it is possible to divide writers 
on policing into two categories. One group, the larger, attempts to describe the 
role and functions of police officers in some way or from a particular perspective, 
and then to explain how and why those roles and functions are, or are not, carried 
out. " On the other hand sociologists whom Popper might wish to describe as 
having an inclination toward field-work generally adopt a 'fly-on-the-wall' or 
'participant-observer' stance in order to discover what the police actually do, 
rather than what they claim (or are supposed, or are suspected) to be doing. "' I 
should say at once that, while this Popperian categorisation may be illuminating 
and even instructive the reader should not put too much weight or reliance on it. 
25 Waddington, PAJ (1983), page 1 
26 ibid page 15 
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Some writers will fall into both categories if their whole output is considered 
(Professor Waddington is an example). And I suspect that few, if any, of the 
authors mentioned will necessarily either accept Popper's view or the use made of 
it here. 
All that is implied by this tentative exercise in methodological classification is 
that while it is to be expected that sociologists of the police will share Marwick's 
view of the value of scientific methods, some objective support exists for 
Popper's contention that a social anthropological perspective will cover the 
majority of their research into policing. Unfortunately, that approach has too 
much in common with the 'interpretation' purposes of historians to supply the 
necessary present-day, problem-solving, element required to meet the needs of my 
research. 
Organization studies 
Turning then to the broader field of social enquiry into which policing can be set, 
i. e. the study of organisations, it can be said at once that the police service clearly 
satisfies the definition of an organization used by Blau, P. in his influential 1974 
work, 'On the Nature of Organizations', i. e. 'The defining criterion of a formal 
organisation - or an organisation for short - is the existence of procedures for 
mobilising and co-ordinating the efforts of various, usually specialized, sub- 
groups in the pursuit ofjoint objectives. "' Equally, the police service accords 
with Thompson's view of 'the organisation as a problem-facing and problem- 
solving phenomenon. "' 
- paradigms and incommensurability 
Regrettably however, the diversity of methodologies now in use within 
organisation studies, and the specificity of their application presents an 
immediately identifiable obstacle to their use in this research. For example, the 
Handbook on Organisation Studies lists at least six, and possibly as many as 
sixteen, differing 'paradigms' in current use in the study of organisations 
33 depending on how that concept is defined. The problem is that there is little, if 
any, common ground between the various paradigms. Responding, it would 
seem, to the combined (but not joint) influence of Kuhn, T. (1970) and 
Feyerabend, P (1974) sociologists of organisations have argued that each of the 
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paradigms that have emerged in their field are not simply different approaches to 
the same subject but amount to a separate and distinct 'scientific revolution'. As 
such, the methodology arising from such revolutions 'is not only incompatible but 
actually incommensurable with that which had gone before. "" It is therefore 
argued that there can be no compatibility, and indeed no reliable communication, 
between the various 'paradigms' in the study of organizations. 
Moreover, 'we are unlikely to find a "solution" to the "problem" of paradigm 
incommensurability. Even if we did find a "solution", there is no guarantee that 
it would be accepted; not if it let down the defences that some individuals believe 
necessary to protect "alternative" work. So, for those reasons we do not believe 
the paradigm debate can be resolved. ... The genie is out of the 
bottle. "' Indeed, 
the diversity and proliferation of theoretical paradigms, coupled with the spread of 
the view that they are incommensurate has, in recent times, reached the point at 
which 'a plethora of alternative approaches' to the study of organizations 
has 
gemerged which directly challenge the supremacy of functionalism and normal 
science. "'. 
The 'paradigmic' approach is not confined to the study of organisations. It is also 
identifiable in the sociology of policing. In his 'Conduct Unbecoming: A Social 
Construction of Police Deviance and Control. ' Maurice Punch says, 'Underlying 
my selection of data and my interpretation of material for this study 
is a 
theoretical perspective ... Working within the 
Symbolic Interactionist 'paradigm' 
my approach particularly builds upon and extends those authors who adopt an 
interactionist perspective on the police. "' 
- methodological proliferation. 
While it would seem that Kuhn and Feyerabend both propose a concept of 
'incommensurability' as between the paradigms of organizational studies, 
Feyerabend is individually responsible for promoting and encouraging an 
unrestrained proliferation in the wider field of the methods and theories of the 
social sciences. In an essay published after Feyerabend's death in 1994, Paul 
Hayningen-Huene credits Feyerabend with this development saying, 
'The weakness of a theory ... may only appear if facts as seen from an 
alternative theory are allowed. This idea is the core of Feyerabend's view 
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of the necessity of theory proliferation. If it is the case that theories are 
mainly testable through reciprocal confrontation, then his (Feyerabend's) 
empiricist persuasion demands that alternative theories should be at one's 
disposal. ' "' 
When coupled with Kuhn's concept of 'incommensurability' the effect on the 
sociologists of organizations and others engaged in social research is apparent and 
has already been described. It is, indeed, in full accord with Feyerabend's own 
preferred methodological slogan, 'Anything goes! ' 
It must be clear from the preceding discussion that there is little or no common 
ground between the various methodological 'paradigms' of organisation studies, 
and that to select one will raise objection, or even rejection, by every other. As 
Jackson and Carter (199 1) put it, 'What it (incommensurability) implies is that 
each paradigm must, logically, develop separately, pursuing its own problematic 
and ignoring those of other paradigms as paradigmally invalid. "' Paradamic 
incommensurability and methodological proliferation thus stand in the way of 
attempts to find common ground among those engaged in organisation studies. 
That being so, it must surely also preclude any attempt to establish a link with 
other academic disciplines, including therefore the study of history even if it is of 
a 'scientific' kind. 
Popper and the scientific method 
Thankfully, despite the disappointments just described, my review of the methods 
used in the sociology of policing and in organisation studies eventually pointed 
me in a more fruitful direction and toward Sir Karl R. Popper. His views had 
come to my attention in two different contexts. First in the discussion of Carr's 
views on the uses of history, and second as a methodological source for Blau's 
study of organisations. In following up on those two contacts with Popper I 
discovered that he had delivered a lecture in Oxford in November, 1967 in which 
he discussed the possibility of drawing social scientific hypotheses from historical 
data. Significantly for my purposes he had said on that occasion that, 'all those 
historians and philosophers of history who insist on the gulf between history and 
the natural sciences have a radically mistaken idea of the natural sciences. '" 
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Popper's view in his lecture was that in the interpretation of history 'you have to 
start from a problem', and that 'A historical document, like a scientific 
observation, is a document relative to a historical problem. And like ... [a 
scientific] ... observation, it has to be interpreted. '41 He suggested that a scientific 
historian should attempt 'to reconstruct the problem situation in which the acting 
person finds himself, and to show how and why his action constituted a solution 
to the problem as he saw it., 4' This 'situational analysis ... [approach]... permits 
the critical discussion of our tentative solutions - of our attempts to reconstruct 
the situation ... this ... is indeed, ... much ... the actual methods of the natural 
sciences. "" Popper also specifically accepted that, 'in the social 
sciences ... situational analysis can sometimes 
be provided by historical research'" 
Popper's lecture seems precisely to address the area of my interest, i. e. the 
common ground between historians and social scientists. At first sight his 
6 situational logic and analysis' methods should provide a complete answer to my 
methodological difficulties. They are claimed to be entirely appropriate to a study 
of the history, including therefore the development, of British professional 
policing, and are equally acceptable as legitimate in the social sciences. However 
and on closer examination, Popper's methods are not as unproblematic as they 
appear. A major problem had to be addressed before they could properly be 
applied to my purposes. 
Science as a method 
Popper's is a scientific method and although science is recognised and accepted as 
appropriate and applicable among sociologists, including those working in the 
field of policing, it is not so readily acceptable among historians. While 
'establishment' figures can be found to say 'that scientific method is the approach 
to be followed in doing history', "' they share with the generality of historians 
grave doubts about its full application to their subject-matter. 
On this issue Popper talks in his Oxford lecture of history being properly 
concerned with 'interesting historical problems ... if we want to understand the 
world in which we live', " and of the historian being required, 'to give objective 
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arguments in support of his situational analysis. "' He claims in his lecture to 
have solved 'the problem of historical relativism', in that in situational analysis 
'There is no criterion of truth. But there is something like a criterion of 
error ... 
knowledge can grow through the critical elimination of error. This is how 
we get nearer the truth'. "" But a careful reading of his script also shows that, 
while he advocates scientific objectivity in historical research, he does not 
specifically describe or discuss how the validity of historical conclusions or 
interpretations maybe objectively tested. By that omission he left unanswered 
the view of many historians of all schools of thought that a scientific approach to 
history is ultimately impossible for that reason. 
Nevertheless and on the other hand, he did accept that there was no objection to 
the use of historical data as the source of his situational analysis. And he also 
recognised the possibility that; 
'many [historical] conjectures that may appear to us to be true at one stage 
may be discovered at a later stage to be erroneous. New documents may 
force us to reinterpret old documents. Or they may raise new problems"" 
of interpretation. And it is that view of the relationship between historical 
evidence and the conjectures that can be drawn from it, coupled with his other 
views on the role of criticism in the elimination of error which provides, I suggest, 
the common ground with Marwick and 'established' historians on which I can 
develop an approach to my research that will resolve my methodological 
difficulties. 
Sources and Methods - conclusion 
In this research I shall apply Popper's 'situational logic and analysis' to 
Marwick's 'established' view that a rational examination of the 'evidence ... to be 
found in the sources' is the correct approach to the study and interpretation of 
history. I shall then add an element of testable objectivity to the combined 
methodology by formulating my findings and conclusions in such a way as will 
allow those responsible for social policy to apply them to a reform or restructure 
of present-day policing whose outcome and consequences can be observed, 
examined and above all, criticised. My proposals for police reform will therefore 
be open to ajudgement of validity on the basis of whether or not they resolve the 
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problems to which they are addressed. In effect, the findings and conclusions of 
my historical research will give rise to proposals for police reform that will 
amount to predictions of the outcome of future events and thus be open, at least in 
theory, to objective criticism and assessment both by the academic community 
and by policing policy makers and practitioners. 
By this means I am able to find myself in agreement with Steuer that, 
'Political decisions, and the public policies which result in them, are often 
based on little more that hunch and guesswork, combined with political bias 
... Policies on such matters as crime, housing and immigration, with serious 
social consequences, are often plucked out of the air, with no apparent 
effort made either to draw on existing knowledge, or to investigate before 
acting ... It is possible to do better by adopting a scientific approach to social 
questions. "' 
Thankfully, the common or layman's conception of a scientific approach is 
adequate and acceptable for my purposes; i. e. what T. H. Huxley once called 
'nothing but trained and organized common sense', " and Popper describes as 
'the method of trial and the elimination of error'. "' That is so because, pace both 
Hume and Popper, " the epistemological issue of the validity of the inductive 
methods of science remains, by common consent, unresolved. " Science, as it is 
commonly practised and understood, therefore remains the most widely 
recognised and accepted way of finding solutions to problems both within and, 
importantly for my purposes, beyond the academic community. 
I should make it clear however, that I do not claim, at this stage, that my methods 
will apply in any context other than this research, or that they have any wider 
significance. In particular I do not say that this thesis constitutes or contains a 
'scientific history' of British policing. That is an enterprise far beyond the scope 
of this work. 
But, put briefly, my methods will: 
a) be scientific to tile extent that they are based on empirical evidence and 
observation and apply 'situational logic and analysis' to an identifiable 
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issue or problem; " that is, 'What we have to do... [is] to reconstruct the 
problem situation in which the acting person finds himself, and to show 
how and why his action constituted a solution of the problem as he saw 
it. "" By this approach, 'science is much more like history than historians 
think. "'? 
b) result in findings and conclusions formulated in a way that will allow 
reasoned and critical examination of them by others active or interested in 
the field; that is, 'What may be called the method of science ... is ... the 
critical discussion and the critical examination of our theories. "" and that, 
,... what we vaguely call the objectivity of science and the rationality of 
science are merely aspects of the critical discussion of scientific theories. ' 
and, 
c) produce recommendations for social change or action that will be open to 
critical testing by; 
i) the discovery of historical or other objective evidence that contradicts or 
is incompatible with my findings or conclusions; and/or 
ii) a comparison between the predicted effect of any proposals for social 
change arising from my findings and conclusions and their actual 
outcome. 
Given these criteria I suggest that common ground and a viable connection 
between a study of the history of policing and solutions to its present problems is 
established for the purposes of this research - which is the identified 
methodological requirement. 
Submission 
In the preparation of this thesis my subject and my purposes have led me away 
from other, perhaps more complex and specific, methodologies toward an 
historiographical modification of Popper's simpler and more practical critical 
rational, falsificationist scientific methods. The approach that I have developed 
is no better expressed than in some remarks made by Popper in July 1948 during a 
lecture entitled 'Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition' delivered to the Third 
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Annual Conference of the Rationalist Press Association at Magdalen College, 
Oxford. While discussing the wider issue of the methods of the social sciences as 
a whole he said; 
'It is the task of social theory to explain how the unintended consequences 
of our intentions and actions arise, and what kind of consequences arise if 
people do this that or the other thing in a certain social situation. Anditis, 
especially, the task of the social sciences to analyse in this way the 
existence and functioning of institutions (such as police forces or insurance 
companies or schools or governments) and of social collectives (such as 
states or nations or classes or other social groups). "" 
The account of my research begins with a re-examination and new analysis of the 
processes by which British professional policing came to be involved in the 
problems of crime and criminality and so gradually emerged in its modem form. 
It concludes with an examination of the major, and apparently insoluble, problems 
that are identified as the legacy of that early history. To the extent that I suggest 
that the contemporary problems of policing are only seemingly insoluble, and that 
a scientific approach to the history and foundations of British policing will show 
how those problems may finally and permanently be resolved, this thesis has the 
potential to make a significant contribution both to the body of knowledge on, and 
to the methods used in the study of, its subject-matter. It is presented for 
consideration on that basis. 
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Foundations of Professional Policin 
Professional policing became a permanent part of the British social scene in 1829. 
On 29th. September that year Robert Peel's Metropolitan Police Act brought his 
New Police to the streets of London for the first time. Some 1000 uniformed 
policemen began to patrol five London Divisions in their distinctive dark-blue 
swallow tail uniforms and reinforced top hats. ' But what were they there to do? 
What was Parliament's purpose in introducing this new element into the criminal 
justice system? 
Peel's New Police 
There had been demands in Parliament for improvements in the system of 
policing for the capital going back to 1770. In that year the first Parliamentary 
Committee sat and reported on the problems faced by the metropolis. But, 
neither its Report and recommendations, nor those of similar committees in 1793, 
1812,1817 and 1822 resulted in any action. 
At 3prn in the afternoon of Wednesday 15'h April 1829 the Home Secretary, 
Robert Peel, rose in the House of Commons to speak in support of his Metropolis 
Police Improvement Bill. The consummate politician knew that although 
opposition to his Bill lay mainly outside the House it was also strong within it. 
Anti-government feeling was high in the aftermath of the passage of his Catholic 
Emancipation Act, which had received royal assent just two days earlier. Peel 
had had to steer the Bill through a stormy passage in the Commons. He then 
watched his Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, perform the same duty in an 
acrimonious two day debate in the Lords. Against that background any proposal 
to tackle the anarchic condition of the policing of the nation's capital was likely to 
attract fierce public opposition. Resistance was particularly strong amongst the 
Government's political opponents in the Anti-Catholic League. Their fear was; 
'that the Duke of Wellington's military government was about to 
introduce into England the despotic police of the continental states, with 
all the detestable details of espionage and domestic interference. " 
In the preceding few days a pamphlet entitled 'An Address to the King' had been 
circulating. Amongst other things it, 
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'called on George IV 'to awake in the name of eternal God, and rally his 
people round his throne' because a plot had been formed to set aside the 
House of Hanover, and raise the Duke of Wellington to the throne by the 
aid of the Irish Catholics about to be enrolled in the new police. "' 
Peel recognised that powerful sections of the public opposed his proposals for a 
gnew police'. Yet, on the other hand, years of agitation about the safety of 
London's citizens had unsettled their representatives in the House of Commons. 
The riotous disturbances that had bedevilled the debate on Catholic emancipation 
had crystallised that concern. Members of Parliament had seen too much of the 
inability of the existing police authorities to keep good order in the capital. Peel 
judged that a sufficient number of them were now finally in a mood to support 
positive action. 
Select Committee of 1828 
The committee which Peel had appointed in 1828 to consider the problems of 
policing in the metropolis had reached much the same broad conclusion as all its 
many predecessors! There was a clear need for urgent, drastic reform. In 
contrast to the fate of all previous reports however, events now conspired to make 
the mood of the House receptive to the idea of change. In opening his address 
Peel gently touched on those events. He said that; 
'he was desirous, now that the attention of the house and the public was 
no longer directed to a subject which had so long excited the warmest 
feeling and the most anxious solicitude of all classes of his majesty's 
subjects, both Catholic and Protestant, of leading the House to the 
consideration of a topic of considerable interest as respected the 
preservation of the rights of property, as well as the protection of the 
persons of his majesty's subjects, " 
by which he meant the 'existing police establishment for the prevention of crime 
as well as its detection. " 
Reporting the findings of the 1828 Select Committee that he had established, Peel 
said, 
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'It had been pretty clearly ascertained that it was altogether unsafe, and 
that it had been so for a long period, to commit the care of the lives and 
properties of the people of the metropolis and its vicinity to the charge of 
the parochial watch, during that part of the twenty four hours which 
constituted the object of their very lax and inefficient protection. " 
Peel knew that the report of his own committee that lay before the House was not 
enough to ensure he would carry the Commons with him. Many members of 
Parliament shared the popular opinion that the emancipation of Catholics and the 
creation of a new police for London were two parts of the same government plot 
to destroy the ancient liberties and privileges of the British nation. So, in 
introducing his Bill to the House Peel was careful to say that; 
'He might rest his case on the report of the [1828] police committee 
which lay on the table, and which clearly showed the necessity of some 
alteration in the existing means for the prevention and detection of crime; 
but he thought it would be more satisfactory to the House and the public, 
to state generally the grounds on which he felt himself imperatively called 
upon to induce the House to abandon the present system of protecting 
property and guarding the safety of the person. " 
Crime in 1829 
Having begun by identifying crime as his target he turned to statistics to reinforce 
his case. There were no databases or complex government information gathering 
systems in 1829. Information on levels of crime and rates of detection of 
offenders was of dubious value, and kept only fitfully by local authorities. Its 
connection with the real situation was tenuous, and its value in political or social 
decision-making questionable. ' 
In the absence of any proven or reliable source of information on levels of crime, 
the 1828 Committee had decided to use the records of tile numbers of persons 
committed to prison in each of the court areas in England and Wales during the 
decade up to 1828. Their reasoning was that the number of committals to prison 
made by a court depended upon, and was therefore some measure of, the number 
of active criminals living in that court's area. Peel told Parliament that these 
primitive statistics showed that 'the proportion which the number of 
criminals ... 
bore to the population' in London and Middlesex was 'not less than 
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one person in every three hundred and eighty-three'. For the entire population of 
England and Wales the figure was much lower and was 'found to be one criminal 
in every eight hundred and twenty-two. "' 
He rejected the possibility that the disproportionate number of criminals found in 
London and Middlesex was a consequence of growth in the population of that 
area. He reported that, 
'the result of a comparison between the rate of increase of population and 
the rate of increase of crime in the metropolis showed that the former was 
not in proportion to, and could not account for, the great increase in the 
latter; for there was an increase of forty-one per cent in the number of 
committals in 1828 over 1821; while there was an increase of population 
of only fifteen and a half percent. "' 
In contrast the figures for England and Wales showed that committals from the 
criminal courts increased by twenty-six per cent and population by eleven and a 
half per cent over the same period. " 
Unreliability of Crime Statistics 
Regrettably, though Peel and his fellow members of Parliament did not know it, 
the information they were using was worthless. The 1839 Royal Commission on 
the Establishment of a Constabulary Force made that discovery ten years after 
these events. The Royal Commissioners then reported that: 
'At the beginning of (our] enquiry it became evident to us that the returns 
of the number of persons prosecuted or convicted, which in the reasonings 
in Parliament are usually assumed as correct indications of the state of 
crime within any district, cannot be relied upon for that purpose. "' 
Even without the benefit of that hindsight, Peel's use of these statistics in the early 
part of his speech still looks odd, especially when his later remarks on the subject 
are considered. Toward the end of his speech Peel returned to these numbers to 
report that, taking England and Wales as a whole and despite an increase in 
population, the total number of committals in had actually fallen comparing 1827 
with 1828 (from 17,921 to 16,556). Indeed, the fall in some areas was 'very 
remarkable'. In Lancashire there had been 2457 committals in 1827 and only 
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448 in 1828. " In fact, by 1828 the level of committals for some felonies in 
England and Wales was below that reported at the beginning of the century. " But 
perhaps we should be charitable and assume that Peel's Committee did not pursue 
their enquiries far or long enough to discover those less helpful facts. 
For whatever reason Peel did not dwell too long on these statistical points but 
quickly moved back to his main theme. He repeated that the overall decrease in 
committals across the country reported by his Committee was in strong contrast to 
the situation in the metropolis of London. 
Peel and the causes of crime 
As to the causes of 'this frightful difference between the increase of crime and 
the increase in population' in the metropolis he said that; 
'Many intelligent gentlemen, who took an interest in the subject, had 
endeavoured to investigate and determine those causes; but he must still 
say - and he spoke in the presence of many hon. Members who had taken 
an active part in the police committee - without having arrived at any 
satisfactory conclusions to the real nature of those causes. "' 
The House would have known that Peel was among the 'many hon. Members' 
who had been active in this field in the past. Six years earlier he had been 
Chairman of the 1822 immediate predecessor of the 1828 Committee whose 
Report he was now presenting to the House. But earlier failures to identify the 
causes of crime, including his own, did not deter Peel from exercising the 
privilege many of his successors in the Home Department have also found 
difficult to resist. He offered the House his own views on the reasons for an 
increase in criminality. He thought perhaps, 
'that the mechanical improvements which so much distinguished the 
country, and were a great source of its prosperity, so aided the 
perpetrators of crime, by enabling them to travel a great distance in a few 
hours, and to use great caution in the selection of time and manner, that 
the means of detection were very much lessened. "" 
This is a factor all earlier commentators, including Peel himself as chairman of the 
1822 Select Committee, had apparently overlooked. Wisely perhaps, Peel did not 
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explore precisely how he thought 'mechanical improvements' might cause a 
disproportional increase in committals to prison from the London criminal courts. 
Had he done so he might have raised some uncomfortable questions in the minds 
of his listeners. Such as, what proportion of those committed to prison from the 
London courts were, in fact, not residents of the capital? It will be remembered 
that Peel's earlier use of statistics on levels of crime rested on the assumption that 
those committed to prison from an area were resident in it. That would clearly 
not sit comfortably with the view Peel now put forward as to the cause of the 
disproportionate increase in crime in the capital 
The parochial authorities 
With the detachment of an historical perspective, Peel's attempt to use an increase 
in crime to justify his proposals for a reform of the policing of the capital looks 
very weak. He was however, in great need both of this foray into criminal 
statistics and his highly selective interpretation of them. Without a crime wave in 
the capital he could not have laid much of the blame for it on 'the very 
unsatisfactory state of that branch of our police which was chiefly controlled by 
the parochial authorities! Despite there being in reality no reliable evidence, 
statistical or otherwise, either for the existence of an increase in crime or, for that 
matter, the conclusion he was now about to draw, Peel announced himself 
satisfied that, 'so long as the present night watch system was persisted in, there 
would be no efficient police prevention of crime, nor any satisfactory protection 
for property or the person. "" 
It is difficult, even now, to see quite how he managed to reconcile those 
comments with the apparent fall in committals between 1827 and 1828, which had 
obviously occurred under the system he was criticising. Or how he dealt in his 
own mind with the remarkable success achieved by the Lancashire parochial 
authorities using the traditional methods. 
A plea for co-ordination 
There is some evidence that he was, in fact, not entirely comfortable with his own 
argument. In a style that the modern reader might recognise, Peel tried to 
neutralise, in advance, any attack on his crime statistics or mention of examples of 
success by the existing watch system. He did so bya politician's ruse. Heasked 
a leading question in order to get his retaliation in first and so steer the debate in 
Is ibid page 872 
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the direction he wanted. To forestall any mention of examples of falling crime or 
the achievements of the Lancashire parochial authorities he said, 
'What advantage from a general point of view could be derived from one 
well regulated district, surrounded by five or six neighbouring parishes in 
which no attempts had been made to remedy the present inefficient 
watch-houses systemT 
To which contrived conundrum he provided his own answer: 
'Would not the necessary effect be to drive the thieves and robbers from 
the protected parish into those parishes on its skirts on which the 
authorities were indifferent about providing efficient security for the 
property &c., contained in it? "' 
But his ruse will not bear critical examination. Peel's is an argument many 
modem police officers, criminologists and other social commentators will 
recognise. It is a standard criticism of crime prevention schemes called 'the 
displacement effect'. Modem detractors of crime prevention initiatives 
commonly argue that the only consequence of suppressing crime of one type or in 
one area is to cause an increase in other crimes or elsewhere. While this may be 
a widely held view, the exact processes of the effect, and even its existence, are 
still subject of dispute today. In Peel's time, and from the crime figures on 
which he depended, the displacement effect he predicted could neither be 
detected nor measured in any satisfactory way. 
By now however, Peel's speech was moving on from the task of generating fear 
of crime among MPs and toward his true objective - the need for uniformity and 
integration in policing. His 'displacement' argument was essential to that 
objective despite there being no solid evidence in his speech to support it. 
Where Peel was leading honourable Members was toward the, 
'conclusion which every one who had inquired into our present watch 
house system must arrive at ... The chief requisite of an efficient police 
were unity and responsibility of its agents - both of which where not only 
not ensured by the present parochial watch-house system, but were 
actually prevented by it. "' 
19 ibid pages 872-873 
20 ibid page 8 72 
Foundations 38 
In the absence of any facts or argument to justify this proposal, he resorted once 
more to the device of a leading question. 'Could there, then, be any unity of 
design under such a systemT His answer was, 'Certainly not; nor responsibility 
until all the parochial police was concentrated under one responsible and efficient 
head. "' 
The Watch House system 
At this point in his speech it becomes clear that Peel's real target is not crime 
itself but rather London's version of the 'watch and ward' system established in 
the reign of Edward I by the Statute of Winchester of 1285. That Act required 
that, in all 'great towns being walled' the inhabitants 'shall watch the town 
continually all night. $22 
Later Acts of Elizabeth I, and George's Il and 111, amended and added further 
provisions to the statute to enable householders in urban areas to avoid 'watch and 
ward' duty by paying a rate into a fund to provide substitutes. This was the 
system whose image was (and largely still is) of drunkards, sluggards and other 
inadequate characters forming a wholly ineffective parish watch system in every 
city in nineteenth century England, including the capital itself. However, there 
were many at the time (and some since, e. g. Emsley, C. (199 1)) who took a 
contrary view of the effectiveness of the 'watch', which is perhaps why Peel 
produced no evidence to support the dismissive assertions he made about it in his 
speech. 
But the main difficulty Peel had in launching his attack on the capital's watch 
system is that none of the Committees he mentioned, including the 1822 
Committee whose chair he had occupied, had proposed either to do away with the 
existing parochial watch, or to 'unify' policing. Only his latest 1828 Committee 
had done so. As subsequent commentators have noted, 'Except for the select 
committee of 1828 ... none of the other committees called for any drastic change 
in the parish system. "' Peel was therefore in grave danger of misleading the 
House by suggesting that all previous committees 'must' also have reached the 
conclusion that policing in the capital be united. They had clearly done no such 
thing, as Peel himself well knew. 
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In particular, the 1822 immediate predecessor of the 1828 Committee had, under 
Peel's chairmanship, also 'inquired into the State of Police of the Metropolis"" 
and had then expressed strong reservations about any radical alteration to the 
existing parish-based system. After noting the admitted flaws of the existing 
arrangements the Committee had said that: 
'If a new system of police were to be constructed ab initio for the 
regulation of a great city, such defects would no doubt be remedied; but 
Your Committee have the satisfaction of thinking that, constituted as the 
present system is, the obstruction to public justice and to the maintenance 
of the peace exists practically in a much less degree than might have been 
apprehended, and certainly not to that degree which would warrant them 
in recommending any fundamental change in it. "' 
Mr. Chairman Peel and his 1822 Committee nevertheless recommended that the 
various uniformed patrols employed by the magistrates' offices of the capital and 
those maintained by the parochial authorities be better integrated and co- 
ordinated. To that end they proposed that the existing day patrols and nightly 
watch of the metropolis be brought 'under the same superintendence'. 
But the 1822 Committee was also careful to say that, 'each [magistrates] office 
should undertake the duty of patrolling its own district', only then adding that, 
'Your Committee are of opinion, however, in order that the several 
offices of police may have full information on what passes with their 
respective districts, that there ought to be a full and unreserved 
communication between the Magistrates and the officers under whose 
superintendence the patrol is placed. "' 
This is a structure of general oversight and good communication between the 
various policing units in the capital that would certainly help to improve the 
preventive impact of their existing system of patrols. It is a proposal however, 
that falls far short of Peel's proposal for a 'unity' of policing. 
In addition, the 1822 Committee significantly reinforced their cautious approach 
to reform later in their Report. In relation to the other main element of the 
policing arrangements for London, i. e. the magistrates offices modelled on the 
innovations introduced by the Fieldings at Bow Street and the officers they 
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appointed and directly employed in patrolling and in the investigation and 
detection of reported crime, the Committee said that, 
'After a full enquiry into and consideration to the state of the several 
police offices (in the metropolis), Your Committee are not disposed to 
submit any important changes in their establishments. "' 
Any remaining doubts about the conservative approach of the 1822 Select 
Committee must disappear in the face of the careful caveat it added to its final 
recommendations. In an important paragraph that well expresses widely felt 
reservations about the reforms Peel was subsequently to propose in his Metropolis 
Police Improvement Bill of 1829, the 1822 Committee said that, 
'It is difficult to reconcile an effective system of police with that perfect 
freedom of action and exemption from interference which are the great 
privileges and blessing of society in this country and your committee feel 
that the forfeiture or curtailment of such advantages would be too great a 
sacrifice for improvements in police, or facilities in detection of crime, 
however desirable in themselves if abstractly considered. "' 
Peel and the London magistrates 
Even Peel's one sure supporter in his call for unity in policing, the 1828 
Committee that he had appointed, was less than totally committed to the idea of a 
single professional police force for London. On that issue it was not too far from 
the position adopted by the 1822 Committee. It recommended the establishment 
of a single head office for the police but it framed its proposals to tread very 
carefully around the powers and responsibilities of the magistrates of the 
metropolis, thus; 
'Your Committee is fully aware of the difficulty of interfering with the 
discretion of Magistrates in the performance of any duties of a strictly 
judicial nature.... 
But the Police Magistrate, in a great city, may be considered as an 
executive as well as ajudicial officer, and one of the chief advantages of 
the establishment of a head Office of Police would consist, in the opinion 
of Your Committee, in its possessing a general superintending authority 
in matters ofPolice, which should remedy the inconvenience that at 
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present results for the independent and unconnected action of the several 
Police Offices. "' 
Most significantly, the 1828 Committee decided that they should therefore 
'Abstain from entering into a consideration of the detailed Regulations which 
should be formed for the constitution and management of the new Police 
Department. "" 
It is clear then, that even the 1828 Committee did not see its proposals as 
sweeping away, or even unifying, the existing policing arrangements of the 
capital. Like all its predecessors including that led by Peel himself, it was careful 
not to trespass on the responsibilities of the magistrates and the officers they 
employed to assist them in carrying out their judicial duties. TheCommittee 
identified the patrolling element in the policing of the metropolis, and in 
particular, the parochial night-time 'watch and ward' as its principal target for 
reform. Of all the Select Committees that had considered the issue that of 1828 
alone recommended that these elements be brought under a single head, but then 
only in a 'superintending' capacity. 
To do full justice to Peel, a forensic reading of his speech to the House shows that 
he did not quite say that all earlier committees on the policing of the capital had 
concluded that 'unity and responsibility of its agents' was the prerequisite of an 
efficient police for the metropolis. He very carefully referred only to the day and 
night time patrols existing in the capital, and even then said that that was the 
conclusion which those committees 'must arrive at' not that they had actually 
done so. 
Adding together the doubts about the validity and consistency of Peel's 
description of a crime wave in the capital; his unsupported assertions of the 
inefficiency of the existing watch arrangements; and his misrepresentation of the 
conclusions reached by the Select Committees that had examined the problems of 
policing the metropolis, the real background to Peel's Metropolis Police 
Improvement Bill can perhaps be glimpsed. The truth seems to be that the 
necessity for unity and responsibility in policing in the capital was not a 
conclusion to be drawn from the growth of crime, nor had it been reached by the 
many committees appointed by the House. It is much more likely to have been a 
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decision Peel himself made, perhaps with the active encouragement of his 
advisers and Home Office officials. 
Peace Preservation Police 
It is highly likely that Peel's experience during his earlier period in government as 
Chief Secretary to Ireland influenced his thinking on the policing of the 
metropolis. He entered Parliament in 1809 and, after a short spell as Under 
Secretary for War went to Ireland as Chief Secretary in 1812, where he spent six 
years. In June 1814 he introduced into the House of Commons a 'Bill to provide 
for the better execution of the laws in Ireland' that proposed, 
'to create salaried [Dublin] Castle controlled police forces as needed in 
disturbed districts in Ireland ... [for which] ... All costs were to be paid by 
ratepayers in the disturbed areas. "' 
These new bodies became known as the Peace Preservation Police. They were 
put under the control and direction of the magistrates in troubled areas to assist 
them to restore order and then to keep the peace. Peel's experience in Ireland 
must surely have come to his aid in dealing with the troublesome disorder of the 
metropolis. It is almost certainly true that, 
'the actual organisation of the Metropolitan Police probably owes as 
much to Peel's experience in Ireland and to the Peace Preservation Forces 
there ... as to anything else. "' 
Peel as Reformer 
On the available evidence it is reasonable to conclude that Peel always meant his 
Metropolis Police Improvement Bill to apply a unified professional body of paid 
constables along the model of the Peace Preservation Police to the safety and 
good order of London. His speech to the House in support of his Bill reveals that 
he meant to substitute them for the disorganised and disreputable rabble of locally 
appointed watch and ward. The importance of this explanation for Peel's 
approach to the reform of policing is that it shows his proposals were not the 
revolutionary approach subsequently widely attributed to him He did not intend 
radically to alter the system of crime prevention, detection and prosecution in the 
capital, but merely to reform one failed part of it - the parochial watch and ward. 
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This is most immediately apparent from his concern not to interfere with or 
disturb the prerogative of the London magistrates to inquire into reports of crimes 
and to employ their own officers to pursue and apprehend criminal offenders. 
Those functions were to remain the preserve of the magistrates and their officers. 
Indeed, if there can be any doubt about Peel's intentions in this respect in 1829, 
10 Geo. 4 cap. 45 must dispel them. That Act emanated from his Home 
Department and passed into law on the same day (I 9th June 1829) as his 
Metropolitan Police Act. Its purpose was to continue unchanged for yet another 
three years the Police Offices Act which was the successor to the original 1792 
Middlesex Justices Act. Parliamentarians thereby preserved and continued all the 
rights, status and privileges of the magistrates of the police offices of the 
metropolis, and the patrolling and plain clothes detective off jeers they employed, 
at the very moment they introduced the New Police. 
Peel's address in support of his Metropolis Police Improvement Bill is not a call 
for a revolution in policing. Nor is it an attempt to launch a campaign against 
crime and criminality despite his reliance on criminal statistics in the early part of 
his argument. Rather it is a politician's speech, resonant with demands that 
someone or something other than the confusion of parish authorities should take 
responsibility for the burden of protecting property and persons in the capital from 
harm, and for preventing outbreaks of crime and disorder. 
'One Head Presiding' 
Peel exposes his true unifying and central ising intent later in his speech. Inan 
unguarded moment, when speaking extemporaneously in response to a question 
from a Mr. Bernal, Peel ignored the reservations even of his own 1828 Committee 
and admitted that to, 
'effect the objects in view .... It was .... absolutely necessary that there 
should be but one head presiding over and directing the operations of this 
new police. "' 
By his 'principle of unity and responsibility' Peel went far beyond his view when 
chairman of the 1822 Select Committee. He did not mean to stop at a co- 
ordinating administrative layer over the existing watch and ward arrangements of 
the parochial authorities. His purpose was to replace the whole system with a 
unified body of police patrols for the capital. In future, those in charge of the 
New Police would have the duty to prevent crime and disorder, and protect 
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citizens and their property in the metropolis, rather than those responsibilities 
being lost in a bewildering confusion of local parish jurisdictions. 
Peel went on to brush aside the few comments and questions asked by Members, 
some of them marvellously ill-judged and misinformed, to win the vote to give his 
Metropolis Police Improvement Bill a first reading. He then handed the project 
over to the 1828 Police Committee, now reformed as a Committee of the whole 
House, to deal with the 'many details' of his proposal. He subsequently spoke 
occasionally and briefly on the subject, chiefly in answer to questions, " but never 
at any length or depth, either in the House or elsewhere. Indeed, 
'Peel had little to do with the police after 1829. The Commissioners 
were the ones who shaped the Metropolitan Police. "' 
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Both Peel's speech in support of his Metropolis Police Improvement Bill and 
contemporary comment show that the full-time professional Metropolitan Police 
Force was to replace the parochial watch and ward system of the capital rather than 
the whole of its policing arrangements. Peel argued that the watchmen system had 
failed to protect Londoners from crime and disorder on their streets and in their 
homes. When the Bill reached the House of Lords on June 51h, their Lordships had 
no doubt about the Government's limited intentions. Lord Holland said, in reply 
to the Prime Minister's speech, 
'when their Lordships consider that the bill was intended for the protection 
of the property, the preservation of the peace and the general security of the 
metropolis, no-one could doubt the propriety of it's introduction" 
The Police Offices under the boards of magistrates of the metropolis, with their 
crime investigation and detection responsibilities, remained untouched as did the 
two types of officers they employed, the plain-clothes detective 'Runners', and the 
uniformed 'Patroles'. The magistrates retained all their criminal investigative, 
detective and prosecution powers and duties under the provisions of the Police 
Office founding Act of 1792 and its successors. For the time being at least 
therefore, the Bow Street Foot and Horse patrols, with their distinctive red 
waistcoats, appeared on the streets of London alongside the uniformed preventive 
constables of the New Police. Significantly, the appearance of the New Police 
also did not in any way affect the position of the small group of plain clothes 
'Runners', nor their employment by the magistrates to investigate reports and 
allegations of crime in order to identify and detect the offender(s)., These 
remained the only officially recognised body of full-time detectives available in the 
capital. 
Peel's neglect 
Peel took little direct interest in his creation after the passage of the Metropolitan 
Police Act. He left the administrative details to others, and particularly to the two 
men selected jointly to head the new organisation, Charles Rowan and Richard 
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Mayne, who became justices of the peace for the metropolis and joint 
'Commissioners' of the new 'Metropolitan Police Force'. 
Peel's name appears on the list of members of a Select Committee on the policing 
of the metropolis, ' and in the list of those enquiring into 'the Petition of Frederick 
Young and others' in 1833, concerning the activities of Constable Popay of the 
Force. ' Almost a decade later he served as a member of a Select Committee on the 
Metropolis Police Offices that sat in 1838. That Committee had a powerful 
influence on the development of British policing. Its impact is dealt with and 
examined in a later chapter. There is however, nothing in the reports of any of 
those Committees to indicate that Peel made any major contribution to their 
deliberations, or that he chaired, or otherwise significantly influenced, any of their 
meetings or deliberations. 
Political context 
Peel's 1829 Metropolitan Police Act came as little more than a Parliamentary 
interlude between Catholic emancipation and the nagging question of electoral 
reform. It was a turbulent time in British politics with much to occupy the 
government of the day. Agitation for reform at home fed on constitutional 
upheaval abroad. The French drove Charles X into exile in August 1830, and the 
Belgians began their revolt to gain separation from Holland the same month. At 
home agricultural labourers and the dispossessed combined in revolt that spread 
from Kent to the North and west as the year progressed. In the midst of all these 
troubles George IV died, precipitating an election that gravely weakened 
Wellington's government. 
The Iron Duke was narrowly returned as Prime Minister in the new Parliament. 
He then flatly refused to countenance any Parliamentary or electoral reform despite 
the House of Commons and the country being combined against him. His 
opponents in the new House thereupon forced him from office and put Lord Grey 
in his place in November 1830. Melbourne came to the Home Office in the new 
administration, removing Peel from any further direct responsibility for the New 
Police. He had had Parliamentary authority over his new creation for just over one 
year. In neither his subsequent short ministry of 1834/1835, nor in his final 
occupancy of the Prime Minister's off ice between 1841 and 1846, is there any 
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indication that Peel sought to make any further significant contribution to the 
evolution of the emerging professional police service. 
Peel and policing 
Contemporaries did not regard Peel's contribution to the establishment of the 
professional police service as an important part of his illustrious career. Thefirst 
of his biographies, by William Cooke-Taylor, appeared in 185 1, the year after his 
death. ' In the 'Preface' to that four volume work Cooke-Taylor says that, - 
' "Cash, com and Catholics" have occupied the attention of the country for 
more than half a century, and the name of Sir Robert Peel is identified with 
all the great legislative measures by which the settlement of many of the 
many important subjects and interests have been effected. " 
Cooke-Taylor does not mention the Metropolitan Police Act in his summary of 
Peel's achievements. Onlypages4to 10 of Volume Il of his morethan2000 page 
eulogistic treatment of Peel's great career deal with the establishment of the New 
Police. Reproductions of extracts from Peel's speech to the House on 15 th April 
1829 fill almost the whole of that small space. Cooke-Taylor's peroration at the 
end of the biography does not mention the subject of policing at all! He praises 
Peel for his contributions to Catholic emancipation; for the repeal of the Corn 
Laws, and for his successes in foreign policy. He ignores completely Peel's 
contribution to the foundation of the Metropolitan Police. 
None of Peel's other contemporary biographers make much of his involvement in 
the appearance of the New Police. His fame as founder of the British police 
service is a much more recent development. Having got his Metropolitan Police 
Bill through Parliament Peel, far from being the father of modern policing, seems 
to have left it to others, and particularly the officials of the Home Office and the 
first Commissioners, to lay the foundations of the modern police service; including, 
it would seem, allowing them to set the functions and purposes of the new 
organisation. 
Peel and his Commissioners 
Years later, Richard Mayne, the longer lasting of Peel's joint first Commissioners, 
wrote a memorandum to the then Home Secretary, Sir George Grey, on the subject 
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of the office of Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. In it he complained 
that: 
'When the Commissioners Office was established it could not have been 
foreseen what the duties would become. The Secretary of State [Sir Robert 
Peel] left it entirely to the Commissioners themselves to arrange for the 
perfonnance of their own duties. " 
Among subsequent commentators Reith's view is, 
'The most inexcusable of all ... [his] ... short-sightedness, was Peel's refusal to 
regulate and determine the status, and even the duties, of the Commissioners 
as public servants, in spite of their urgent requests to him to do so. " 
Other contemporary sources support this picture. None records any direct 
involvement by Peel in the important decisions needed in the early days of the New 
Police. The register of confidential letters sent bythejoint Commissioners 
between 8 April 1830 and December 1833, contain only one entry of a letter 
directly addressed to Sir Robert Peel. Only 15 others went to the 'principal 
secretary' at the Home Office, Samuel March Phillipps. " Those letters invariably 
deal with 'incidents' on which the Home Off ice wanted reports. Only two letters 
from Peel appear in Richard Mayne's personal 'Register of Letters'. " The first is a 
note dated 5h July 1829 asking Mayne to come to Whitehall Gardens on the 
occasion of his appointment as one of the first two joint commissioners. Theother 
is a brief congratulatory note on Mayne being nominated for a knighthood in 
January 1848. 
The Public Record Office has a document that may perhaps throw some further 
faint light on these issues. Its date and provenance are unclear. The note seems to 
be a private record made by Mayne of 'consultations with Sir R Peel'. " Hebegins 
by listing the following subjects as having been discussed: 
'numbers, ranks, pay, dress, equipment, duties, whether to be confined to 
nights, class from which men to be selected, portion of town to be first taken 
charge of. 
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Police division, how laid out. Parish boundaries not regarded. Population 
and local circumstances considered... ' etc. etc. 
Mayne then goes on to note the 'Difficulties' facing the new service: 
'public jealousy, parochial opposition, various interests patronage taken 
away, unfriendly feeling at police officers, some of the magistrates openly 
opposing, unfitness of many of the men, inexperience of all, correspondence 
very laborious ..... ; 
and in a side note at this point, 
'Police not seen in boxes as watchmen nor crying the hour, supposed absent, 
want of confidence in, much complaint about. ' 
It would seem that the note is not a record of initial 'consultations' about the New 
Police because Mayne later notes 'Proofs of success' which he lists as, 
'Public opinion shown by newspapers unfriendly at first now changed 
Very many letters and testimonials 
Presentments of grand juries 
Testimony ofjudges, chairmen of sessions 
Applications from place to be taken under protection 
New patrolling [? ] of City Police and further alteration proposed 
Criminal Registers 
Witnesses from all parts to speak as to former and present state of the town 
Prostitutes and drunken persons 
Applications for officers from many parts of the country' 
It is revealing to the modem eye that this meeting between the Home Secretary and 
his Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis does not seem to have dealt with the 
state of crime in the capital. The Secretary of State offers no comments, 
exhortations or advice on that issue. For his part Richard Mayne makes no claim 
that Metropolitan Police patrols have had any impact on the incidence of crime or 
disorder. Nor does he draw attention to any example of success by the Force in 
the detection or pursuit of criminals. 
It is not possible to determine how frequently Peel met the Commissioners or the 
extent to which he discussed with them the problems they faced. Thepublic 
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record of the correspondence between Peel and his Commissioners includes no 
directions or instructions on the purposes or strategies of the new police 
organisation. It is reasonable to suppose that, in the atmosphere of the time, such 
important and sensitive issues would have been recorded somewhere and in some 
form had they been discussed. The conjecture is therefore, that Peel gave no such 
formal advice or guidance to his Commissioners. 
At the same time lack of any surviving record of discussions between the first 
Commissioners and Peel on these issues is not proof that such exchanges did not 
take place. Nor does it give grounds for criticism of the conduct of Peel or his 
successors as Home Secretary. The Select Committee 'appointed to inquire into 
the Conduct of the Metropolitan Police on 13 th May last, in dispersing a Public 
Meeting in Cold Bath Fields', an event which resulted in the death of constable 
Culley, asked Rowan and Mayne; 
'All the instructions you are in the habit of receiving from the Secretary of 
State are verbal, are they not? - (Answer) We have never received any 
written order, I think. "' 
Rowan and Mayne are not quite correct in their answer to this question. 
Parliamentary Papers for 1830 include a copy of a written Instruction issued by 
Peel to the Commissioners on 10"' December 1829 dealing with appointments to, 
and within, the New Police. " 
Rowan and Mayne did, however, accurately report the custom of the day in their 
answer to the Select Committee. Peel and his successors as Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs followed established ministerial practice in failing to record any 
instructions and directions that might have been given to the Commissioners. It 
was always for those attending on ministers to make their own note of what took 
place. Mayne clarified this point in his evidence to the Cold Bath Fields Select 
Committee, when he said that it was the Commissioners who had the habit of 
making a memorandum on their return to their office in Whitehall Place. " That 
practice probably explains the private note preserved in the Public Record Office 
referred to earlier. Rowan and Mayne did not normally expect, nor apparently did 
they ever remember receiving, written instructions from the Secretary of State. 
The consequence is that, even if they were given, instructions or directions on the 
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proper purposes and functions of the New Police would not necessarily be 
preserved in the public record. 
The magistrates and the New Police 
While there is a distinct lack of any record of official guidance to Mayne and 
Rowan, a tide of comment and criticism from both public and press swept over 
them. Tempers and debate ran hot in what was essentially a political dispute about 
the form of British civil society in the post-Napoleonic era. Opposition to the New 
Police force was not confined to Peel's political opponents. Significant parts of 
the British establishment were disturbed by the development. In addition, the 
Metropolitan Police Force took to the streets with an old-established and 
powerfully supported policing organisation still firmly in place in the capital, and 
one that did not look kindly on Peel's newcomers. The police offices established 
under the successors to the 1792 Act scattered around London under the direction 
of local boards of magistrates, had many powerful supporters. 
Those alarmed by Peel's innovations had the benefit of having that active and long- 
established system of policing to contrast with the Peelers. Theytookfull 
advantage. By long engagement in both investigative and patrol policing the 
police offices had accumulated unrivalled experience in dealing with the problems 
of crime and criminals in London. And they continued, by statute, to play a key 
role in that important aspect of the policing of the capital. Section 42 of the 1829 
Metropolitan Police Act had specifically provided that 'nothing in this Act 
contained shall affect or alter' the legislation supporting the existing police offices. 
Parliament thus deliberately and specifically protected and insulated all their rights, 
status, powers and privileges from any interference by the New Police. 
For their part Bow Street and the other police off ices were naturally suspicious of 
the 'Peelers'. They saw them as rivals for the attention and support of the capital's 
citizens, and as a potential threat to their prestigious and lucrative monopoly of the 
detection and pursuit of criminals. The police office magistrates, and their 
supporters in Parliament and elsewhere, prompted and published a fund of critical 
comment on the new organisation. They constantly sought to provoke friction 
between the Metropolitan Police Force and newspapers, politicians and public, 
especially in the early days. 
Influence of Colquhon 
Peel's opponents among supporters of the Police Offices drew heavily on the 
writings of Patrick Colquhon, perhaps the best-known, and most influential, of the 
First Commissioners 52 
London magistrates after the Fieldings themselves. Colquhon's 1796 work, 
'Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis', played a significant role in the public 
debate about policing. He strongly influenced all the parties involved, not 
excepting Peel and his advisers. More than 30 years before the Metropolitan 
Police Act, he has a good claim to have first proposed the establishment of a 
unified police service for the metropolis. ". His 'Treatise' says, 
'is it not fair to conclude, that the insecurity which the public experiences 
with regard to life and property, and the inefficacy of the Police in 
preventing crimes, are to be attributed principally to the following causes? 
... 2. The want of an active principle, calculated to concentrate and connect 
the whole Police of the Metropolis and nation, and to reduce the general 
management to system and method by the interposition of a superintending 
agency, composed of able, intelligent and indefatigable men, acting under 
the direction of His Majesty's principal secretary of State for the Home 
Department, on whom would devolve the subordinate care and direction of 
the general Police of the Metropolis, "' 
However, in contrast to the 'watch and ward' target of the 1828 Select Committee 
and the Metropolitan Police Act that was its outcome, Colquhon's reforms aim at 
the identification, detection and prosecution of criminals active in the capital. His 
proposed new police establishment was to be based on the police offices, and 
would create 'a complete history of the connections, and pursuits of all or most of 
the criminal and fraudulent persons who resort to the Metropolis' and a 'complete 
register of every known offender and thereby establish a clue for their detection. "' 
Colquhon's 'Treatise' is clearly about the detective aspect of the magistrates 
responsibilities rather than the protective and preventive effect of 'watch and ward' 
and other forms of uniformed patrolling. 
Colquhon's impact on the debate on the policing of the metropolis was 
nevertheless considerable. The extent of his influence can be seen in the 
recommendation of Peel's 1822 and 1828 Select Committees that a 'general 
superintending authority' be set up under the Secretary of State to co-ordinate and 
integrate the activities of the off ices. The idea was not implemented, but it is 
taken almost word for word from the 'Treatise'. 
16 Colquhon, P. (1796) 
17 ibid. page 29 
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Opponent's of Peel's reforms also drew on Colquhon's 'Treatise' to emphasise the 
local nature of the contribution made to the reduction of crime and disorder in the 
capital by both the magistrates' officers and by parish constables and watchmen. 
They played heavily on the distinction between those locally based arrangements, 
independent of government control, and the direct accountability of the New Police 
to a government minister. They sought to exploit public fears that Peel's New 
Police, in contrast to the parochial system, sought to impose 'a despotic system of 
surmises, low artifice, anonymous charge, and popular perversion which 
characterised the worst spirit of the worst times of France' on the British public, 
along the lines then being created by the oppressive Napoleonic regimes of the 
continental powers. In Peel's time and afterward press and public alike were thus 
led to link support for the old system of policing with opposition to Continental 
style despotism, both being described as a patriotic duty. 
Constable Culley 
A widespread public sense of a despotic tendency or potentiality in the appearance 
of the New Police, fuelled by the supporters of the old police offices, is probably 
sufficient to explain the most infamous episode in the opposition to Peel's reforms. 
During the dispersal of the Cold Bath Fields meeting of the National Union of the 
Working Classes on 13 th May 1833, a section of the mob attacked and stabbed 
three of the large number of Metropolitan Police constables employed on the event. 
Constable Culley of the Metropolitan Police Force died from his wounds in 
Calthorpe Street. The more violent quarters of British society greeted the crime as 
a blow struck for freedom against the tyranny of 'Peel's Police, Raw Lobsters, 
Blue Devils, Or by whatever other appropriate Name they may be known'. " A 
jury of Londoners subsequently acquitted those accused of the murder. 
Opponents of the New Police existed at every level of society, not simply among 
the rougher elements of the mob. Nor did the opposition gain its strength solely 
from the misplaced patriotism of the magistrates and others whose position or 
patronage Peel's reforms threatened. There was also a body of informed opinion 
that continued to voice a thoughtful and deeply felt concern about the creation of; 
'a Force unknown to the British Constitution, and called into existence by a 
Parliament illegally constituted, legislating for their individual interests, 
consequently in opposition to the Public good'20 
19 Metropolitan Police Museum - Poster c. 1830 
20 ibid. 
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A month after the establishment of the Metropolitan Police Force, the 'Morning 
Journal' printed an article on the New Police under the heading of 'The 
Gendarmerie'. It repays reproduction at length. It not only recalls the old Saxon 
traditions of local peace-keeping, but well expresses the very real reservations 
about Peel's reforms felt by many otherwise well-disposed citizens. 
'It is a characteristic of the British constitution, and it is the salt that has 
preserved that constitution, that the whole interior government of the people 
shall be left to the people themselves.... Our forefathers would have seen 
with extraordinary jealousy the erection of a power in our streets, which 
neither conferring with the magistracy, nor guided by the feelings belonging 
to civil life, would account for its proceedings to none but a member of the 
executive, who might, in process of time, be a tyrant, or a tool in the hands 
of a tyrant, and would take its immediate stamp not from a man of civil 
knowledge or civil habits, but a soldier. ' 
Having made the political point, the 'Morning Journal' then touched on an issue of 
the most profound importance to it readers, and one that strikes a chord even in 
these much changed times. 
'It is mere ignorance or mere chicanery to say that a change of city watch is 
of no great importance. The liberty of the subject does not consist in the 
great machinery of empire, but in the little provisions for personal security. 
The foundation of all English freedom is in the single law which prescribes 
that no man shall be kept under charge untried, but that his case shall be 
decidedbyajury. The whole comfort of English life depends upon that 
other simple provision, that a man's house is his castle. Those things may 
make no great figure beside the pompous codes of other nations, but they are 
the essence of English liberty; for while life, limb and property are safe 
under the shield of the law, man may defy despotism. "' 
On the same day the 'Morning Herald' said in its leader: 
'We certainly object to the new police in principle, as we objected to the old 
systernindetail. The latter was good in its principle, for it was in strict 
accordance with the English Constitution, but it was bad in practice. We are 
21 ibid. Press Cuttings - 1829 page 5. 
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of opinion ... that the principle ought to have been left untouched and the 
practice refonned. ' " 
The London 'Times' took a different view, describing the New Police as 'an 
important and valuable improvement upon the former system of 'ancient, reverend' 
and most inefficient watchmen. "' But even that stalwart defender of Peel's 
reforms based its support not on the demonstrable successes of the new system but 
on the perceived defects of the old. 
Importance of Patrol 
All sides of the argument about the improvement of the police of the metropolis 
agreed on one point. There was an urgent need for a system of regular visible 
uniformed police patrolling for the protection of citizens and the deterrence of 
crime. Even the most fervent supporters of the parochial watch and police offices 
system did not deny that effective preventive patrolling was an essential element in 
the policing of the metropolis. The Bow Street magistrates themselves employed 
both Foot and Horse Patroles for that purpose in and around the capital. The 
magistrates clearly appreciated the importance of the visible or imminent presence 
of officers of the law as a deterrent to crime and a reassurance to the public. Their 
patrols were, like their plain clothes colleagues among the magistrates' officers, 
empowered to investigate crime and pursue criminals but had an entirely 
preventive remit. 
The 1821 version of the 'Rules and Regulations of the Foot Patrol Belonging to the 
Public Office at Bow Street' said that; 
'the Primary object of the Establishment is by prompt, regular and vigilant 
performance of the Patrole Duty to prevent as much as possible the 
commission of crimes, particularly street robberies and burglaries. "" 
As to the horse patrols, the magistrates directed that: 
'The Duty of the Horse Patrole stationed on the roads is for the protection of 
persons travelling on the high roads. "' 
Under Peel's chairmanship, the 1822 Parliamentary Select Committee on the 
Policing of the Metropolis recognised the value of, and strongly supported, the 
22 ibid. page 7 
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patrolling activities of the magistrates uniformed officers. Its Report to Parliament 
says that; 
'Your committee consider that the chief recommendation of a patrol consists 
of its tendency to harass and banish the offender, by preserving an annoying 
scrutiny, and thus prevent the commission of crime. "' 
That wholly preventive precedent for policing and its wide public support did not 
go unnoticed by the founders of the New Police. 
First Instructions to the New Police 
In the atmosphere of violent controversy that existed at the time, any public 
comment by Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne, thejoint first Commissioners of 
the Metropolitan Police, on the issue of the duties and functions of the new 
organisation needed very careful handling. Supporters of the existing police 
offices could be expected to give the closest critical scrutiny to every action or 
statement on the issue. Accusations of political chicanery, or even subversion of 
the constitution, were likely to fly from all sides and on the lightest excuse. 
In the circumstances Rowan and Mayne adopted the only safe course. Working 
with the grain of public opinion they decided to emphasise and reinforce the clear 
intentions of Parliament for the new organisation; that it should be no more than an 
efficient replacement for the 'very unsatisfactory' and ineffectual patrol service 
formerly provided by the capital's parochial watch and ward. The wording of the 
1829 Metropolitan Police Act was wholly preventive. Itsaidthat; 
$a sufficient number of fit and able men shall from time to time, by the 
direction of one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, be appointed 
as a Police force for the whole of ... [the Metropolitan Police District] ... who 
shall be sworn in by one of the ... [Commissioners] ... to act as constables, for 
preserving the peace and preventing robberies and other felonies, and 
apprehending offenders against the peace, '" 
The genius of the founders of the Metropolitan Police lay in finding a way to blend 
together the words of the legislators and the precedent of the remit of the Bow 
Street uniformed Patroles, to formulate a statement of the purpose of the 
Metropolitan Police Force that set the new organisation securely off in the tradition 
of the old Saxon constables. Mayne and Rowan drew a skilful line through all the 
26 Report of the Select Committee on the Policing of the Metropolis (1822) page 99; Parliamentary Papers (1822) (440) VoL IV 
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disquiet surrounding their new organisation when in 1829, with the 'approbation of 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department', they adopted a strictly preventive 
view of the purposes of a professional police establishment. Their first 
Instructions say that: 
'It should be understood, at the outset, that the principal object to be attained 
is "the Prevention of Crime" 
To this great end every effort of Police is to be directed. The security of 
person and property, the preservation of public tranquillity and all the other 
objects of a Police establishment, will thus be better effected than by the 
detection and punishment of the offender, after he has succeeded in 
committing the crime. "' 
For the avoidance of any error the duties of each individual Constable of the Force 
are set out later in the Instructions. Rowan and Mayne tell each man that, 
'He will be held responsible for the security of life and property, within his 
Beat, and for the preservation of the peace and general good order, during 
the time he is on duty. "' 
Identical versions of that definition of policing appear in the 1836,1851 and 1862 
revisions of those Instructions. " It will be noted that nothing in the wording 
trespasses on the criminal investigative and detective responsibilities or functions 
of the magistrates and their officers. 
The magistrates of the police offices and their officers continued to be solely 
responsible for 'the detection and punishment of the offender after he has 
succeeded in committing the crime', a function that Rowan and Mayne explicitly 
exclude from the activities their Force. Nowhere else in their original Instructions 
to the Metropolitan Police Force is any mention made of the Force, or any of its 
individual constables, having any responsibility for the investigation of reports or 
complaints of crime, or for the investigation, detection or prosecution of 
unidentified criminal offenders. In all matters of crime the aim of the New Police 
is prevention and deterrence, and on the protection of citizens from the harm crime 
can do, rather than the identification and pursuit of offenders. It is a distinction 
28 Metropolitan Police Instructions Orders etc. (September 1829) pages I and 2. Metropolitan Police 
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Rowan and Mayne well understood but which, as will subsequently appear, they 
found difficult to maintain or to get others to accept. 
Buttressed and protected by the wording of the Metropolitan Police Act as a 
justification for their view of their duties, Rowan and Mayne focused their 
Instructions to the Force on the primacy of preventive patrolling. In so doing they 
lodged themselves and their constables firmly in the long tradition of the English 
common law as the successors to the citizens and watchmen who discharged the 
responsibility of every community to keep its own peace and good order. The 
Commissioners' definition of their role in the criminal justice system emphasises 
their concern with the protection and support of the citizens of the capital, and 
makes no mention of their formal connection to government. 
Other Instructions 
Rowan and Mayne's Instructions on other matters are a mundane mass of detailed 
bureaucratic directions, advice, and orders, distinguishable from their modem 
counterparts only by the beauty of the handwriting in which they are recorded. 
They fill the pages of leather bound tomes, ready for transfer by hand into books on 
each Division, where Superintendents would read them to all ranks at regular 
intervals. Directions and instructions on every imaginable subject follow one 
another in bewildering succession. Reports of quite trivial disciplinary offences 
preface notices of the dismissal of the constables involved. In the early days, 
before Mayne found a lawyer's way of avoiding the draconian wording of the 
disciplinary provisions of the 1829 Act, dismissal was the only penalty for even the 
most minor infractions. 
The Instructions therefore note dismissals for gossiping with servants; for 'quitting 
his beat for a few minutes on a false pretence'; for failing to wear the regulation 
armlet on their uniform; for 'using highly improper language to a gentleman', etc. 
etc. Endlessly, and perhaps morejustly, they announce dismissals for improperly 
entering public houses, consorting with women and being intoxicated on duty. " 
Nowhere amongst all these instructions and directions however, is any amendment 
or revision made to the definition of the nature or purpose of the duties performed 
by these new public servants. 
Equally, the Instructions set no objectives for the Force. Rarely is the task of 
combating crime and disorder mentioned. When it is, almost invariably it is in 
connection with the receipt of a complaint or a report of an individual crime or a 
31 Public Record Office MEPO 7/1. 
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particular type of offender, to which patrolling constables should pay attention. 
The Instructions contain no crime statistics. They do not even update those used 
by Peel in his speech to the House on the Metropolis Police Bill. The 
Commissioners apparently see no need to demonstrate that their new Force has any 
impact one way or the other on levels of crime or disorder in the capital. Nor do 
Rowan and Mayne feel the need to include exhortations or initiatives to urge 
constables to improve their performance against any of the many other policing 
problems faced by the Force. 
Rowan and Mayne's orders and instructions are about the structure, organisation 
and administration of the Force. They demand good housekeeping, good 
discipline and the prompt and proper completion and filing of records. The 
Commissioners pay particular attention to the appearance of constables, and the 
duties of their supervisors in that regard. Famously, an instruction of 16th October 
1829 directs that: ' 
'[The men] are likewise to be once more cautioned that if they are seen 
lounging about with their hands in their great coat pockets, the pockets will 
be taken away. "' 
Responsibilities of the New Police 
Rowan and Mayne clearly see their prime responsibility to be the good 
administration and good discipline of the new Force, and their orders and 
instructions reflect that view. If there is an underlying strategy for the New Police, 
a 'mission statement' or 'management vision' as a modem observer might call it, 
, 
it 
is that crime and criminals are to be banished, or at least brought under control, by 
the mere disciplined presence of the New Police on London's streets. 
This is a picture of the purpose of the new organisation fully and forcefully 
expressed by the 1822 Parliamentary Committee. It believed that a unified police 
for the metropolis should be solely concerned to 'harass and banish the offender 
by preserving an annoying scrutiny' in order not to come into conflict 'with that 
perfect freedom of action and exemption from interference which are the great 
privileges and blessings of society in this country. ' Rowan and Mayne were 
clearly concerned to see their new 'Peelers' entirely devoted to that laudable end, 
and to no other. 
32 ibid. page 12 
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There is nothing in any of the Orders and Instructions given to the Metropolitan 
Police Force in its first 40 years to indicate that the first Commissioners felt any 
need to further discuss, expand upon or otherwise dissect the 'prevention of 
crime' as a complete statement of purpose for the Force. ' Rowan and Mayne 
never altered or amended the statement of purpose set out in the original 1829 
book of Instructions that, with the 'approbation of one of His Majesty's Principal 
Secretaries of State, they issued to each and every member of the New Police. 
Their decision not to further explain their first definition of the role and function 
of the New Police was publicly and politically expedient at the time. It has 
however, created difficulties for later commentators on the development of British 
policing. The problem is that the expression 'the prevention of crime' can have a 
number of radically different meanings. It can also be attached to a wide range of 
actions; from changes in the curriculum of infant schools, to the publication of 
learned discourses on moral topics; from charitable work among poor, to the 
transportation and execution of offenders; and from supporting and defending the 
rights of the individual, to amending the law to ensure the conviction of reputed 
criminals. 
Direct evidence on what Rowan and Mayne meant by the words is sparse. It is 
fortunate therefore, that Parliament appointed three Select Committees in the early 
years of the New Police to 'inquire' into various aspects of its performance and 
activities. Rowan and Mayne gave evidence to all those Committees. For the 
most part the questions put to them do not directly address the functions and 
purposes of the new police organisation or its involvement with crime and 
criminality. Nevertheless some of the evidence given by the Commissioners to 
those inquiries is significant. It gives an insight into their thinking on those 
subjects. Two of the three early Select Committees are of special interest in this 
respect; the 1833/34 Police of the Metropolis Committee, and the 1833 Popay 
Committee. The third, the 1833 Cold Bath Fields Committee dealt with the 
incident in which a mob murdered constable Culley. it looked closely at the 
conduct of the public order maintenance duties of the Metropolitan Police on this 
occasion, but its Report contains nothing of direct relevance to issues of crime. 
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Select Committees 61 
The 'Popay' Select Committee of 1833 
The 1833 Select Committee set up to consider 'the Petition of Frederick Young 
and others' (the Popay Committee) ' was not the first to be appointed that year, 
but it was the earliest to complete its work. The petitioners mentioned in its title 
were leading figures in the National Union of the Working Classes. They 
complained that sergeant Popay of the Metropolitan Police Force had spied on the 
meetings of the Union; had joined the Union under a false name and identity; had 
taken an active part in its meetings; and had encouraged members to advocate 
revolution and the overturn of the constitution. 
In its Report the Committee solemnly conclude that it should 'mark [Popay's] 
course of behaviour with their most grave and decided censure'. More seriously, 
it also criticises his supervisors for their, 'lack of caution not always exercised... 
[in]... warning him against having recourse to undue means' to obtain 
information about the business of the National Union of the Working Classes. ' 
The significance of the work of the Popay Committee lies in the attention it paid 
to the policies and practices of the New Police in the employment of its constables 
in activities other than their basic duty of preventive patrolling in uniform. The 
final conclusion of its Report resolves that; 
4with respect to the occasional employment of Policemen in plain clothes, 
the system, as laid down by the heads of the Police Department, affords no 
just matter of complaint, while strictly confined to detect Breaches of the 
Law, and to prevent Breaches of the Peace, should those ends appear 
otherwise unattainable; at the same time the Committee would strongly 
urge the most cautious maintenance of those limits, and solemnly deprecate 
any approach to the Employment of Spies, in the ordinary acceptance of the 
Term, as a practice most abhorrent to the feelings of the People, and most 
alien to the sprit of the Constitution. " 
Rowan and Mayne gave evidence to the Committee on three occasions. On their 
first visit on 10 July 1833 the Committee asked directly about the employment of 
their officers in plain clothes, 
'What is the rule of the service as to the wearing of the uniform? - (Rowan 
and Mayne) That they shall wear it, except allowed to do otherwise. As to 
2 Select Committee on the Petition of Frederick Young and Others (1833) Parliamentary Papers 
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the use of patrols in plain clothes,... to guard against ... robbery; ... we have 
found it better done by persons in plain clothes, who were not thus known 
to the thieves, both in preventing them and in catching them when they 
have been going in. " 
On the specific case of the employment of Popay in plain clothes, the Committee 
asked, 
'Supposing Popay allowed himself to be thought other than a policeman, 
and knew he was considered in the light of a drawing-master, and under 
that assumed character attended these meetings, would he have your 
sanction? - (Rowan and Mayne) 'Certainly not. ' 
'Would it not be in direct opposition to the rules you think necessary to Jay 
down for the conduct of the partiesT - (Rowan and Mayne) 'Most 
decidedly so. We have repeatedly cautioned the superintendents and the 
men, if we have seen them about doing anything which could be 
represented that they were acting in the odious sense of the word spies. On 
all occasions we have most strongly told them they must not do so. " 
Finally the Committee took the Commissioners back to the founding of the New 
Police. The Chairman put to them that, 
'I believe the original rules of the police force did not comprehend the 
employment of men in plain clothes? - (Rowan and Mayne) There was a 
discussion with the Secretary of State whether they should put on a uniform 
or not. The question was discussed at great length, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the two systems were weighed; it was thought more 
desirable that they should be in uniform; ... but after they had been in 
uniform some short time, it became clear that some of the police could not 
perform their duty in uniform so well as they could out of it.... some of the 
magistrates thought would be a dangerous precedent, and that mischief 
might arise from it; but the Secretary of State authorized the 
Commissioners to do so. The Commissioners had nothing but the public 
good in view in doing it, and believe the public have been better protected 
by it. "' 
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Use of Spies 
The issue of the employment of the New Police in plain clothes was only 
indirectly of concern to the Popay Committee. It is not the main focus of its 
inquiry. Its real fear was that the government had used Rowan and Mayne's 
constables to obtain information about the activities of its political opponents. 
63 
The possibility of the use of the New Police for such partisan purposes seriously 
alarmed the Committee. That feeling became clear when Rowan and Mayne 
appeared before it for a second time, a fortnight later on 23 rd. jUly. 
In the interim the Committee had questioned Popay about his activities, and 
obtained copies of his reports to his superiors. This showed that the 
Commissioners had, in truth, personally seen and approved reports prepared by 
Popay. Even more damaging was that his reports included material clearly 
falling outside any duty he had to 'prevent Breaches of the Law, or Breaches of 
the Peace'. The Chairman put the Committee's fears directly to Rowan and 
Mayne. 
'Had you ever any object in view to gain any information for the 
Government or to employ spies to pry into people's private lives? - 
(Colonel Rowan) I will venture to say there are no two gentlemen in the 
town that would more abhor such an action then the two Commissioners of 
Police, and they would not obey any such instructions from any 
Government - (Mr Mayne) I must be allowed to say, that the imputation 
that we could have sanctioned or allowed any such practice has been 
painful to us in the highest degree. ' 
'As gentlemen and men of honour, you would have felt it an insult to be 
requested to conduct such a system? - (Mr. Mayne) Yes, and I would 
undoubtedly have quitted the office rather than comply with any such 
direction. "' 
These exchanges expose the reality of these concerns for parliamentarians in the 
early days of the New Police. They also show Rowan and Mayne's obvious 
anxiety to allay them and to assert their independence from government control. 
The Commissioners are at pains to assure the Committee that their men did not 
adopt the guise of 'spies' to 'pry into people's private lives', or represent 
themselves as being anything other than constables when going about their duties. 
Both Commissioners assert that, even if government were to direct them to 
8 ibid. pages 5771578 atpara. 3917 to 3918 
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employ their men on such duties, they would refuse to obey the instruction and 
resign rather than accept it. 
It would seem that Rowan and Mayne dealt successfully with these issues on this 
occasion. The Committee's Report does not criticise their policies and practices 
for the occasional employment of constables in plain clothes, and wholly supports 
their view of this aspect of their duties. However, in its Conclusions the 
Committee takes the opportunity forcefully to remind both the Commissioners 
and Parliament that the constables of the New Police should only be out of their 
uniform in order 'to detect Breaches of the Law, and to prevent Breaches of the 
Peace', and even then only when 'those ends appear otherwise unattainable'. ' 
The grey area in all this lies in the Commissioners' evidence about their 
deployment of constables in plain clothes to deal with specific problems such as 
robbery. Clearly, such plain clothes activity deceives the public about the status 
and intent of those constables. The Commissioners certainly meant to deceive 
those members of the public who might be tempted to commit crime. But it is 
also apparent from the Commissioners' evidence that this type of employment is 
exceptional and that it was not detective work as was practised by the magistrates 
officers or as a modem observer might understand the term. Insofar as it was to 
detect offenders, it was aimed at them 'when they have been going in' rather than 
after they had committed their crimes. Thus the adoption of plain clothes by the 
Peelers simply enabled them to catch, prior to or in the act, offenders who would 
otherwise escape immediate arrest. Their deployment in this guise was also a 
response to demands for action from the public or their representatives, and was 
undertaken only where uniform patrolling proved to be ineffective in the 
prevention of particular crimes. 
Rowan and Mayne also made it clear that plain clothes work formed no part of the 
ordinary duty of their constables. In no sense did their men undertake the 
detective and investigative duties performed by the officers employed by the 
magistrates of the metropolis. Nor did their constables use their temporary 
anonymity to associate with criminals or their compatriots in order to gather 
information about offenders, as was the practice of the plain clothes Bow Street 
Runners. The Commissioners left absolutely no room for doubt on these issues. 
They were adamant that any attempt to impose those duties on their men would be 
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met by blank refusal, and promised theirjoint resignation if government insisted 
upon it. 
Police of the Metropolis Select Committee, 1833/1834 
In April 1833, prior to the Cold Bath Fields incident in which constable Culley of 
the Metropolitan Police was murdered, and before the start of the work of the 
Popay Committee, Parliament appointed a Select Committee to 'inquire into the 
State of the Police of the Metropolis within the Metropolitan District, and the 
State of Crime therein. "" Robert Peel appears in the list of members of this 
Committee, but he does not seem to have played any major role in it. The terms 
of reference of this 'Police of the Metropolis' Committee are identical with those 
of the 1828 Select Committee that had been the precursor of Peel's Metropolitan 
Police Act. This 1833/34 Select Committee explicitly accepted that its inquiry 
continued the work of that earlier Committee. It set out to review the operation 
of the New Police, and to examine its 'management and conduct'. " The 
appointment of the Committee coincided with one of the periodic renewals of the 
legislation that supported the police offices still operating in the metropolis 
alongside the New Police. Parliament needed guidance and advice on the 
renewal of the legislation supporting the offices now that the New Police were up 
and running strongly. 
The work of the Committee spread over two years and two separate sessions of 
Parliament. Four months into its hearings, on 16'h August 1833, the Police of the 
Metropolis Select Committee decided to suspend its inquiry. The reason given 
was that since its appointment the Popay and the Cold Bath Fields Select 
Committees had started work on specific aspects of the activities of the 
Metropolitan Police Force. In the circumstances the Committee offered no 
Report, suggesting that it be re-appointed to complete its inquiry in the next 
Parliamentary session. 12 
Evidence to the 1833 Police Committee 
Before it adjourned, the 1833/34 Committee called Rowan and Mayne to give 
evidence on four occasions; on 29'h April, I" May, and on 2 nd and 15'h July, 1833. 
Appearances before Select Committees heavily engaged the Commissioners in 
this period. Their final appearance before the first session of the Police of the 
10 Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis etc. (1833) Parliamentary Papers (1833) vol. XIII 
pages 401 et. seq. 
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Metropolis Committee on 15 Ih July fell between their last two visits to the Popay 
hearings, and just after the death of constable Cul ley and the consequent 
appointment of the Cold Bath Fields Select Committee. 
The prevention of crime 
In their first two examinations the Police of the Metropolis Committee questioned 
Rowan and Mayne about their general stewardship of their responsibilities since 
the foundation of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829. Nothing of interest on 
the subjects of crime and criminality arose on those occasions. But when they 
appeared on 2 nd July the Commissioners responded to complaints by the parochial 
authorities of St. Luke's that the Metropolitan Police did nothing about the 
burglaries that plagued the parish. 
Rowan and Mayne's first response was to argue that the offences were not 
preventable by any action of their patrolling constables. They then pointed out 
that there was no evidence that the burglaries were due to negligence by the any 
of the constables posted to the beats on which they had occurred. When asked to 
give an example of 'negligence' by a constable in these circumstances, they 
replied, 'if the property is of great bulk, that is a strong reason for thinking the 
police to blame ... [since] ... there must 
have been negligence in allowing the thief 
to pass along the beat. "' 
What might be surprising to the modern observer is that the Committee did not 
then pursue the matter further. It did not go on to examine what steps Rowan and 
Mayne, or the constables responsible for the parish of St. Luke's, took to 
investigate and detect these offences. Their modern counterparts would not have 
escaped so easily. They would be asked to explain what they had done to 
identify and catch the burglars, or to recover the stolen property. But the 1833/34 
Select Committee did not put those questions to Rowan and Mayne because it 
recognised that that duty did not rest with them. In 1833 only the magistrates of 
the police offices of the metropolis and the officers they employed had any 
responsibility for, or interest in, such matters. 
The Select Committee's restricted view of the responsibilities of Rowan and 
Mayne's officers is explicit elsewhere in its Report. At a later stage in their 
evidence on this occasion the Commissioners dealt with complaints from the 
magistrates of the metropolis that officers of the Metropolitan Police had 
exceeded their duty by questioning witnesses and inquiring into charges brought 
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to their Station Houses. "' The magistrates alleged that the Metropolitan Police 
regularly usurped their responsibilities by discharging people from their custody 
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as a result of such 'inquiries' into criminal offences. They complained that, in 
law, the officers in charge of station houses should instead bring all such accused 
persons before the courts for examination. 
Rowan and Mayne were at great pains to explain that no such 'inquiries' into the 
offence took place. They said that officers in charge of station houses simply 
took steps to discover whether the offence alleged was a felony. That was 
necessary to justify the detention of the suspect. No inquiry into the strength of 
the evidence, or the truth or otherwise of the accusation took place. " This 
exchange demonstrates how keen Rowan and Mayne were to reassure the 
Committee that they both clearly understood and energetically maintained the 
distinction between their legal status and responsibilities and those of the 
magistrates of the metropolis. 
The detection of offenders 
Rowan and Mayne appeared before the Committee on 15 th jUly 183 3 for the last 
time before its adjournment to the following year. The Committee questioned 
them about the conduct of a certain Inspector Bullock who had obtained a warrant 
to search a house in Lambeth in connection with a 'coining' case being 
investigated by the Royal Mint. " Mayne took the opportunity to set out the 
Commissioners' views on the involvement of their constables in the detection of 
crime. He explained that in this particular case and under the directions of the 
Mint some of their men had donned plain clothes to keep surreptitious observation 
on the house, later entering it to purchase false coins without revealing their 
identity. Mayne informed the Committee that he had subsequently written on the 
papers in the case that, 
'Mr. Thomas (the Divisional Superintendent in charge of the officers) has 
been acquainted, that I never approved of the employment of his men in the 
manner here stated; in future, no steps shall be taken without the immediate 
sanction of the Commissioners. "' 
The Committee Chairman then asked the Commissioners, 
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'Now will you state what was your objection to that course? - (Rowan and 
Mayne) Our objection was, that it was entrapping the party into committing 
an offence; we did not choose to employ police to induce the parties to 
commit the offence in order to obtain a conviction against them. We have 
in every case proceeded on the principle (where it was in our power) to 
prevent the offence, and not to induce the parties to commit the very act for 
which they were afterwards convicted. "' 
The Committee went on to refer to the officers employed by the magistrates and 
asked; 
'Do you apprehend a different system was pursued by the Bow-street 
officers and patrols previous to the establishment of the Metropolitan 
Police? - (Mr Mayne) I have heard so; and it has been reported to me that 
Mr. Powell comparing the Metropolitan Police with the former Bow-street 
officers complained of the Metropolitan police spoiling cases, by not acting 
upon the same principle as the former police officers had done. "' 
Later on this occasion Rowan and Mayne further clarified the distinction between 
the duties and responsibilities of the officers employed by the magistrates and the 
constables of the Metropolitan Police. When discussing the possibility that the 
'whole executive police [of the metropolis] were placed under the control of the 
Commissioners', Mayne was asked, 'do you see [in those circumstances] any 
objection in appropriating a certain number of men to attend constantly at each 
office, and thereto be under the complete control of the magistratesT Mayne 
said 'No, "' an answer which he subsequently amplified by agreeing that, when so 
employed, such constables would be 'considered as in the confidential employ of 
the Police Magistrates. "' Indeed he then removed any doubt about the sharp 
difference between the duties of his constables and the activities of the officers 
employed by the magistrates by reminding the Committee that what it proposed 
was already common practice, and that 
cat present, when one of the Metropolitan Police is employed in any 
particular case by the magistrates, we do not require him to report what is 
done under the direction of the magistrates. t22 
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Instructions from Home Secretary 
At their final appearance before the 1833/34 Police of the Metropolis Select 
Committee on 26 th June 1834 Rowan and Mayne were given an opportunity to 
respond to the evidence presented by other witnesses. In advance of their 
attendance they received copies of what others had said to the Committee. One 
such witness was the Chief Magistrate at Bow Street, Sir Frederick Roe. In 
dealing with a complaint he had made against them Rowan and Mayne repeated 
and confirmed the evidence they gave to the Popay Committee about their 
relationship with the Home Secretary. The Committee asked, 
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'6177. In reference to orders which you receive from the Secretary of 
State's office, at any time, are they in writing, or are they verbally given? - 
(Rowan and Mayne) I do not remember that we have ever had any orders as 
to our conduct, or the general management of the Police, in writing. 
Any orders which involves expense is always given in writing? - (Rowan 
and Mayne) Yes, if not in the ordinary line of Police duty. 
But orders with reference to the management of conduct of the Police in 
general are not given in writing? - (Rowan and Mayne) Not in general; I do 
not remember any instance where it was done. "' 
Almost immediately after these exchanges the Committee invited Rowan and 
Mayne to set out any alteration in the law they wished to propose. The 
Commissioners asked for the unification of the policing patrols of the 
metropolis. "' They suggested that the Bow Street horse patrols be incorporated 
into their Force; that the City of London constables and the Thames River police 
be brought under their control; and that the officers attached to the police offices 
of the metropolis acting under the control and direction of the magistrates be 
'replaced' by their constables. At the same time they made it clear that they did 
not seek any additional powers for their own constables beyond those they already 
possessed. They also said that 'common informers... might be beneficially 
superseded' in their district, and that the right to lay informations before the courts 
under penal statutes be confined to 'constables ... or to the party actually 
aggrieved by the offence committed'. 
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Common Informers 
In this last matter Rowan and Mayne draw attention to a troublesome and 
contentious aspect of the criminal law of England as it stood in 1834. At that 
time, in principle and in the ancient Saxon tradition, an aggrieved party was still 
responsible for the prosecution of a criminal offender. He or she had to apply to 
ajustice (or a magistrate in metropolitan districts) who would examine the 
allegation and any witnesses. Ina prima facie case the justice would bind the 
complainant over to prosecute the alleged offender before a grand jury and at his 
trial if necessary. Henry Fielding's innovations of 1750 bad had an important 
impact on that process. The plain clothes detective officers employed by the 
magistrates undertook investigative work in the metropolis on behalf of their 
employers. But they did not take on every case, and had no obligation in law to 
do so. 
The magistrates' officers were also available for private hire, although the practice 
was officially frowned upon. In any case, only the wealthier sections of London 
society could afford to employ them. Most people were unwilling to spend either 
the time or the money required to pursue those who had offended against them. 
The common informer had long filled that gap in the criminal justice system. 
These were people willing to 'inform' the justices about the perpetrators of crime 
and to accept an obligation on behalf, or in place, of an uninterested or 
impecunious victim, to prosecute the criminal through the criminal justice system. 
The 'informers' reward was a portion of any fine or other penalty imposed on 
conviction. The opportunities for collusion, corruption and perjury are obvious, 
and were freely taken. 
In their evidence Rowan and Mayne intimated as much when they expanded on 
their objections to the 'common informer' system. The Committee asked, 
'Now you have stated, that in your opinion, it would be advisable there 
should be no common informers allowed within the metropolitan district, 
but that the Police should take that duty on themselves; will you state your 
reasons for that to the Committee? - (Rowan and Mayne) I venture to 
recommend that the power of laying information should be confined to 
constables, or to persons interested or aggrieved for having suffered some 
damage or loss in the subject of complaint ... The Police at present do not 
interfere so much as they might in laying informations, insasmuch as many 
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of the magistrates have stated, that it is not the duty of the Police, and that 
they will not convict parties on their evidence. "' 
These passages in Rowan and Mayne's evidence to the Select Committee shed a 
clear light on the role of their Force in the investigation and detection of reports 
and allegations of crime in the metropolis in the 1830s. The New Police had no 
direct part in it at all. Victims of crime had the first, and prime, responsibility to 
bring such matters before the courts. Then the justices (or magistrates) and any 
officers they, or the local parish or citizens association, employed had a role. 
Finally the 'common informer' made his contentious contribution to the detection 
and punishment of offenders. Only on the periphery of the process did the 
Metropolitan Police Force under Rowan and Mayne play their prevention of 
crime, deterrence and peacekeeping part, and their determination not to seek any 
additional powers for their constables shows they had no ambition to increase 
their involvement in these matters. 
The attitude of the magistrates of the metropolis also supports Rowan and 
Mayne's view of the role of their men. Many magistrates would not examine a 
suspected criminal offender solely on an information laid by one of the New 
Police. Some would not even allow a Metropolitan Police constable to lay such 
an information against a suspect, holding that it was no part of their duty to do so. 
It was that anomaly and the corruption caused by the common informer system 
that Rowan and Mayne wished to remove when they asked that their men be given 
the right to lay information before the magistrates. There is no sign that they 
wished to usurp the detective and investigative functions of tile magistrates or any 
of their off icers. 
Reports of the Select Committees 
The Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis completed its Report on 
13'h August, 1834, having received copies of the Reports of the Select Committees 
on Popay, and on the Coldbath Fields Riots of 1833. As has already been noted, 
no issues of importance on the question of the involvement of the New Police in 
crime and criminality arose from the Cold Bath Fields Committee Report. 
The Report of the 1833/34 Police of the Metropolis Select Committee is highly 
complimentary to Rowan and Mayne. The Committee report to the House of 
Commons that, 
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'Your Committee have perused the Evidence and Reports of these 
Committees ... and ... deem it their duty to express their ... opinion ... that the 
Metropolitan Police Force, it's management, and the principles on which it 
is conducted, deserve the confidence and support of The House. That it is 
well calculated to check crime and to maintain the peace and order of the 
Metropolis, both effectively and constitutionally. ... The conduct of the 
Commissioners throughout these enquiries was highly honourable to them; 
and from the Evidence of various Witnesses, Your Committee are of 
opinion, that the conduct of the Men generally deserves the approbation of 
the Public. "' 
On the specific issue of the relationship between Rowan and Mayne's New Police 
and the magistrates of the police off ices in the metropolis the Committee fudged 
shamelessly. It said, 
'Your Committee are of opinion, that ... the immediate general control over 
the Constabulary Force ought to be vested exclusively in the Police 
Commissioners. Your Committee do not propose to curtail by law the 
powers which the Magistrates of the several Police Offices possess as 
Justices of the Peace, or to define the exact boundaries by which the power 
of the Police Commissioners is to be separated from that of the Police 
Magistrates. "' 
The Committee did however, make one major point about the difference between 
the plain clothes detective officers employed by the magistrates and the constables 
of the New Police in the conclusion of their Report. They say, 
'Your Committee ... conclude with this Expression of their Opinion; viz. 
that the Metropolitan Police Force, as respects its influence in repressing 
crime, and the security it has given to person and property, is one of the 
most valuable of modem institutions. And the high character of those who 
now direct it, and the consequent improvement in the moral character and 
discipline of the Men, together with its successful working in practice, has 
clearly shown, that what, under the old Police, was considered by the 
Magistrates and the most experienced officers as a necessary evil, viz. flash 
houses, where the most vicious and desperate characters were allowed 
openly to assemble, hardening each other in their career of crime, and 
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seducing others, in order that they might be more readily secured when an 
adequate reward was offered, and the association of the Police Constables 
with low and infamous characters as a means of obtaining information, is 
not a necessary part of a system which has as its object only the prevention 
and detection of crime. 128 
In these concluding paragraphs the Report of the 1833/34 Select Committee make 
explicit the distinction both in law and in practice between the officers (who were 
also legally constables) attached to the police off ices of the capital under the' 
magistrates, and Rowan and Mayne's constables. The magistrates' officers had a 
unique position in the criminal justice system. They alone among all the 
constables of the capital, had the power 
'to act as Constables for the Preservation of the Peace, and for the Security 
of Property against felonious and other unlawful Modes of obtaining the 
same, and for apprehending Offenders Against the Peace, as well as by 
Night as by Day"" 
The Committee was glad to note that such specialised investigative and detective 
duties formed no part of the policy or practice of the Metropolitan Police Force 
under Rowan and Mayne. In particular, it was pleased to find that the constables 
of the Metropolitan Police did not associate with active and known criminals in 
order to cultivate them and their acquaintances as sources of information about 
crime in the capital, a practice which the Select Committee determined to 
condemn. 
To the contrary, the hope of the Committee was that Rowan and Mayne's New 
Police: 
gmay carry into practice, to the utmost extent, every measure which can 
augment the difficulty and multiply obstructions in the way of the 
depredator, as well as every arrangement best calculated to diminish the 
chances of a profitable conversion of property when dishonestly obtained. 
The former will tend to prevent, the latter diminish the motives to commit 
crime. '" 
No better proof of the existence of that distinction can be given than that the 
Committee recommended, and Parliament enacted, no important changes in the 
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legislation supporting the powers and duties of the magistrates of the metropolis 
when the Police Offices legislation was renewed for a further 3 years on 18"'. June 
31 1833. 
'Executive' and 'Judicial' functions 
Apart from what the Report of the 1833/34 Select Committee reveals on the issue 
of Rowan and Mayne's views on the employment of their men in the detection 
and prosecution of crime, one other aspect of the Committee's work is of interest. 
It is an apparently innocuous matter, but the involvement of the Committee in it 
had long term, complex consequences for the development of policing in Britain. 
At the behest of Rowan and Mayne the 1833/34 Select Committee looked closely 
at the possibility of unifying all the remnants of the parochial constable and watch 
and ward systems still cluttering the policing of the capital. It did so as part of its 
understanding that it was the successor to the 1828 Select Committee, whose 
Report had led to the foundation of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829. The 
Committee, like all its predecessors, jibbed at the policing fence still existing 
between the City of London and the rest of the capital. And it did not follow up 
Rowan and Mayne's suggestion that the magistrates' officers be 'replaced' by 
their men. But it decided strongly to recommend the amalgamation of the River 
Police, the constables appointed by the Westminster parochial authorities, and the 
horse patrols maintained by the police offices, with the Metropolitan Police Force. 
Both Rowan and Mayne were eager to encourage the Committee along these 
lines, if only the remove the irritation and confusion that these separate 
jurisdictions caused within their bailiwick. Indeed, so anxious were the 
Commissioners about this problem that they had expressed concern about it well 
before the appointment of the 1833/34 Select Committee. On 20"' June, 1832 
Rowan had written a letter to Under Secretary Phillipps at the Home Off ice on the 
subject. In his and Mayne's evidence to the Committee on 15 th July 1834 Rowan 
mentioned his letter to Phil I ipps. "A copy subsequently appeared as an 
Appendix to the Committee's Report. " 
Rowan's letter complains of 'a want of cordial co-operation' from the magistrates 
off ices and the officers they employed toward the new Metropolitan Police, and 
the 'embarrassments' that resulted from it. He sought Phillipps' support for some 
amendment to the Bill then being prepared to renew the Police Offices' 
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legislation. In particular he asked that 'a distinct line be drawn, defining the 
duties to be performed by the Police Magistrates and by the Commissioners 
respectively. ' Rowan suggested that, 
'it should be declared that the duties of the Magistrates and the public 
offices should, in future, be purely judicial, whilst the duties of the 
Commissioners and the Metropolitan Police should be altogether 
executive. ' 
In this connection the earlier discussion of the position of the officers attached to 
the police offices should be remembered. When the Commissioners asked that 
the Metropolitan Police be given the 'executive' duties of the magistrates they 
clearly did not include the duties performed by the officers employed to act as 
agents for the magistrates in their 'judicial' functions of investigating reports and 
allegations of crime in order to identify and prosecute offenders. It is important, 
as will appear, that Rowan's letter is understood in this way, i. e. that it does not 
imply that the Commissioners were willing to absorb either the criminal 
investigative and detective duties of the magistrates or the officers specially 
employed on them. 
In the event, neither Rowan's letter nor the rest of the Report of the 1833/34 
Select Committee led to any immediate action on the issue. As has been noted, 
the problem of the relationship between the magistrates and the Commissioners 
was deliberately fudged in the Select Committee's Report. Nor, it would seem, 
was any action taken on the Committee's recommendation that all the different 
preventive and street police of the capital, including the uniformed foot and horse 
patrols attached to the Bow Street Off ice, be put under the direction of Rowan and 
Mayne. But Rowan's suggestion that a clearer division should be made between 
judicial and executive activities in the respective responsibilities of the 
magistrates of the metropolis and the Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police 
Force was not completely forgotten. It survived to have long term consequences 
for the future of policing. 
Detective duties 
One thing is unmistakable from a study of the evidence given by Rowan and 
Mayne to the Select Committees in 1833 and 1834. It is that the New Police had 
no responsibility for, and no desire to take on, the crime investigative and 
detective activities of the magistrates and the officers they employed, not even as 
part of the creation of ajudicial/exccutive division between them. These arc 
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duties in which the plain clothes 'Runners' specialised, and which both the 
1833/34 Select Committee and Rowan and Mayne were more than happy to leave 
as the exclusive responsibility of the magistrates. For their part the 
Commissioners were no doubt pleased that, by their evidence to the Committees, 
they had managed to preserve and reassert both the independence of their Force 
from government control, and their purely preventive place in the battle against 
crime and disorder in the capital. 
Turning Point 77 
6 
Turnin Point 
There the issue of the role and purposes of the New Police and its involvement in 
crime and criminality rested until 1837 when the policing arrangements for the 
metropolis again came on the Parliamentary agenda. Once more the legislation 
supporting the activities of the magistrates of the police offices and the officers 
they employed came due for renewal. By this time circumstances had altered 
radically. Rowan and Mayne's Metropolitan Police Force now had the confidence 
of the vast majority of Londoners and their Parliamentary representatives while 
the reputation and standing of the magistrates' officers had declined. When yet 
another Select Committee was appointed to enquire into the police offices it did 
so 'with a view to improvement of the same. " 
Police Offices Select Committee of 1837/8 
On 24th April 1837 the new Select Committee on the Police Offices of the 
Metropolis called its first witness, Samuel March Phillipps, the long serving 
Under Secretary at the Home Office. He was one of those principally involved in 
the first foundation of Peel's New Police and had been in post since its inception. 
The Committee asked about the recommendations of the 1833/34 Select 
Committee on the amalgamation of the various bodies of police in the metropolis. 
Phillipps said that the Metropolitan Police had absorbed only the Bow Street foot 
and horse patrols. The local constables appointed by the Westminster parochial 
authorities, the River Police, and the City of London remained outside the control 
of the Commissioners! 
Pressed on that that issue Phillipps revealed, perhaps unintentionally, the reason 
for the delay. He trenchantly defended the old system. He rejected the idea of 
amalgamating the River Police with the Metropolitan Force when it was 
suggested that might bring about 'unity of purpose and action' between them. He 
dismissed the idea, saying, 'I am persuaded there is more of sound than of 
substance in that remark. " He went onto support the traditional role of the 
magistrates of the metropolis as both investigators and adjudicators in cases 
brought to them and in employing plain clothes officers to assist them in that 
work. When asked, 
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'Do you conceive in reference to other offices that objections might arise, 
that such a course is objectionable, namely to the Magistrate interesting 
himself in the detection of that criminal whose case he has to decide upon 
afterwardsT 
he replied, 'I should say not; decidedly not. " 
The Committee then turned to the possibility, raised by the Commissioners with 
the 1833/34 Select Committee, that the magistrates' officers should be 'replaced' 
by Metropolitan Police constables. The 1833/34 Select Committee had decided 
not to recommend the idea, suggesting instead that the Commissioners should take 
over responsibility for the 'pay, clothing and general discipline' of the magistrates 
officers while leaving them 'under the immediate and direct control of the Police 
Magistrates'. ' In a series of questions the 1838 Select Committee put this 
'replacement' suggestion to Phillipps. He saw no benefit in the idea. The 
Committee pressed him to explain his objections to this and the other 
amalgamating proposals of the 1833/34 Select Committee. Phillipps defended 
the existing arrangements as according with both the law and the principles of the 
English criminal justice system. ' The Chairman thought he saw an opportunity 
in this answer to get round Phillipp's obduracy: 
'The Committee understand, correctly, from your evidence, that there is no 
practical objection to that consolidation [of the policing of the metropolis] 
recommended by the [ 1833/34] CommitteeT 
He got a dusty answer. 'I think it would fail. ' 
Phillipps also gave evidence about the relative merits of the officers attached to 
the police off ices and the constables of the Metropolitan Police in the detection of 
criminal offenders. The issue arose from an earlier answer. Phillipps had 
mentioned the growing practice of sending officers from London to assist in cases 
of serious crime committed elsewhere in the country. The Police Offices Select 
Committee expressed surprise that the Bow Street Magistrates met all such 
appeals, and that Metropolitan Police constables never responded to them. 
Following along the consolidating and amalgamating line being taken by the 
Committee, the Chairman asked; 
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'Would it not be most advisable for all applications of that kind referred to 
the Commissioners, who have a much wider selection of men to furnish the 
demand you have spoken of, and would it not thereby prevent that 
interruption to the system of consolidation which is desiredT 
i. e. to the 'replacement' idea. 
In a reply that supported his position on the magistrates' officers but which, 
though true and justified, offended Rowan and Mayne's pride in their Force and 
aroused their ire, Phillipps said; 
'The officers attached to the police offices would be more expert in the 
detection of crime than the common Metropolitan Police officers; they are 
more practised in that particular business, more exercised in looking for and 
searching out proofs, and therefore more expert in tracing out and detecting 
crime, than the common Metropolitan Police officer. "' 
Four days later, on 28 1h April, the Committee recalled Phillipps to continue his 
evidence. It asked if the Home Department planned to put forward amendments 
to the Police Offices Act when its renewal was considered during the current 
Parliamentary session. Phillipps said that only minor matters were contemplated. 
The Chairman asked, 
'No alteration in the law, and nothing to improve the administration of 
justice? - (Phillipps) None to improve the administration ofjustice in the 
police offices. 
It was not contemplated then, to extend the jurisdiction, in any way, of the 
Magistrates? - (Phillipps) That was not intended. ' 
Subsequently in his evidence that day Phillipps reinforced and confirmed the 
Home Office position. He said that the Home Off ice neither required nor 
expected major changes in the legislation on the policing of the metropolis, 
despite the appointment of the Select Committee. The Chairman then put to him 
a whole series of radical proposals the Committee apparently had in mind, aimed 
at a review and restructure of the work of the police offices. ' He then asked 
Phillipps, 
'Would it not be desirable, in the present Act, to introduce a few clauses 
embodying these improvements that you have expressed your opinion on? ' 
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He got a typically defensive mandarin response; 
'They might be introduced into the Police Bill, if determined upon and 
settled, but I think the best course will be to introduce a temporary Bill in 
the present session to continue the Police Act which is about to expire, to 
the end of the next session; the alterations suggested, if they are to be 
adopted, will require a great deal of careful consideration, and ought not to 
be got up in a hurry. " 
Toward the end of his evidence on 28h April Phillipps made an important 
concession to the ambitions of the Committee on the issue of reform. It came in 
response to a question on something the Select Committee clearly saw as a 
persistent problem, i. e. what should be the proper relationship between the 
magistrates of the metropolis and the Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police. 
The framing of the question showed its origins in Charles Rowan's letter to 
Phillipps in 1832 on the subject of ajudicial/executive division between the 
functions of the magistrates and the Commissioners, which had found its way into 
the Appendices to the 1833/34 Select Committee's Report. The1837/38 
Committee put their question on this letter to Phillipps in such a way that he had 
the unappetising choice of disagreeing with Rowan, or retracting his earlier 
support for the existing structure. Forced into that comer Phillipps agreed that, 
'the general principle is right, that the judicial business should go to the 
magistrates of the police offices and the administrative or executive should 
go to the Commissioners. "" 
This was a significant concession to the reforming intent of the Committee, as 
subsequent events were to prove. 
There is more than a suspicion that the Committee ambushed Phillipps on this 
appearance before it. His answers to the Committee's questions and suggestions 
bear the mark of a man ill-prepared and under pressure. Hemisjudgedthe 
reforming mood of the Committee. He revealed self-satisfied inertia in the Home 
Office on the issue of the policing of the capital. He certainly underestimated the 
determination of the Select Committee to use the opportunity of the imminent 
expiry of the Police Offices legislation to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
whole of the criminal justice arrangements for the metropolis. 
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Edward Gibbon Wakefield 
In that ambition the Committee found an ally in the person of Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, Esq. whom they called in and examined on V June 1837. Wakefield 
is acolourful figure. His claim to the attention of the Select Committee rested on 
two books. The first was an ambitious proposal for the colonisation of South 
Australia by means of cheap land sales to the labouring masses newly generated 
by urban and industrial growth. The second was a treatise on capital punishment 
in London and its lack of effect on the criminal propensities of the population. 
Both books drew on his experience as a prisoner in Newgate Gaol while serving a 
three year term for the abduction of a 12 year old heiress with intent to marry. 
On release from prison in 1829 he embarked on his South Australian colonisation 
project and later stood as MP for Birmingham in the 1836 Parliamentary election. 
He was disappointed in both schemes. 
Wakefield strongly criticised the performance of the Metropolitan Police Force in 
the detection and punishment of criminals. He thought the Force effective in 
4maintaining order, in preventing nuisances, in driving out of sight many evils 
which still exist. "' But he did not think it had had any effect in rooting out the 
'prompters of crime', by which he meant those who recruited young people to 
take up a criminal way of life. Such characters are immortalised by Charles 
Dickens' Fagin in 'Oliver Twist'. In Wakefield's opinion the Force had not 
restricted the activities of these receivers of stolen property in the capital. " 
It is notable that the Committee did not press Wakefield on these criticisms of the 
Metropolitan Police. The earlier 1833/4 Select Committee had clearly confirmed 
that it was no part of the duty of Rowan and Mayne's men to seek out and 
prosecute the 'prompters' of crime. That was the duty of the plain clothes and 
other officers employed by the magistrates. Indeed those officers had been given 
special powers in law not available to Metropolitan Police constables to enable 
them to carry out that work. Those earlier findings must surely have been known 
to the members of the 1837 Select Committee. If not, then they ought to have 
been. They provide a complete answer to Wakefield's comments. But they were 
not put to him. 
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Having been allowed to launch these unjustified and indeed, unwarranted 
accusations against Rowan and Mayne, Wakefield was then asked about the 
opinions expressed in his second book. He said that punishment, even public 
executions, had little or no deterrent effect on criminal behaviour. He therefore 
dismissed that approach to the reduction of criminality. 
That forthright declaration led the Select Committee to draw him out on the 
subjects of the investigation of crime and the detection of offenders. The 
exchanges are lengthy but are worth reproducing. They show that, from his own 
knowledge and despite his earlier disparaging remarks, Wakefield recognised that 
Rowan and Mayne's men had no responsibility for the investigation and detection 
of criminals. The exchanges also shed an illuminating light on the practice and 
understanding of crime control in nineteenth century England. 
The Chairman asked Wakefield, 
'There being, therefore, so many fertile sources of crime in the metropolis, 
is it not desirable that some much more efficient means of detection should 
be afforded? - (Wakefield) Most desirable, as it appears to me; for although 
one cannot say that the detection of crime in London is exactly nobody's 
business, still it is very difficult to point out whose business it is; if a person 
is robbed in London, it seems to be nobody's business but his own; at least 
there seems to be no public functionaries whose business it is to detect the 
person who commits that crime. ' 
The Chairman pressed him on that point. 
'In fact you would confine the business of detection to persons properly 
qualified, having a duty of that nature specially intrusted to them? - 
(Wakefield) It has always appeared to me that there should be some class of 
police officers apart from all the others,... whose sole business should be as 
far as possible to hinder the commission of crime by rooting out the 
nurseries of crime, and to detect crime by pursuing thieves and tracing 
stolen goods, and by all the other methods in which crime is detected. "' 
Wakefield's answers to the Committee accurately report the situation in the 
metropolis in 1837. No one individual or organisation had overall responsibility 
for the investigation of crime, or for the identification, detection and pursuit of 
criminal offenders. The magistrates officers might be persuaded (by promises of 
13 ibidpage437at paras. 1205and]206 
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rewards) or directed (by the magistrates) to pursue offenders, but they had no 
overall responsibility for the detection of crime in the metropolis. Wakefield's 
evidence is also that responsibility for the investigation of reports and allegations 
of undetected crime did not fall within the remit of the Commissioners of the 
Metropolitan Police Force, even by default. Yet the Select Committee did not 
take him back to his earlier criticisms of Rowan and Mayne's alleged failures in 
this respect, as they might well, and indeed ought to, have done. 
Taken as a whole it is possible to infer from Wakefield's evidence and from his 
character that he saw the situation he described to the Select Committee as an 
opportunity. The conjecture is that Wakefield had some hope that he might be 
appointed to undertake the responsibility for 'rooting out of the prompters of 
crime' in the capital. Given his lack of success in other attempts to establish 
himself in a worthwhile career, the suggestion must be that Wakefield was not 
simply aiming to inform the Select Committee. He was also trying to get himself 
ajob as public prosecutor, and/or pursuer and rooter-out of criminals. 
Shortly after hearing Wakefield's evidence, and in an odd parallel with the 
experience of its 1833/34 predecessor, wider events interrupted the Select 
Committee's work. On this occasion it was the sudden death of the King and the 
accession of the eighteen-year old Victoria to the throne. On 28'h of June the 
Committee reported that, 'the unexpected and melancholy demise of his Majesty 
... have induced Your Committee to suspend the 
further progress of the Inquiry'. 
The Select Committee then closed its proceedings with a recommendation that 
Parliament should renew the Police Offices Act as a temporary measure and re- 
appoint it to complete its work in the next session. 
The Commissioners and amalgamation 
When it resumed the next year, the Select Committee called Rowan and Mayne 
back before them on I" and 91h of March. They put two issues to the 
Commissioners. One was the amalgamation of all the patrolling police 
establishments in the capital with their Force, which they had earlier discussed 
with Under Secretary Phillipps. The other was the evidence of Wakefield about 
the lack of an effective means of detecting crime in the capital. 
Dealing with the first issue, Rowan and Mayne were still in favour of 
incorporating all the remnants of the old parish-based policing system into their 
Force. They had, after all, asked as much of the earlier 1833/34 Select 
Committee. Yet the police offices, the River Thames, the parish of Westminster 
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and the City of London still had their own constables. Rowan and Mayne were 
eager to use the opportunity presented by the appointment of the Committee 
finally to remove the anomalies and irritations caused by these separate police 
establishments operating within their area. The City was exempt from the 
provisions of the founding 1829 Metropolitan Police Act. It had stubbornly used 
its powerful financial and economic position to remain an island of the old system 
surrounded by the New Police. Nevertheless Rowan and Mayne were ready to 
indicate their willingness to absorb it and all the other existing police 
establishments in the metropolis. " 
The initial suggestion by the Select Committee on this occasion was a 
straightforward transfer of all these parochial constables into the Metropolitan 
Police Force. The suggestion met with a surprisingly cautious response from the 
Commissioners. They merely asked if the funding for all those men would 
follow their transfer. " The Chairman then tried to clarify their view by the tactic 
he had used when dealing with the evidence of Under-Secretary Phillips and at 
this point matters began to get confused. He asked, 
'You see no practical objection, then, to your being invested in fact with all 
the executive duties of the police of the metropolis, taking that in its largest 
and most practical extentT 
The question clearly again returns to Rowan's letter of 1832 to Under-Secretary 
Phillipps that now formed an Appendix to the 1833/34 Select Committee Report. 
That letter had advocated just such a division of work as between the magistrates 
of the metropolis and the Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police. The 
Commissioners followed Phillipps line in dealing with it. They said, 'We do not 
think that any practical difficulty exists'. "' 
Richard Mayne then went on to expand and clarify that answer. He made it clear 
that what the Commissioners wanted was for the magistrates to give up 
responsibility for all the practical work arising from theirjudicial functions; i. e., 
the execution of warrants, the service of summonses, etc. That would end the 
confusion of the existing arrangements in which the magistrates either kept such 
work to themselves, i. e. assigned it to the officers they employed, or allocated it at 
their whim to one of the other police establishments in the capital, including, of 
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course, to the Metropolitan Police Force. Predictable conflicts and clashes 
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resulted, usually from failures in communication. Mayne said, in support of the 
proposition in Rowan's letter and the evidence given earlier by Under Secretary 
Phillipps, that, 
'such an arrangement would more completely effect the proposed 
separation of the judicial and executive duties of police, and would prevent 
any prejudicial interference between ... the magistrates' offices and the 
general body of the police, ' 
He then described the support the magistrates might expect under this 
arrangement, saying, 
'that, if such a plan were adopted, the entire body of the police would then 
feel it their duty and be equally interested to act in execution of the 
warrants of the magistrates, and assist in getting up the evidence in cases 
before the magistrates, or in any other way that might be useful. ' 
In further exchanges the Committee suggest that the existing police office officers 
might remain in their posts but be stripped of their police powers, so that they 
would 'be more in the nature of ushers and door-keepers than officers of police. "" 
Rowan agreed with another surprisingly modest response. Instead of simply 
accepting the suggestion, as well he might, he said, 
'It would be idle to say we imagine the great mass of the metropolitan 
police officers are equal in skill to the chosen body of officers the 
magistrates have had under their orders; but I believe (and we can 
corroborate that fully) there are a number of men in the metropolitan police 
more than equal to the number of those in the magistrates' off ices, who are 
quite equal to any duty, be it what it may. ' 
adding, 
'There is no sort of police duty which we could not find an officer well 
qualified to perform. -And those officers of the metropolitan police are 
under the observation of the magistrates as much as the officers under their 
more immediate orders. "' 
Clearly, in these two responses Rowan and Mayne are encouraging the Select 
Committee along its amalgamating and unifying line. But in view of the widely 
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differing duties and functions of the magistrates officers and the constables of the 
Metropolitan Police these exchanges cannot amount to an agreement by Rowan 
and Mayne either that they should absorb all the remaining magistrates officers 
into their Force (the Committee suggest some should be retained as 'ushers and 
door-keepers'), or, more importantly, that all the activities those officers could be, 
or should be, transferred to their men. The Commissioner's focus is on the need 
for ajudicial/executive division as between themselves and the magistrates; and 
on the problem of 'prejudicial interference' between the 'executive' activities of 
their constables and the magistrates officers arising from a failure to make that 
division. And it should also be noted that Mayne's claims for the skills of his 
constables relates to their performance of duties 'under the observation of the 
magistrates', i. e. while they are engaged in those shared 'executive' functions. 
The present-day observer might regard this as a subtle distinction, but the Report 
of the 183 3/34 Select Committee with its condemnation of any 'use of spies' by 
the Metropolitan Police, on which the Commissioners and the Committee were 
agreed, makes the matter clear. In 1838 'executive' duties in the policing of the 
metropolis did not include the magistrates 'judicial' function of the investigation 
of reports and allegations of crime in which their own employed officers (which 
might on occasion include one or more of Rowan and Mayne's constables on loan 
or attachment) acted as their agents. Thus, in their response to the Select 
Committee on this occasion Rowan and Mayne do not accept, nor does the 1838 
Select Committee propose, that they or their constables should take over any of 
the magistrates' existing judicial responsibilities in relation to crime investigation 
and criminal prosecutions. There are signs however, that the Select Committee 
did not quite grasp, or perhaps never understood, either the complexities of the 
subject they were discussing or the subtleties of the Commissioners' position on 
it. 
The Commissioners and the duties of the magistrates 
Symptoms of a misunderstanding between the Commissioners and the Committee 
appear almost at once when the Committee tried to deal with the implications of 
the proposed changes in the relationship between the magistrates and the 
Commissioners. Rowan and Mayne demurred when the Committee suggested 
that Superintendents of the Metropolitan Police should take charge of all cases 
'sent before the magistrates, or to trial from his division', in effect to become the 
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public prosecutor for their districts. " Pressed by the Committee, the 
Commissioners agreed that such a public officer was desirable, and allowed that it 
was possible that he might be an officer of police. Rowan and Mayne were able 
to give that ground because the Committee revealed at this point that it was 
thinking in terms of the continental system of public prosecutors. This was the 
system already operating in Scotland and Ireland whereby a public official 
undertook responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases 
before the courts. "' Rowan and Mayne could safely agree with that proposal. It 
was similar to one put forward by Wakefield. He had proposed that a new and 
separate element be added to the English criminal justice system to undertake the 
identification, pursuit and prosecution of criminal offenders. Since the 
Commissioners were already clear that they did not have, and had not agreed to 
undertake, those responsibilities, such a development could take place without 
touching upon, or adding to, any of the existing duties and functions of the 
Metropolitan Police. " 
Later the Select Committee further explored the theme of a division between 
judicial and executive functions in the criminal justice system of the metropolis. 
They suggested that the Commissioners might wish to take on one of the main 
responsibilities of the magistrates, and issue warrants in cases of felonies and 
other offences. Now Rowan and Mayne took alarm and dug in their heels. They 
flatly rejected the idea saying, 'We do not think it would be desirable or 
convenient for the public. "' Significantly, they also rejected outright a proposal 
to give them control of some of the 'nests of crime' mentioned by Wakefield. 
The Committee then offered to give them power over low brothels and lodging 
houses. " This was also rejected. It is a pity that the Select Committee did not go 
on to clarify why the Commissioners refused these offers of greater power. Had 
it done so it might have discovered Rowan and Mayne's unwillingness to become 
involved in the criminal investigative, detective and prosecution responsibilities of 
the magistrates and their officers. 
The Commissioners and crime 
The reason for that reluctance was revealed but, it would appear, not grasped by 
the Committee when Rowan and Mayne returned to the hearings a week later on 
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90'March. In the interim they had received a copy of the evidence given to the 
Committee the previous year; that is, before the death of the King and the 
interruption of its proceedings. The Select Committee wanted Rowan and Mayne 
to review their position after considering the evidence of other witnesses. Rowan 
and Mayne may by then have had second thoughts about the extent of their earlier 
concessions to the amalgamating ambitions of the Committee. They may also 
have baulked after reading what others, especially Phillipps, had said earlier. Or 
it may simply be that both they and the Select Committee recognised a need to 
clarify their evidence or clear up some differences between their evidence and that 
of other witnesses. But for whatever reason the proceedings of the Committee do 
not follow their usual pattern on this occasion. After some preliminary 
inconsequential inquiries about the treatment of vagrants, the Committee 
interrupted its questions to invite the Commissioners to comment on the evidence 
given by earlier witnesses. " 
Rowan and Mayne's response to this opportunity shows that, for their part, they 
were anxious to correct any misunderstanding arising from their agreement to a 
judicial/executive division of responsibilities between themselves and the 
magistrates of the metropolis. They began by responding to the evidence of 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield and his criticisms of the New Police as failing 
adequately to deal with either the prevention or the detection of crime in the 
metropolis. They then went on, in a unique and important passage, " to set out 
their view of what the New Police could, and should, do in the battle against 
crime in the capital, and the limits of their powers and responsibilities as they 
understood them. They are clearly speaking from a carefully prepared script and 
their remarks on this occasion should have cleared up any earlier ambiguities in 
their evidence to the Committee. 
Dealing first with Wakefield's charge that 'the metropolitan police have not been 
useful in preventing crime' the Commissioners began by explaining that, insofar 
as they understood their duties, they did not follow the distinction between the 
prevention of crime and its detection which was made by other commentators, 
including and especially by Wakefield. They had a specific and unique view on 
that issue, based firmly on their Force being a purely preventive element in the 
criminal justice system. Theysaid, 
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'We would remark ... that by many persons there is a wider distinction 
drawn between the prevention of crime and the detection of crime than is 
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warranted by a consideration of the subject, at least as regards the 
operations of a street police; which we would explain thus: Suppose, for a 
moment, a police to be so numerous as to render the commission of crime 
in the streets impossible, without being seen, and the party detected in the 
act; this would be decided prevention, but merely by fear of instant 
detection and subsequent punishment. On the other hand, suppose that 
every crime committed, without exception, were detected immediately, or 
within a certain number of hours afterwards, the effect in the prevention of 
crime would be nearly, and the principle altogether, the same as in the first 
supposed case, viz. the fear of being immediately brought to justice. If 
this view be correct, detection, as far as it goes, is prevention, as regards a 
street police. ' 
As to the prevention of crime the Commissioners went on to say, 
'It being impossible, however, in such a district as that of the metropolitan 
police, to prevent crime by the actual presence every where of the 
constable, we would advert to a simple mode of prevention of another 
kind. ' 
They then presented to the Select Committee a paper showing the number of 
offences against property committed in the metropolis for the previous year 
(1837). The total was 8,821. Of those offences the Commissioners estimated 
that some 6000 'might have been prevented by a little precaution on the part of 
those upon whom the loss has fallen; ' They say that; 
'this is the prevention to which we refer, and which is so much the more 
desirable, as these are chiefly cases which it is next to impossible for any 
vigilance on the part of the police to prevent' 
This is an importance passage in the Commissioners' evidence. It shows that 
they had an entirely different view of the distinction between the prevention and 
detection of crime from that made by other commentators. Insofar as they 
understood their responsibilities they regarded the patrolling activities of the 
uniformed constables they employed as adequately serving both purposes. As 
they had tried to make clear to the earlier 1833/134 Select Committee, their 'street 
police' could do no more that deter miscreants by their presence, and detain those 
caught in the act of crime. The prevention of 'cases which it is next to 
Turning Point 90 
impossible for any vigilance on the part of the police to prevent' was a 
responsibility of others, not one they bore alone. 
For the sake of clarity, the Commissioners then set out the extent of their 
contribution, as a street police, to the detection of crime in the metropolis. " They 
say that when any of their constables discovers, or receives a report of, a crime, 
croute papers' are prepared and circulated. The system was that the police 
division where the offence occurred initiated these route papers. The 
Superintendent (or the Inspector on duty if the Superintendent was not available) 
then circulated them to all the other divisions of the metropolitan police. Each 
division through which they passed noted the time of receipt on the back. In the 
morning all route papers arrived at the Commissioners office for perusal and 
comment. Provided no further immediate action arose from the papers, a report 
of the crime went to the Bow Street Police Office for inclusion in the printed daily 
police report prepared and published by the Chief Magistrate, together with 'any 
clue ... or any thing which they think will facilitate the detection of the offender'. 
In addition, the Commissioners sent descriptions of any property stolen to all 
pawn brokers and marine store dealers in the metropolis, with a warning not to 
receive the property described. " 
The 'route papers' also recorded 'the name of the police constable who was on the 
beat where the felony took place ... and the name of the constable whose particular 
business it was made to trace the offiender'. " Whether or not this aspect of the 
droute papers' system confused the Select Committee is not clear from its 
subsequent proceedings. Rowan and Mayne do not mention at this point the 
occasional employment of their constables to work under the directions of the 
magistrates in specific cases, an ad hoc arrangeenit which they had described to 
the 1833/34 Select Committee, although for completeness it might have been 
helpful had they done so. But the strictly limited extent of the involvement of the 
constables of the Metropolitan Police in the investigation and detection of crime 
ought to have been apparent in the Commissioners' answers to the next two 
questions put to them. 
In answer to Lord Hotham, Rowan said that the process described was 'in all 
cases followed if the circumstances are such as to permit of it being employed 
with any hope of a favourable result', to which Mayne added, 'And to the proper 
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extent in every case. "' After further remarks by the Commissioners the 
Chairman (Mr. Benjamin Hawes) then asked, 'Are there not classes of crime 
which arise from causes beyond the reach of police regulationsT Rowan's 
response was to refer to the paper on crime in the metropolis which the 
Commissioners hadjust discussed with the Committee when setting out their view 
of their responsibilities for the prevention of crime. He pointed out that only 12 of 
the 26 categories of crime listed on that paper could properly be regarded as being 
within the responsibilities of a 'street police', i. e. could in any way have been 
prevented or detected by a patrolling constable. " 
What the Select Committee may have failed to understand is that the 
Commissioners' route papers simply put the old Saxon 'quick and fresh pursuit' 
and 'hue and cry' on a formal basis. Their system did no more than 
communicate news of the crime to all the constables on duty in the Metropolitan 
Police district and then ensure that all necessary action to detain nearby or 
immediately available offenders had been taken. By an extension of those 
responsibilities constables might be assigned to the attempt to trace a fleeing 
offender or even temporarily employed in plain clothes to identify him where, as 
the Commissioners put it, there was 'any hope of a favourable result' and 'to the 
proper extent in every case'. But if, by a further extension of the system, a 
Metropolitan Police constable was employed by a magistrate for the investigation 
and detection of an escaped or unidentified offender, then the Commissioners took 
no interest in what he did, nor had any responsibility for it, as Mayne had told the 
1833/34 Select Committee. But none of those extensions or exceptions altered the 
essentially limited nature of the Commissioners 'route papers' system, which was 
very much more concerned with mollifying victims and answering any subsequent 
criticisms of the immediate actions of their Force than with the identification and 
detection of the perpetrators of crime, which remained the responsibility of the 
magistrates. 
If the Select Committee was unclear on these points it was not helped by Richard 
Mayne. He was unable to resist the temptation to add a final flourish to the 
evidence of the Commissioners on these matters and rebut the slur earlier cast on 
the abilities of his constables by Under Secretary Phillips. He ended his remarks 
on the route papers system by boasting that it had had some success in crime 
detection. He said; 
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'We have had several ... cases ... which shew there was as great a degree of 
skill available on the part of the officers concerned, as could be shown by 
any other body of police"' 
All Mayne meant to imply in this codicil to the Commissioners evidence at this 
point is that where Metropolitan Police constables were employed to pursue 
offenders under the 'route papers' system and its extensions, they were as good at 
catching criminals as any others engaged in the work in the metropolis, such as 
parochial constables and the like, including presumably therefore, the magistrates 
officers and not excepting the plain clothes detective 'Runners' themselves. He 
does not suggest that the Commissioners had any responsibility for such work, or 
that it formed any part of the normal duties of their constables. And in their other 
answers to this, and previous, Select Committees the Commissioners sought to 
make it clear that they had no reason or any wish to take it up. 
Unfortunately Mayne in particular had too often over-complicated these matters. 
Neither the evidence of the Commissioners to the Select Committee in the session 
before its adjournment in 1837 nor their subsequent attempt to clarify their 
attitude toward detective work in their later appearances before the Committee 
was sufficiently clear or coherent. The Commissioners had overreached 
themselves in their anxiety to bring about an amalgamation of the 'executive' 
policing of the capital and to reject Under Secretary Phillipps' adverse view of the 
detective ability of their officers. So they allowed themselves the luxury of 
boasting and in the process confused the Select Committee. 
Subsequent events give weight to the conjecture that the Committee may have 
gained the false impression from the Commissioners evidence that they were both 
able and prepared to absorb all the criminal investigative and detective 
responsibility of the magistrates officers, including all the plain clothes activities 
required for the judicial function of identifying, detecting and prosecuting 
criminals. The Commissioners' later efforts to explain the subtleties of their 
position on these issues seems to have fallen on stony ground. Their explanation 
that their Force was a 'street police' with a field of effective action limited to 
preventable offences and the 'quick and fresh pursuit' of offenders may not have 
registered with the Committee. Nor did Committee members seem quite to grasp, 
or simply could not understand, that Rowan and Mayne regarded the uniformed 
patrolling activities of their constables and their immediate efforts to detain 
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offenders when they failed to prevent a crime as a full description of the 
responsibilities they were prepared to accept, and as adequately and successfully 
serving both the prevention and the detection of crime as they understood it. 
Misunderstandings 
For whatever reason the 1837/1838 Select Committee seems to have wrongly 
concluded that the Metropolitan Police both could and would take up all the 
whole of the policing of the capital including providing replacements for all the 
officers presently employed by the magistrates. The error may have been 
avoided had the exchanges between the Commissioners and the 183 7/3 8 Select 
Committee dealt explicitly with the work of the specialist detectives among the 
magistrates' officers -the 'Runners' and their imitators - or their criminal- 
associative and informant-cultivating activities. But they did not do so and there 
are two good reasons for this unfortunate omission. First, those activities had a 
dubious basis in law and were only unofficially sanctioned by the magistrates. 
And second, the Commissioners and the Committee were in agreement on the 
issue. They both condemned the close involvement of the magistrates' officers 
with the criminal classes and wished to see it ended. 
It is also reasonable to assume that the Select Committee and the Commissioners 
believed that the judicial/executive division of responsibility they proposed to 
establish in the capital, coupled with the growing success of tile New Police, 
would make such work unnecessary. That however, was a serious misjudgement. 
Growth in both the quantity and complexity of crime led to an increase rather than 
a decrease in the demand for the detective duties of the magistrates' officers, and 
especially for the specialised skills of the plain clothes 'Runners' and their 
imitators. That understandable mistake had the most serious consequences for 
the future of Peel's New Police. 
Rowan and Mayne were amongst the last of the witnesses called before the Select 
Committee on the Police Offices. Its Report was published to Parliament in July 
1838. Its findings and conclusions were the starting point for a revolution in the 
development of policing in Britain. 
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Acts and Consequences 
By order of Parliament the 1837/38 Select Committee on the Metropolis Police 
Offices published its Report on ll'h July 1838. The Committee's terms of 
reference focussed on the need to review and reform the magistrates offices of the 
metropolis. The chief influence on its conclusions and recommendations was the 
emergence and success of Peel's New Police under Commissioners Rowan and 
Mayne. 
Government, as represented by Under Secretary Phillipps and the Home Office, 
had expected little to come of the Committee's work but the imminent expiry of 
the legislation that supported the police offices gave the Committee an 
opportunity it exploited to the full. It decided on a radical restructure of the 
functions and duties of the magistrates of the metropolis and to raise their status 
and pay accordingly. At the same time the Select Committee took the far- 
reaching decision that henceforward the magistrates would perform purely 
judicial functions and rely on the Metropolitan Police for the discharge of their 
traditional executive duties. The outcome was the passage of two Acts of 
Parliament in the following year, the Metropolitan Police Act (2&3 Vict. Cap. 
47), and the Metropolitan Police Courts Act (2&3 Vict. Cap. 71). 
The hasty Acts of 1839 
Regrettably, despite Under Secretary Phillipps' warning to the 1838 Select 
Committee that changes to the police offices legislation 'ought not to be got up in 
a hurry', neither Act received the drafting and careful consideration they 
deserved. The Select Committee Report was with Parliament in July 1838. 
The Bills to implement its recommendations were delayed for seven months; 
first, by the Home Office unpreparedness revealed in Under Secretary Phillipps' 
evidence to the Committee, ' and second by the difficulty of drafting their 
complex, contentious and interlocking provisions. The Bills finally came on the 
Parliamentary agenda in February 1839. Time was by then short. The Session 
was due to end in October and both Bills were contested measures. Each had to 
pass through both Houses of Parliament before the end of the session else they 
would fail and need re-introduction. Speed was necessary because the 
legislation supporting the existing Police Offices was about to expire. The 
Select Committee on the Metropolis Police Offices (1837)Parliainentary Papers (1837-8) (451) Vol 
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problem was that the Bills were inseparable. Since they dealt with the 
redistribution of activities between the magistrates courts and the police they 
stood or fell together. 
When the Bills came into the House of Commons Members of Parliament (MPs) 
complained about their clumsy drafting. During the Committee stage of the 
Metropolitan Police Bill; 
'Mr. Duncombe could not but think that the whole of the bills which had 
been introduced for the improvement of the metropolitan police very 
clumsy and bungling pieces of legislation. Already had the House been 
favoured with no fewer than three or four editions of these bills. The first 
was scarcely intelligible and the resolution they were now called upon to 
sanction partook largely of the same character. " 
He was speaking on the clause that dealt with the relatively simple matter of an 
increase in the salaries of the Commissioners. 
When the same Metropolitan Police Bill reached the House of Lords, Lord 
Ellenbrorough complained that it mixed together far too many different kinds of 
legislation. He thought it ought to be at least four separate bills. But, 'because 
there had been great difficulty in getting this Bill through the House of Commons, 
as it was, and he might thereby endanger its passing at all, ' he would not propose 
any amendments. 3 
But neither the complexity and incoherence the Bills, nor that too little time had 
been allowed for Parliament to consider them was the principal difficulty facing 
government. It was that the Bills aroused passionate opposition. The 
Metropolitan Police Bill proposed to amalgamate all the differing police 
establishments of the metropolis into Rowan and Mayne's Force as recommended 
by the Select Committee, thus ending all local involvement in the policing of the 
capital. The plan included the City of London, with predicable results. The 
City Corporation and its many supporters in Parliament launched a weighty and 
well-constructed counter-attack. As a result MPs almost immediately struck out 
the first ten clauses of the Police Bill in order to preserve the independence of the 
City police. ' 
2 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (1839)vol 48pps 711-712 
3 ibid. vol 49 page 92 7 
4 ibid. voL 48page 133 
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Serious though that set-back was, it was not the main objection to the legislation. 
MPs took alarm at what they perceived to be an increase in the power and 
jurisdiction of the magistratesjust as they were coming under the authority of the 
Secretary of State. The Bills were thus seen as combining an assault on the right 
of trial byjury to an intolerable extension of the powers of the government. The 
combination allowed MPs to wrap their attack on the Bills in a cloak of freedom 
and the liberty of the subject. They made the most of the opportunity. 
The Courts Bill proposed to replace the police offices of the metropolis with 
police courts headed by paid magistrates. The new magistrates lost their 
executive functions but gained summary jurisdiction to hear and determine cases, 
including minor crime. In addition it was proposed that a single magistrate could 
hear any case. The Secretary of State was given power to appoint all the 
magistrates; could make regulations for their conduct; and could dismiss them if 
he found them unsuitable. In parallel, the Police Bill greatly extended the 
authority of Rowan and Mayne's men to arrest citizens and bring them before the 
new government-appointed magistrates. The combined effect of these proposals 
provoked outrage. 
Mr. Law, speaking in the Commons during the Committee stage of the Courts Bill 
said that, 'He did not apprehend that such propositions ... would, at any former 
period of the history of the country, have been entertained for one hour'. ' Colonel 
Sibthorp objected to the Third Reading of the Police Bill because, 'a more 
noxious and oppressive measure never had been introduced to Parliament', ' while 
Mr. George Palmer opposed the Third Reading of the Courts Bill because its 
passage would do, 'more ... to destroy the constitution of the country than could 
be accomplished by all the efforts of the Radical reformers. " 
Lords Broughton and Lyndhurst made desperate attempts the delay the Bills in the 
House of Lords. Their aim was to hold them up to the end of the session and so 
kill them. Their Lordships focussed their main effort on the Courts Bill since it 
contained the provisions that most clearly increased the role of government in the 
criminal justice system of the capital. Their Lordships allowed the Police Bill 
through its Third Reading to await Royal Assent, and then Broughton and 
Lyndhurst launched a savage assault on the Courts Bill in its Committee Stage, 
managing to mangle it sufficiently to drive it back to the Commons for 
s ibid. voL49page534 
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reconsideration! But by desperate improvisation both it and its companion 
Police Bill scraped through before the close of the Session. The Police Bill 
received Royal Assent on 17'h August 1839 and the Courts Bill became law nine 
days later on 26 th August 1839, the very last day before the prorogation of 
Parliament. Four days later Henry Phipps replaced Lord John Russell as 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs. 
Some of the exchanges that marked the last despairing effort of their Lordships to 
thwart the Bills are worth reproducing considering the importance of this 
legislation for the future of policing in Britain. One such took place during the 
Committee stage of the Courts Bill. Their Lordships were debating Clause 3. It 
dealt with the payment of magistrates. Lord Brougham objected in principle to 
the clause, picking up the point that it gave great power of patronage to the 
Secretary of State. ' Lord Lyndhurstjoined in to say, 
'Now considering the time at which the bill had come up from the other 
House, was it not reasonable to ask to continue for another year the present 
system? "' 
Viscount Duncannon, the government minister responsible for getting the Bill 
through the Lords, rejected that idea. Lord Lyndhurst tried another tack. 
'If this Bill really was founded upon the reports of the Committee of this 
and the other House, it ought to have been brought forward at an earlier 
period, so that its provisions might have been compared with those reports 
and the evidence on which they were founded. "' 
Clearly Lord Lyndhurst is complaining that the Bills were before Parliament when 
members had had no opportunity to read and absorb the Committee reports on 
which they were based. The legislators had to implement conclusions drawn 
from information they did not have. 
Again Viscount Duncannon refused to budge. Lord Brougham then returned to 
the fray. 
'When the money [for the magistrates] was voted by the House of 
Commons 600 members at least had gone away. In fact it was voted by a 
House which hardly existed but by a bare quorum' 
8 ibid. vol. 50 pps 183 to 192 
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Viscount Duncannon replied that, 'the Bill had been a long time before the other 
House and he never remembered any bill to have undergone more discussion. ' 
Brougham snapped back. 
'I beg my noble Friend's pardon. The bill got into Committee in the other 
House only a fortnight since, and it was then discussed. The state of the 
House on that discussion was shown by the divisions upon it, which 
consisted of ten or fifteen to thirty Members. "' 
These exchanges illustrate how hurried and ill-informed was the thought given to 
these important Acts. Both Houses of Parliament recognised how radical they 
were. It is apparent that both Commons and Lords felt that insufficient time had 
been allowed fully and carefully to discuss and examine the Bills as they passed 
through their stages in Parliament. That fault must lie with government. The 
Select Committee of 1837/38 published its Report in July, 1838. Seven months 
later the rush to get the Bills through Parliament began. It ended with the Courts 
Bill going through all its stages in the House of Lords in eleven days. But the 
unreadiness of both the Commons and the Lords to debate these important matters 
is also due, at least in part, to their own neglect. 
The Royal Commission of 1839 
On 27th March 1839 just after the Police and Courts Bills first appeared on the 
Parliamentary agenda a Royal Commission sitting to 'inquire as to the best means 
of establishing an efficient Constabulary Force in the counties of England' 
presented its First Report. Full-time, paid, police forces on the model of the 
Metropolitan Police were already emerging in British cities. Former 
Metropolitan Police officers commanded many of them. The remit of the Royal 
Commission was to examine the implications of an extension of Peel's New 
Police to rural areas. Members of the Royal Commission were Charles Shaw 
Lefevre (soon to be Speaker of the House of Commons); Edwin Chadwick, the 
well-respected social reformer, and Lt. Col. Charles Rowan, joint Commissioner 
(with Richard Mayne) of the Metropolitan Police Force. 
The Royal Commission was in session throughout the proceedings of the 1837/38 
Select Committee and its first Report was presented to Parliament during the 
passage of the 1839 Metropolitan Police and Courts Bills. In parallel with the 
Select Committee, the Royal Commissioners examined the respective roles of 
12 ibid., page 197 
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justices and constables in the English criminal justice system. UnliketheSelect 
Committee the Royal Commission undertook a detailed and comprehensive 
analysis of the history and development of policing in Britain. On that much 
better base its proposals for the future of the criminal justice system differed 
significantly from those of the Select Committee. 
Two important points made by the Royal Commission do not appear in the Report 
of the Select Committee. First, the Royal Commission identified a need for 
legislative action if ordinary constables, rather than officers working under the 
direction of the magistrates, were to undertake even 'preliminary enquiries' into 
reports of crime or offences. And second, Chadwick and his fellow Royal 
Commissioners saw the vital importance of the appointment of a 'public 
prosecutor' if responsibility for the pursuit and detection of offenders no longer 
fell on the magistrates and their officers. "' It is not clear from the available public 
records whether or not these finding of the Royal Commission were known to 
Rowan when, with Mayne, he gave evidence to the 183 8 Select Committee on the 
Police of the Metropolis. 
Enquiry into crime 
On the first point, the Royal Commission closely examined the historic 
relationship between constables and justices. It found that the common law had 
originally assigned the 'function of enquiry' to constables in relation to crimes 
committed within their bailiwick. However, constables progressively lost that 
function over the centuries following their first regulation by the Statute of 
Winchester. "' In that period the King's justices gradually assumed the 
prerogative to make 'preliminary inquiries' into criminal cases. Later, Henry 
Fielding and his successors expanded and developed that activity of thejustices. 
They introduced the investigative and detective work of the officers attached to 
the police offices, but they ensured that these officers worked under the direction, 
and used the powers, of the magistrates rather than their own as constables. The 
Royal Commissioners contrasted that development with the procedure still in 
force in cases of suspicious death. They found that the coroner still relied on 
local constables to gather evidence for his inquest. 
In their Report to Parliament the Royal Commission drew attention to this 
anomaly, and proposed that the old powers of the constables to enquire into 
13 First Report of the Royal Commission on Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force, 
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crimes reported to them should be restored. Under the heading 'Abandonment 
of the principle of preliminary enquiry', it said that, 
'it appears to be highly desirable that additional powers for securing 
important evidence should be given by the legislature, and that the principle 
should be uniformly put into practical operation by virtue of a legislative 
enactment. The speedy enquiry gives operation to the other principle of 
"quick and fresh pursu if' ... by the constables'. 
" 
When Members of Parliament were considering the legislation to establish a 
judicial/executive division between the magistrates of the metropolis and the 
Metropolitan Police Force, the Royal Commission Report was available to them. 
The report told them that, due to the passage of time, Rowan and Mayne's 
constables no longer had any power in law to make even preliminary enquiries 
into reports and allegations of crime beyond those needed for the discharge of 
their 'quick and fresh pursuit' responsibilities. 
Elsewhere in their First Report the Royal Commissioners note many similar 
examples of decay in old system. " They used that evidence to justify their 
conclusion that the means to prevent and detect crime in rural areas had declined 
to a point beyond local remedy. The only way forward was the adoption of full- 
time paid constables on the model of the Metropolitan Police Force and their 
being given power by statute to inquire into reports of crime. "' 
Public prosecutions 
The second point made by the Royal Commission and ignored by both the Select 
Committee on the Police of the Metropolis and the Parliamentary legislators of 
1839 was the 'Constitutional arrangements for public prosecutions'. "' The Royal 
Commission reported that, 
'one subject strongly pressed upon our attention has been the necessity of 
recommending the appointment of public prosecutors. From all parts of 
the country we have received suggestions of the necessity of providing for 
the appointments of some officer to prosecute those cases in behalf of the 
community at large "in which no individual has any special interest, and in 
which the community has a special interest of its own, superadded to that of 
individuals"'. 
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No such official existed in 1839. Prosecution in criminal cases was the 
responsibility of the aggrieved party or a common informer. It remained so, with 
minor exceptions, right up to and beyond 1879 and the first establishment of the 
office of Director of Public Prosecutions. This unsatisfactory state of affairs thus 
continued for decades after the 1839 Royal Commission Report despite some 
later, even more trenchant, comments on the subject from the Royal Commission 
on the Criminal Law. For example, the Eighth Report of the Criminal Law 
Royal Commission (1845) says; 
'It is obviously of the highest importance to the due administration of 
criminal justice, that provision should be made for the effectual prosecution 
of offenders by agents bound and properly qualified to execute the duty. ... 
The intrusting the conduct of the prosecution to a private individual opens a 
wide door to bribery, collusion and illegal compromises. "" 
The direct and obvious remedy for such defects would be to appoint public 
prosecutors to bring criminal cases before the courts. 
The Royal Commission drew attention to the fact that no public authority, 
including therefore Rowan and Mayne's force, had any responsibility for criminal 
prosecutions. Under the prompting of Edward Wakefield the 183 8 Select 
Committee on the Police Offices had discussed exactly this problem with Rowan 
and Mayne who had then rejected an offer of that authority from it. But neither 
the Metropolitan Police nor the Courts Bill made any provision in 1839 to lay 
responsibility for the conduct of prosecutions on the Metropolitan Police. Nor 
did either of the subsequent Acts provide Rowan and Mayne's men with the 
necessary investigative powers to do so. All the Acts did was to permit, for the 
first time, Metropolitan Police constables to lay informations before the 
magistrates if they so chose. But they were given neither the right nor the 
obligation to do so. 
In sum, the Royal Commission of 1839 made available to Parliament a well- 
researched, authoritative and timely description of the law and the English 
criminal justice system that ought to have been a significant factor in the drafting 
and passage of the 1839 Metropolitan Police and Metropolitan Police Courts Acts. 
The Royal Commissioners established two vital matters that ought to have been 
recognised and dealt with in the legislation. First, they found that Rowan and 
19 Royal Commission on the Criminal Law, Eighth Report. Parliamentary Papers (1845) Vol. XIVpps. 
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Mayne's men lacked any power to enquire into or investigate reports or 
allegations of crime and criminal offences. And second, the Royal Commission 
identified the need for the appointment of public prosecutors as a remedy for the 
endemic corruption and inefficiency they found in the process of bringing 
criminal offenders before the courts. 
Consequences 
III-drafted, desperately rushed and passed by a tiny minority of ill-informed MPs, 
the Metropolitan Police and the Metropolitan Police Courts Acts nevertheless 
mark a watershed in the history of British policing. Together the two Acts aimed 
to set a new pattern for the prevention, detection, prosecution and control of 
crime, first in London and then throughout the nation. The new dispensation 
rested on a principle of separation between judicial and executive functions in the 
criminal justice system. Parliament adopted that principle in order to clarify the 
relationship between the magistrates of the metropolis and the Commissioners of 
the Metropolitan Police. In fact, due to the misunderstandings and confusions 
created by the proceedings of the 1838 Select Committee on the Police Office the 
Acts of 1839 fatally undermined the relationship between justices and constables 
that had gradually emerged from the long development of English common law. 
Section 5 of the Courts Act allowed the magistrates to have sworn constables on 
theirstaff. However, it confined the jurisdiction of those officers to the precincts 
of the Court buildings and to the security of the magistrates. Sections II and 12 
of the Police Act removed any further possibility of 'prejudicial interference' in 
the executive work of the magistrates by directing the Commissioners to ensure 
that a 'sufficient number' of their constables attended on the magistrates 'for the 
purpose of executing such Summonses and Warrants as may be directed to them'. 
The Sections then provided that only constables of the Metropolitan Police could 
undertake such work in the metropolitan police district. However, the Act does 
not give Rowan and Mayne's constables the powers or authority granted to the 
magistrates' officers who had formerly carried out this function. Finallyinthis 
connection, Section 18 gave exclusive rights to the magistrates of the metropolis 
as defined in the Act, to issue warrants or summonses for execution in the 
metropolitan police district. 
The Courts Act greatly enhanced the status of the magistrates. Section 3 made 
seven years' experience as a practising barrister a pre-condition for appointment 
to the bench. Section 9 increased their salaries. Section 2 strictly limited their 
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numbers to a maximum of 27. Other parts of the Act extended the powers of the 
magistrates. Section 21 gave them power to issue warrants 'on good grounds, 
stated on oath' thus allowing such documents to be issued on the sworn 
information of any of the constables of the Metropolitan Police. Other sections 
of the Act empowered the magistrates to compel the attendance of witnesses; to 
order the search of premises, etc., and to deal with receivers of stolen property and 
goods found in their possession. Sections 15 and 16 brought the magistrates of the 
metropolis firmly under the direction of one of Her Majesty's Principal 
Secretaries of State (in practice always the Home Secretary). In both the Courts 
Act (section 55) and the Police Act (sections 74 to 80), the interpretation clauses 
require that the two Acts be construed together. 
Effects of the Acts 
Rowan and Mayne no doubt quietly welcomed the Select Committee's 
determination to remove all their competitors in the metropolis. Most 
subsequent commentators on this development in the policing of the Metropolis 
agree that the Commissioners', 
'confusion ofjurisdiction [with the police offices] was sensibly eliminated 
in 1839 when the police authority was removed from the magistrates, 
leaving them only with judicial authority. "" 
The overall intent of the Metropolitan Courts Act was to confine the magistrates 
to judicial, rather than executive, functions in the criminal justice system. The 
Metropolitan Police Act then sought to transfer their executive functions to 
Rowan and Mayne's Metropolitan Police Force. In this, regrettably, the 
legislators followed their Select Committee into error. Neither the Courts Act nor 
the Police Act of 1839 makes the necessary provision to enable the constables of 
the Metropolitan Police to carry out enquiries into reports of crime. Hence their 
new right to lay informations before the courts was of little value since they had 
no authority to inquire into the case. Unless, that is, they did so under the 
directions of the magistrates in which case Rowan and Mayne took no 
responsibility for their actions. These facts must have been known to both 
Commissioners through Rowan's membership of the Royal Commission that 
discovered them. More importantly, neither Act makes any provision for, 
recognises or even mentions the specialised criminal-associative and informant- 
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cultivating detective work of the 'Runners' which was thus truly 'discontinued' 
without replacement. 
Year of turmoil 
There is no real excuse for this legislative muddle although 1839 was undoubtedly 
a year of political turmoil as well as economic depression. Melbourne's weak 
government offered its resignation over the issue of a constitution for Jamaica, 
precipitating the 'Bedchamber crisis' which momentarily opened the prospect of 
power to Robert Peel's Tories. But the excitement should not have distracted 
Parliament from the importance of the policing Bills, although it may have 
preoccupied Robert Peel himself at a crucial moment in the history of his creation. 
In particular, the failure of Parliamentarians to take full advantage of the wealth of 
excellent information readily available to them on policing issues in the Royal 
Commission Report during the debate on the Bills is censurable to say the least. 
Both the Select Committee and Parliament ignored the important issues raised by 
the 1839 Royal Commission. Significantly, no proper preliminary or preparatory 
consideration was given to the extent and importance of the work of the 
magistrates' officers in gathering information about, and cultivating informants 
among, active criminals and their associates before it ceased. That work of the 
magistrates' officers, and particularly the 'Runners' and their imitators, ended in 
the capital after 1839 but the need for it did not. Rather it grew with rising crime 
while the only organisation either available for, or capable of undertaking, any of 
those vital and troublesome detective duties continued under Commissioners who 
neither recognised nor accepted that they had either the powers to carry them on, 
or any obligation to discharge them. 
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Emergence of the Detectives 
Mayne's letter of 1842 
Three years later, in 1842, the problem caused by the 'discontinuance' of tile 
magistrates' officers began to come to a head. In July of that year the near 
revolutionary Chartist movement, which so troubled government with its radical 
programme of reform and its tendency to use public disorder to further its aims, 
reached one of its periodic peaks. Itpresentedall/4million signature petition to 
Parliament in support of its six-point Charter. Against that background Mayne 
wrote a Memorandum to his Home Secretary, Sir James Graham, dated 14th June, 
on behalf of himself and his fellowjoint Commissioner, Charles Rowan., In it, 
under pressure from the Home Office, he responds to some quite fierce criticism 
of the Metropolitan Police Force. However, his subject it is not the performance 
of his Force against the public order threat posed by the Chartists. It is its 
handling of a sensational murder case. 
The offender, Daniel Good, had escaped from the custody of one of the constables 
of the Metropolitan Police. He then remained at liberty for some two weeks 
despite his guilt and identity being widely known. Mayne complains that the 
publicity given to the case had 'assumed to show a want of skill in the 
Metropolitan Police and a defect of general organisation applicable to detective 
duties. ' In particular Mayne wishes to rebut a painful assertion of the 'greater 
efficiency of the Bow Street officers' I in finding and arresting fleeing offenders, 
doing so later in his Memorandum by recording that 'The Commissioners cannot 
find any proof of such assertions. ' 
He adds that he, 
4cannot find that any documents are in existence of the cases of murder or 
other crimes occurring within the limits now forming the Metropolitan 
Police District prior to the establishment of the Metropolitan Police, to 
enable [him] to form any comparison of the total number of cases that 
occurred, or of the proportion in which the parties were detected. ' 3 
I 'Memorandum relative to the Detective powers of the police' Public Records Office HO 451292 
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Mayne then makes some other fairly telling defensive points on the case of Daniel 
Good in this very important document, before reminding his Home Secretary of 
his understanding of the limitation put on the responsibilities of the Metropolitan 
Police at its foundation. In so doing he clarifies and confirms his own and 
Rowan's view of the proper role and activities of his Force - an issue that the 1838 
Select Committee on the Police Offices had misunderstood and which the Acts of 
1839 had consequently mishandled. He tells the Home Secretary that, 
'The organisation of the Police was made in the first instance without any 
direct provision for the performance of such detective duties, as at that time 
the officers of Bow Street, the Magistrates officers and others, were 
considered exclusively applicable to this branch of the Police 14 
He says that when, 'one or more ... [of his constables] ... were specially charged 
with each ... case', 
'This employment of the men, however useful and necessary for the 
purpose, interfered with the regular routine of duty assigned to each 
individual in the police; and where the enquiry is prolonged and requires 
the whole of his time to be devoted to it ... considerable inconvenience 
arises in supplying the place and carrying on the other Police duties of the 
individuals so employed. " 
However, the problem for Mayne's position on this issue in the year 1842 is 
transparently obvious. Three years earlier Section 5 of the Metropolitan Police 
Courts Act of 183 9 had 'discontinued' the magistrates' officers without effective 
replacement. Those were the men, and especially the detective Runners and 
their imitators, who were best equipped and prepared to seek out a fleeing felon. 
They did so by applying their knowledge of criminal communities to the task, and 
by activating the informants they had carefully cultivated in the 'flash' houses 
they ran with the connivance of their employers, the magistrates of the old police 
offices. These however, were precisely the specialist detective duties that both 
Rowan and Mayne and the Select Committee of 1833/34 had condemned, and 
which the Commissioners had rejected as any part of the responsibilities they 
were prepared to accept, when they had given evidence to the 1838 Police Offices 
Select Committee. After the demise of the magistrates officers, no-one had 
4 ibid. page 13 
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carried on or taken up that work. In the Good case, it would have been 
invaluable. 
The Commissioners had made some adaptation to their system of crime detection 
after 1839, but the importance they attached to it can be best seen in their actions. 
They did not assign any of their constables permanently to such duties. They 
continued with their tried and tested system of allowing Superintendents of 
division to employ constables to investigate reports of crime, or to work under the 
direction of the magistrates, as necessary. But the Commissioners' focus 
remained, as it always had been, on prevention and on the primacy of uniform 
patrol and 'quick and fresh pursuit' rather than on the detection and prosecution of 
unidentified offenders. 
The Report of the Select Committee of 1838 had been highly complimentary to 
Rowan and Mayne and of the methods adopted by their Force. The 
Commissioners therefore took at its word and were content to rely on regular 
uniform patrolling as their principal means both to prevent and to detect crime. 
However, 'When ... the detection of criminals also was gradually cast upon the 
Police" after 1839, the demand for constables to fill the gap opened by the loss of 
the magistrates officers fell ever more heavily on the Metropolitan Police Force. 
The Commissioners careful, and to every appearance grudging, response was to 
expand the 'route papers' system they had described to the Select Committee. 
That had always allowed local divisional Superintendents to respond to local 
demands and the Commissioners began to allow them to employ a few of their 
constables in plain clothes for limited periods to took into specific or troublesome 
crimes. But it was unusual for those officers to be in engaged in such work for 
more than a month at atime. They invariably returned to their 'normal' duties at 
the end of their spell in detection. 
This ad hoc addition to the 'Divisional system' could still be justified in terms of 
the original purposes of the New Police and had the great presentational 
advantage of reproducing the precedent of the local control exercised by the 
magistrates over their officers, without in any way duplicating it. The 
Commissioners themselves had no direct involvement in the detective work of 
their officers. Their 'Divisional system' of detectives thus avoided the worst of 
the criticism that it was a covert introduction of the 'continental' system of 
government spies into the community. Unavoidably however, this local and 
ibidpage 14 
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informal system of crime investigation and detection bad some other, less 
desirable, characteristics. Not only did it not develop the necessary intimate 
Force-wide knowledge of criminals and their habits, haunts, weaknesses and 
strengths, but it also lacked effective co-ordination and the benefits that good 
communication, shared best-practice, pooled knowledge and accumulated 
experience, can bring. 
The Detective Branch 
In 1842 therefore, the Commissioners were in a corner. Their much amended 
Divisional system was already buckling under the pressure created by such 
movements as the Chartists and other social manifestations of the effects of 
industrial isation and urbanisation. And it had failed completely in the case of 
Daniel Good. So, despite the development being contrary to the purpose of the 
New Police as he understood it, Mayne reluctantly proposed, on behalf of both 
Commissioners, to set up a headquarters Detective Branch staffed by constables 
employed as full-time detectives. His misgivings about that development 
nevertheless remained serious and well-founded, and are fully and clearly set out 
in the latter part of his 1842 letter to his Home Secretary. 
Having reminded his Home Secretary that his Force had never been given 
responsibility for the investigation or detection of reports of crime at its 
foundation in 1829, Mayne draws attention to the fact that the magistrates officers 
had continued to have that duty right up to the end of 1839. Ile then moves on to 
raise perhaps the most potent argument against the permanent employment of his 
constables in such detective work. In a passage that is as relevant today as it was 
in 1842 he points out that the employment of his men on such duties would bring 
tile corruption associated with the activities of tile old Bow Street officers into the 
Force. He says; 
'That these [Bow Street] officers had advantages in tracing out some sorts 
of cases is true: - the Commissioners believe it is well known, that, by at 
least some of them, a communication was kept up with thieves or their 
associates, from who occasionally they received information that led to 
detections, that might not otherwise have taken place. Upon the propriety 
of returning to such a system, the Commissioners will make no observation, 
as, in a moral point of view it has been repeatedly denounced. But even 
upon the consideration of mere pecuniary loss and gain, a balance against 
the Public would necessarily be the consequence; for such an understanding 
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between the officers of the Police and criminals in practice, causes the 
officers to allow a number of cases to remain unnoticed in order that now 
and then in a case of great notoriety, the parties or their associates whose 
cases have been connived at on other occasions, may be induced to give the 
information. 
That the thieves will not continue to act on such a system, unless they find 
it upon the whole for their common advantage, will readily be believed. " 
Having made that powerful point he then goes on to raise a second important 
issue. He says that, 
'The Commissioners are aware that there is some danger in establishing 
such a Branch of Police, to whom the duties of a detective character would 
more immediately belong; of causing a relaxation of the exertions of the 
Police in general for the same purpose, which have hitherto been successful 
to so great an extent; - and it may be diff icult to def me the exact point of 
time and the exact circumstances under which the advantage of pursuit by 
the whole body of the Police is to be abandoned; " 
In this passage Mayne raises a second fundamental difficulty created by the 
formation of a full-time, specialist detective branch within the professional police 
service, and one which, even now, troubles British chief police officers. He asks 
when, how and in what circumstances he is to decide when to transfer the 
investigation of a crime from his uniformed patrolling constables to one of the 
officers of the specialist detective branch. In asking that question Mayne 
touches, without actually raising, a wider issue still unresolved to this day. How 
much time, effort and resources should the police put into an attempt to prevent 
crime from being committed in the first place or to catch offenders in the act, and 
how much into the investigation of already reported crimes in order to identify 
and prosecute the criminals responsible? Mayne has no answer to either his or the 
wider question in 1842, but says that tile Commissioners, 'apprehend that 
arrangements may be made to prevent such a result', ' i. e. a diminution in the 
effectiveness of the New Police in their preventive/immediate pursuit role. 
In sum, Mayne's letter tells his Home Secretary that full-time detective work will 
bring the corruption associated with the old Bow Street Runners into his Force. 
7 ibid. pages H to 12 
9 ibid. page 15 
9 ibid. 
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At the same time it will make the management of crime investigation by his 
officers much more difficult. Nevertheless, as a result of the errors of the 1839 
Acts he now has no option other than to propose the he should set up a detective 
branch at Scotland Yard. It was a proposal that, 'the Commissioners submit for 
the decision of Sir James Graham, how far it may be desirable as an experiment to 
try the effect of such a plan. '" 
Other contemporary sources confirm that Rowan and Mayne's acquiescence in the 
creation of a body of full-time detectives in their Force was reluctant. Sir Edwin 
Chadwick, the principal mover of the 1839 Royal Commission which was the 
precursor of the spread of the New Police idea to the whole nation, is quoted as 
saying in 1840 that, 
'I know from Sir Charles Rowan and Mr. Richard Mayne that they disliked 
detection on principle and only yielded to its adoption on what they deemed 
superior authority. "' 
The first detectives 
All through his long career Mayne, in particular, fought hard to retain the 
character of the Metropolitan Police Force and to preserve its primarily 
preventive, uniformed patrolling role. But in 1842 the combination of the 
legislative errors of 1839, the social disruption caused by the Chartists, and the 
Good incident, defeated him. Under 'superior authority', he and his fellow 
Commissioner accepted that they should now establish a 'detective branch'. For 
the first time they would employ two Inspectors and six sergeants permanently in 
plain clothes for the investigation of crime. 
But it is clear from the way in which the new branch was structured and managed 
that the Commissioners were determined tile Scotland Yard detectives should not 
replicate the now-discontinued magistrates' officers and specialist detective 
'Runners'. Nor did they want the detective branch to signal an abandonment of 
the preventive and protective principles on which their Force was founded. The 
Commissioners did not give the branch any general responsibility for the 
investigation of crime reported in the metropolis. That remained at the discretion 
of local Superintendents under the amended divisional system they controlled. 
The headquarters detective officers were assigned only to exceptional cases, and 
solely at the discretion of the Commissioners, or were employed, again with the 
10 ibid. page 17 
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assent of the Commissioners, on enquiries requested by government departments. 
And the new detectives were not encouraged to cultivate informants amongst the 
criminal classes, nor were they directed or allowed to associate with criminals for 
that purpose. " Rowan and Mayne's response to the pressures they were put 
under in 1842 was essentially minimalist. Unfortunately it was sufficient to 
cause a significant shift in both the public and the political perception of the role 
of the New Police. 
Samuel March Phillipps, the long serving Under Secretary of State at the Home 
Department, replied to Mayne's proposals in a letter dated 20th June, 1842. " He 
told the Commissioners that the Home Secretary had agreed to the employment of 
a small number of full-time detectives. Considering Phillipp's own fierce 
opposition to the disbandment of the old police offices and the officers they 
employed, so forcefully expressed by him to the 1838 Select Committee, this 
letter no doubt caused him as much trouble as it did the Commissioners. But the 
Detective Branch of the Metropolitan Police nevertheless then appeared under 
Inspectors Haynes and Pearce with a strength of six sergeants 
Detective Branch expansion 
Shortly after he became sole Commissioner for the Force, and we may surmise 
still grudgingly, Mayne allowed a temporary increase in the strength of the 
Detective Branch of one Inspector and one Sergeant in 1856. He eventually 
made those additional appointments permanent in 1864. In the same period, 
Mayne formalised the occasional employment of uniform police officers in plain 
clothes to look into particular crimes. In 1862 he gave written authority for 
divisions to employ, at their discretion and strictly on a non-permanent basis, up 
to a limit of 200 men in plain clothes at any one time. This expansion completed 
the final structure of his 'Divisional' system of detection. 
These are profoundly important developments, both for the emerging police 
service and for the public it served. Yet no record exists of any form of public 
debate or discussion of this significant extension to die activities of the police 
service before its implementation. In particular, no action was taken on the 
recommendation of the 1839 Royal Commission that constables should be given 
the power to make 'inquires' into reports of crime, and the post of public 
prosecutor remained unfilled. 
12 Smith, P. T. (I 985)page 6112 
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No new Bills to regularise this change in the criminal justice system of the 
metropolis appeared on the Parliamentary agenda. Nor were any amendments to 
existing legislation proposed. Parliamentary Papers contain no record of this 
decision. Graham, the Home Secretary at the time, seems not to have informed 
his colleagues in government about the first appearance of the Detective branch. 
His Prime Minister was Sir Robert Peel. Even he does not seem to have noticed 
or mentioned the event, although he may perhaps be excused. He was at the time 
deeply embroiled in the political consequences of his post-Reform Act 
transformation of the Tories into a new Conservative Party. "' But the fact is that 
the records of Parliament do not include the emergence of the full-time police 
detective, and it did not appear as an issue, nor was it debated, in either House. 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) for the months of June and July 1842, when the 
letters on this subject were passing between Mayne and his Home Secretary, 
contain no reference to those highly significant events in the history of British 
policing. " 
On an issue which a dozen years earlier had aroused ferocious debate both in the 
House and in the press, and only three years previously had outraged both Houses 
of Parliament, no public discussion followed the first tentative manifestation of 
that 'despotic police of the continental states, with all the detestable details of 
espionage and domestic interference' that had earlier so exercised tile fears of 
Englishmen for their freedom. The Government minister responsible for the 
development did not even mention it in Parliament, nor did lie publish it or 
otherwise expose it to public comment or debate. 
Postscript - alternate interpretations 
It must be said that this interpretation of these events will not be found in extant 
histories of, or commentary on, British policing. It is, despite the quantity and 
strength of the evidence available to support it, unprecedented in the literature on 
the emergence of the full-time professional detective in the British police. 
Charles Reith, the respected and already quoted author on the history of the 
British police service, is no counter-example. At the end of Chapter XIII of his 
'A New Study of Police History' published in 1956, lie turns to the 'baffling 
problem' of the emergence of the British police detective. " Hebeginsby 
reproducing the quotation mentioned earlier in which Edwin Chadwick claimed 
14 Eastwood, David (1992) 
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that Rowan and Mayne 'disliked detection on principle' and that they 'only 
yielded to its adoption' on 'superior authority', before going on to say: 
'It is very difficult to imagine anyone forcing Rowan and Mayne to yield, 
against theirjudgement and principles, in a matter of this kind, and if they 
did yield, it could have been only to dictates from the Home Off ice, backed 
possibly by the Cabinet. On the other hand, the fact that Rowan and Mayne 
strongly disliked detection in comparison with prevention is clearly seen in 
the wording of earlier police documents, and they had very good reason for 
their views. "' 
He quotes liberally from those 'earlier police documents' to establish his point 
before making an attempt to explain the disparity between the strong contrary 
views of the Commissioners and their actions in setting up the Detective Branch. 
His argument puts the blame firmly in 'the hands of Home Office officials ... [by 
whom the] ... policing principle ... [of prevention was] ... confused with function. ' 
According to this view, by conflating 'principles' with 'functions' Home Office 
officials introduced detection into the stated activities of the professional police 
service and, indeed, persuaded or cajoled the Commissioners into founding the 
Detective Branch. 
Clearly, Reith's argument depends upon establishing a distinction between tile 
'principles' followed by the New Police and the actual 'functions' they 
performed. This device enables him to describe the emergence of the Detective 
Branch as merely a shift in emphasis among the various 'functions' of the police 
rather than a departure from the preventive 'principle' on which the whole 
organisation was based. Some support for that interpretation of Reith's views on 
these matters is given by considering his later remark that: 
'Detection is a function of police, and a necessary one, but, together with 
all other police functions for the control of crime and disorder, it must be 
constantly co-ordinated in service to the principle of prevention, and in no 
circumstances be allowed, as a function, to supersede it. '" 
However, no evidence is presented to support this conjecture. Indeed Reith's 
discussion of these issues effectively ends with that comment. 
It is greatly to Reith's credit that he is both aware of tile disparity between the 
apparent views of the Commissioners and their action in first creating the 
17 ibid, page222 
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Detective Branch, and that his command of the literature and sources leads him to 
recognise a need to suggest an explanation for it. And his identification of the 
Home Office and its officials as prime suspects in the matter is well-judged, as 
will be later shown, if not for the reasons he gives. The weakness of his 
explanation is however, two-fold. First, he does not apply to his problem the 
concept of detection as it was understood by the Commissioners at the time. 
Second and more importantly, his explanation depends on both the prevention and 
the detection of crime being functions of the British professional police service at 
its first foundation. 
As to the first point, Reith does not give due weight to the unique views of the 
Commissioners on issues of prevention and detection in crime, set out in their 
evidence to the 1833/34 Select Committee on the Polis of the Metropolis. Put 
simply they saw no distinction between prevention and detection in the operations 
of a street police, and regarded their single function as being more than adequately 
served by their patrolling constables. And on the second point, contemporary 
sources establish that the provisions of the founding statute of the New Police 
specifically exclude the Commissioners from any involvement in what the modern 
observer would describe as criminal investigation and detection, and the public 
record shows that they fought very hard to remain so. Equally, Under Secretary 
Phillipps' evidence to the 1838 Police Off ices Select Committee shows that, at the 
relevant time, there was no unanimity or enthusiasm inside the Home Office for 
the creation of a detective branch to carry out those functions within the 
Metropolitan Police in 1842. Indeed, as will be shown, there is clear evidence 
the Home Office were fully aware that such detective work was not and was never 
intended to be among the functions of the New Police. Hence Reith's conjecture 
of a distinction between 'principles' and 'functions' in policing within the Home 
Office as an explanation of the emergence of the full-time professional detective 
in the British police service, while useful and interesting, is not consistent with tile 
evidence presented here. 
By comparison with Reith other authors are far less aware of tile problem. Clive 
Emsley, who takes a more sociological view of the history of policing says in his 
'The English Police: A political and social history', 'It was, aflcr all, Mayne who 
in June 1842 persuaded the then Home Secretary, Sir James Graham, to authorise 
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the appointment of two inspectors and six sergeants for detective work', " quoting 
as his source Smith, P. T. (1985). 
Smith however, after describing instances of the operation of the Commissioners' 
'Divisional system' of detection, merely says: 
'Few details are known about the founding of the Scotland Yard detectives 
except for a letter from Mayne to the Home Office recommending that two 
inspectors and six sergeants be selected for "their abilities and general 
qualifications for those peculiar duties". The new band of detectives, freed 
from jurisdictional restraints, investigated crimes of a more serious nature. 
They were sometimes despatched to other parts of the country or even 
abroad. "' 
Although Smith sees no reason to give the appearance of the detectives any 
special thought, he accurately reports that: 
'At first there was no full-time force of men trained specifically for 
detection because there seemed no obvious need for such ... It was after 
1839 with the abolition of the Runners ... that the need for detectives was 
felt. "' 
He seems therefore to take something of Reith's position, i. e. the assumption that 
all aspects of the detection and prevention of crime were functions of tile New 
Police ab initio, without sharing Reith's recognition of the need for an explanation 
of any of the Commissioners' behaviour or decisions in setting up the Detective 
Branch. 
It may be that Ernsley's view is also coloured by that of other authors in tile field. 
Douglas Browne for instance, in his otherwise magisterial 'Tile Rise of Scotland 
Yard' (1956) writes that following the Good incident and another notorious case; 
'It is known that within a fortnight, their deliberations hastened by this 
series of events, the Commissioners had decided to press for the immediate 
establishment of a separate Detective Department at Scotland Yard. A 
'Memorandum relative to the Detective Powers of the Police ... was 
forwarded to the Home Office on June the 14"'. "' 
Browne claims that; 
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'the Commissioners' Memorandum ... has disappeared, but it seems that 
they asked for the appointment of two inspectors and eight sergeants to the 
new Detective Branch. $23 
Indeed, in defence of both Emsley and Browne, the idea that the Commissioners, 
and particularly Richard Mayne, were advocates and instigators of the emergence 
of the detectives is widespread in the literature on British policing. Historians and 
commentators as diverse as Moylan (1946), Cobb (1957), Ascoli (1979) and 
Petrow (1994) take that line on the provenance of the detectives. Cobbin 
particular develops the hypothesis into a full-blown, long-term conspiracy by 
Mayne to overcome the opposition of the Home Office and the reluctance of 
Rowan to introduce detectives into policing. The penultimate paragraph of his 
chapter on 'The Detective Department' says; 
'Thus did the Detective Department of the Metropolitan Police come into 
being. Its creation - though very sudden and sharp at the end ... had been a 
long, slow and gradual process guided by the undeviating determination of 
Richard Mayne. "' 
His conclusion is however, reached by reasoning that, on the evidence available in 
the public record, is inconsistent with Mayne's views on this issue,. 
It is difficult now to be certain how this strand of thinking on the origins of the 
detectives began but some suspicion must be attached to Sir John Moylan. He is 
among the earliest of modem authors on policing and his credentials as an 
authoritative source can hardly be questioned. " His position as Receiver for the 
Metropolitan Police bridges whatever gap there might be between the Home 
Office and professional policing. His post in the Metropolitan Police was, until 
recent times, equal to that of the Commissioner, and even now is regarded as 
second in the command structure while being at the same time to some extent 
outside it. Moylan's last position at the Home Off ice was equally at tile pinnacle 
of that hierarchy. So who should doubt him when he asserts that; 
'In 1842 ... the Commissioners ... persuaded a reluctant Home Secretary, Sir 
James Graham, to sanction, as a cautious experiment, tile formation of a 
small detective branch'? " 
23 ibid page 121 
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Coupled with the fact that Mayne, as a lawyer, carried on such correspondence on 
crime as the Commissioners were called upon to deal with, and that he alone 
signed the 'Memorandum relative to the detective powers of the police' (for 
which an explanation can be given arising from a significant, but at the time 
undiscovered, drafting error in the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839), an 
assumption that Mayne in some way prompted or fostered the emergence of the 
professional detective may be understandable. However, it is not ultimately 
defensible or compatible with the available evidence. 
On the other side it might well be argued that the contrary now needs an 
explanation. If Sir John is so well placed to know the truth about these matters, 
why should he lie or dissemble? That question, which connects with the issue 
of the role of the Home Office and its officials in these matters, will be addressed 
in a later chapter, when the relative contribution of the Home Off ice and the 
Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police to the appearance of the professional 
police detective is examined and assessed. For the present purpose it is enough 
to say that all Home Office officials can be shown to have a strong and continuing 
motive to minimise the extent of their involvement in the creation of a Detective 
Branch within the Metropolitan Police, and to emphasise that of the 
Commissioners. 
Finally, I could not leave this discussion of the myth of Mayne and the 
Commissioners as the progenitor(s) of the professional detective without 
mentioning F. E. Heron, a regular contributor to the magazine of the Metropolitan 
Police Training School at Hendon in London. Writing on the origins of 
detectives for the benefit of the staff and students at that Training School lie said; 
'The Commissioners had wanted for some time to have a body of men 
specially trained to investigate the more serious crimes ... and in 1842 they 
managed to persuade the Home Secretary to approve such a section. "' 
Others far well less acquainted with, or concerned about, the history of policing 
than Heron can hardly be blamed for mirroring his error. 
Other writers, such as Brogden (1982), Bayley (1981), Critchley(1967), and 
Prothero (1931) are, in their various ways, useful and valuable contributors to the 
literature on the history of British policing. But they are also among those who, 
like Smith (1985), take the function of crime detection by the police for granted 
27 Heron, F. E. (date u/k) page 18 
Emergence of Detectives 118 
and therefore see no need to give any special attention to, or explanation for, the 
emergence of a full-time Detective Branch. 
Among such writers are some however, who deserve special mention. The 
category includes at least two, Stead (1985) and Tobias (1970), who were active 
academic members of the staff at the National Police College (as it was then 
known) at the time of their writing. Given that such well-placed experts in the 
history and business of policing are content that the appearance and presence of a 
large and constantly growing body of full-time detectives within the professional 
police service needs no special explanation or discussion, it is hardly surprising 
that the wider body of academics and commentators interested in the subject have 
tended to take the same view. That lacuna in the study of the development of the 
British police service will, I hope, now begin to be filled. 
Conclusion 
This last part of this chapter presents alternate views on the process by which 
criminal investigation and detection became accepted as a full-time function for 
British professional police officers. My interpretation has been given together 
with its sources so that the whole of the material on which it is based is readily 
available for critical inspection. It is now for the reader tojudge which of the 
many available explanations for the first emergence of the British professional 
police detective is to be preferred. 
What is truly surprising about alternative accounts of the origins and development 
of the modem detective however, is the lack of any real appreciation of the 
significance of the reports of the two Home Office departmental committees 
examined in the next chapters. As will be shown, neither the presence of 
detectives in, nor their impact on, British professional policing can be properly 
understood or assessed without reference to them. 
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Fergusson and the Detective Branch 
Mayne as sole Commissioner 
Charles Rowan retired, honoured and deeply respected, on grounds of ill-health at 
the beginning of 1850. After an uncomfortable period with his undistinguished 
successor, Captain Hay, who died in office in 1855, the founding 1829 Act was 
amended to allow Richard Mayne to become sole Commissioner on 20th August 
that year. The Detective Branch of the Metropolitan Police grew very little under 
Mayne. Only in 1867, twenty-five years after its inception, did the small seed 
planted in 1842 end its long gestation and begin to grow. 
In that year Mayne, as sole Commissioner, found himself again under heavy 
pressure from the Home Office. Two problems fuelled public and political unrest 
about the work of his Force. First, the long running agitation associated with the 
demand for electoral reform, a campaign that culminated in the passage of the 
second Reform Act that year. Second, the disruption and outright terrorism 
associated with the activities of Fenians and other Irish insurgents. Of the two, 
Fenianism. had the larger impact. 
'The Times' of London first mentions the 'Fenians' in March 1864. For the next 
couple of years they are the subject of comment as causing trouble in Ireland, the 
USA and Canada. In early 1866 there are reports of them being responsible for 
disturbances in Bradford. ' They are first mentioned in Parliament in June that 
year! By March 1867 'The Times' reported fears of a Fenian rising in 
Liverpool. " Public disquiet came to a head on 18 th September, 1867 when Police 
Sergeant Brett was murdered during an attempt to rescue Fenian prisoners in 
Manchester. 
The Queen's Speech to the new session of Parliament that year included a 
condemnation of Fenianism. She said; 
'I rely for [its] effectual suppression upon the f inn administration of the law 
and the loyalty of the great mass of my subjects. ' 
In a 'Humble Address to Her Majesty' read to the House of Commons the next 
day (20th November 1867) Mr. Pryce said; 
I 'The Times', 3 April, 1866page 4 col 4 
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'We assure Your Majesty of the deep regret with which we learn that the 
treasonable conspiracy commonly know as Fenianism, baffled and 
repressed in Ireland, has assumed in England the form of organised 
violence and assassination. 
We beg to convey to Your Majesty our participation in the opinion which 
Your Majesty expresses that such outrages require to be rigorously put 
down, and to express our confidence that Your Majesty may rightly rely, 
for their effectual suppression, upon the firm Administration of the law and 
the loyalty of the great mass of Your majesty's subjects. " 
In an editorial dealing with the debate on the Queen's Speech, 'The Times' 
heartily endorses the Sovereign's plea for firmness in the face of insurgency. ' In 
the same article it reports an incident in which Gathorne Hardy (later, Earl 
Cranbrook), the Home Secretary, was 'bearded in his office' on 18th November. 
A group of protesters, on behalf of the three Fenians condemned to death in 
Manchester for the murder of Sergeant Brett, sought an audience with the Home 
Secretary. He refused to meet them. They then invaded his office to put their 
plea personally for a commutation of the death sentences. Such Jacobite 
behaviour, said 'The Times', made all too clear the need for the firm action 
promised in the Queen's address to Parliament. 
Three weeks later, on 13 th . December, a Fenian 
bomb killed 12 people and injured 
126 others in a botched attempt to rescue two of their members from Clerkenwell 
Prison. That incident, coming so soon after the failure of the Metropolitan Police 
to protect him from the mob even in his own office, convinced Hardy that the 
Metropolitan Police was neither able to protect Londoners from the danger and 
damage caused by domestic and Irish insurgency, nor capable of dealing with the 
conspiracies underpinning such movements. With public and political pressure 
intensifying he determined to resolve both problems. The f irst was relatively 
easily addressed by a decision to review the strength, structure and organisation of 
the Force. But the second presented more complex difficulties. 
Mayne's opposition 
Agitation for electoral reform and Fenian insurgency were both driven by groups 
of hard-core activists. They differed in their degree of willingness to break the 
law or to use violence to achieve their objectives. But both movements depended 
4 Journals of the House of Commons vol 123page 6 
5 'The Times' 201h November 1867, page 6 coL I 
Fergusson 121 
for their success on tight-knit secrecy among the leadership. Mayne'spolicing 
methods, his focus on preventable crime and his insistence that his men should 
never 'take on the guise of spies', were incapable of dealing with such 
movements. The solution to the problem is to be found in what Mayne had 
described as 'duties of a detective character ... [which] ... in a moral point of 
view ... [had] ... been repeatedly denounced', such as those developed and practised 
by the Bow Street Runners and the other magistrates' officers. Skill in 
information-gathering and informant-cultivating is required for success in dealing 
with all forms of criminal conspiracies, including insurgency from whatever 
source. But Mayne's opposition to any proposal to impose the 'detective duties' 
of the magistrates' officers on his Force was predicable, well-known and 
immovable. Indeed, on the evidence he and Rowan had given to the 1837/38 
Select Committee on the Police Offices he would be likely to view the 
conspiracies of reformers and Fenians as non-preventable if not political, and 
thus of no direct concern to his 'street police'. 
Understandably, Secretary of State Hardy 'found Mayne's views on detection 
"quite inapplicable to the times and the circumstances. "" He may even have been 
aware of the legislative difficulty in expanding or extending the work of the 
detective branch of the Metropolitan Police that had been raised with his 
predecessors, first by the 1839 Royal Commission, and later by Mayne himself in 
his 1842 letter. Hardy must surely also have anticipated that any aftempt to create 
a plain clothes detective unit within the Metropolitan Police Force capable of 
dealing with conspiracies would not only meet implacable objection from his 
Commissioner, but might, despite the Fenian outrages, arouse all the old political 
fears of despotism that had accompanied Peel's original efforts to found the New 
Police. Yet to combat domestic or Irish insurgency on the English mainland, that 
is what Hardy needed; a body of plain clothes detectives capable of coping with 
'treasonable conspiracies'. 
It would be wrong however, to assume that the reformers and Fenians were the 
source of, or even the main element in, pressure on Mayne to increase or expand 
his detective branch. Simple growth in crime and disorder had a major impact on 
the New Police. Well before the events of 1867 Mayne had responded to the 
increasing workload falling on his small group of headquarters detectives. He 
had appointed a Chief Inspector to have overall command on the Detective 
Branch and increased its strength by four Sergeants. He later added a Clerk 
Emsley, C (199 I)page 72 
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Sergeant to deal with its growing administrative burdens, thereby almost doubling 
the size of the unit. " But even at this size, its maximum under Mayne, the full 
time Detective Branch still comprised only 16 officers out of the more than 8,000 
strength of his Force. 'Quick and fresh pursuit' and local crime investigation 
remained at the discretion of local Superintendents, employing their own officers 
as part-time 'divisional detectives' for that purpose. Mayne's expansion fell a 
very long way short of meeting Hardy's need, but it was as far as he was likely to 
go. And his standing with the press, public and politicians as the sole remaining 
founder of the Force protected him from being bullied or ignored on this issue. 
After struggling with the problem for some two months Hardy found a way round 
it. He decided to appoint Sir James Fergusson, MP, a stalwart member of his 
Parliamentary team, to head an enquiry into the structure and organisation of 
Metropolitan Police. He presented the move as a preliminary to an expansion of 
the Force by one thousand men but made no mention of any intent to solve the 
problem of criminal conspiracies. Significantly, he did not seek a publicly 
accountable body such as a Parliamentary Select Committee, still less a Royal 
Commission, to carry out the work. He might well have done. The importance 
of this increase in the size of the Force and public interest in the effectiveness of 
government in dealing with agitation for reform and the Fenian threat certainly 
justified that level of inquiry. Instead he made the enquiry an internal or 
Departmental committee working directly under his control, and reporting to him 
rather than to Parliament. If Hardy's purpose in adopting that form of enquiry 
was to ensure that his plans for a counter-insurgency capacity within the Force 
could be concealed from public scrutiny it was well-judged. 
On 8th February 1868 Hardy issued an 'order of reference' to the inquiry. 
'I think it desirable at a time when the police force is being so largely 
increased, to enquire into its condition, its government in its several 
divisions, the duties discharged by the Assistant Commissioners, and how 
far their time is occupied in clerical work, the advisability of appointing 
persons of higher position and education as officers between the 
Superintendents and the Assistant Commissioners and Chief 
Commissioner. " 
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The 'order of reference' says nothing whatsoever about the need to form or 
expand a specialist detective branch, nor does it mention the problem of the 
conspiracies behind the public disorder and the Fenians outrages. Indeed, it 
makes no specific reference to the organisation of crime investigation and 
detection at all. 
The Fegusson Report 
Besides Sir James Fergusson, MP as Chairman, members of the committee were 
Mr. Henry Thring and Mr. George Everest. The Departmental Committee 
completed its work in three months, delivering its Report to Hardy on 8th. May 
1868. After paying tribute to 'the great public services that have been rendered 
by the Commissioner during a period of service extending over 39 years, and 
frequently in circumstances of great anxiety and difficulty', the Report began with 
the main issue on the Committee's publicly announced agenda. 
Despite its expressed admiration for (now Sir) Richard Mayne and his 
contribution to the development of the Metropolitan Police, the Committee said 
that it was, 'however, of opinion that a system adapted only to the government of 
3,000 men may well be found to be defective when applied to the government of 
8,000 men', ' and that such a system could not cope with 'the evils that arise from 
the great extension of the Metropolitan Police force in numbers, and the 
Metropolitan Police District in area, without a corresponding change in the 
organisation of the force, especially in reference to the number of superior 
officers. "' Again, the Committee does not mention the evils occasioned by the 
activities of Fenians or other agitators and insurgents. Nor does it criticise the 
arrangements made by the Metropolitan Police for the investigation of crime. 
The Committee is however, highly critical of the organisation of the Force and 
particularly its apparent failure to adapt to the rapid social changes in which it had 
become a significant factor. There are signs that the sharpness of this critique 
deeply disturbed Richard Mayne. He must have felt particular pain in reading the 
conclusion that: 
'the management of the police is extremely centralised, nothing of 
importance being done except under the direction of the commissioner or 
assistant commissioner. "' 
9 ibid. page 16 
10 ibid. page 16 
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and that, 
'We think it impossible that, with so limited a number of superior officers 
who are engaged in considering minute details of discipline and of general 
management, there can be sufficient contact and acquaintance between 
officers and men to secure confidence or proper supervision, and the 
inquiries we have made have justified us in our conclusion in this respect. "' 
To solve that problem the Committee recommended, among many other things, 
that the Metropolitan Police area be divided into four police 'Districts'. Each 
District would comprise of a number of parishes to be commanded by an 
'Assistant who would be charged with the whole responsibility of protecting his 
District ... In short, the police district would form in some respects, for police 
purposes, almost a separate town. "' 
Students of police history will recognise the proposal. It is almost exactly, after 
many experiments and variations, the structure adopted by the Metropolitan 
Police Service today. The bulk of the remainder of the Report deals with a range 
of administrative, recruiting, disciplinary, financial and even educational matters 
arising from a decision greatly to increase its strength. 
Fergusson and the detectives 
Having thus dealt with the public part of Hardy's plan, the Committee turned to 
his second, undisclosed, problem. It devoted the last six paragraphs of its 
'General Account' to the 'Detective Force' and two paragraphs of its 
'Recommendations' to the same subject. Despite there being nothing in their 
publicly announced instructions from the Secretary of State to authorise it, and 
without adducing any substantial argument or evidence to justify it, the 
Committee produced a two-pronged recommendation. that: 
'The detective police, having regard to their number, appear to the 
Committee to be very efficient for the detection of ordinary crime, but their 
numbers are wholly inadequate to the present requirements of the 
metropolis,... [and] ... their constitution scarcely adapts them to cope with 
conspiracies and secret combinations. ' 
Accordingly the Committee baldly state that: 
12 ibid. page] 7 
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'the detective police should form a separate division under the control of a 
special superintendent and under the immediate command of the head of 
police. "" 
The Committee was not content with overturning the clear wording of the original 
Act of 1829 on the definition of the functions and purposes of the New Police. It 
decided to contradict the one and only General Order ever issued by Robert Peel, 
the political progenitor of the Metropolitan Police. It recommended that, 
'The officer in command of the detective force should have the power to 
recommend men for his division, whether or not they have filled the office 
of constable. "' 
By thus introducing the idea of men being recruited directly into the plain clothes 
branch of the Metropolitan Police without having first served a period in 
uniformed preventive patrol, the Committee contravenes Peel's dictum of 10th 
December 1829 that; 
tno person shall be qualified to fill a superior station unless he shall have 
served a given time in a subordinate station'. " 
All this was anathema to Richard Mayne. The Committee's recommendations 
ignore all the reservations about the employment of detectives he had voiced in 
1842. To have his opinions on that issue rejected in a report that also reflected 
badly on his stewardship of the Force, must have been particularly galling. But 
neither his evidence (if he appeared before it) nor any other comments he made to 
the Committee have been discovered. Neither the copy of the Committee's 
Report in the Public Record Office nor that currently held in the Metropolitan 
Police Service Library includes a record of the evidence it heard. 
Significance of Fergusson 
Two important points ought to be raised on this latter 'detective' part of 
Fergusson's Report. First, before reaching its conclusions and recommendations 
about the 'Detective Force' of the Metropolitan Police the Committee clearly 
knew that there was no legislative authority for its existence. Second, its terms of 
reference gave it no remit even to consider the criminal investigative activities of 
the Force. 
14 ibid. pages 21 - 22 
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On the first point in its Preliminary, General Account of the Force, opposite the 
side-heading 'Duties of police', the Committee describes and confirms the role 
and responsibilities of the Metropolitan Police Force in this period. The 
Committee says; 
'The ordinary duties of the police force consist in patrolling the streets and 
preventing crime; their extraordinary or special duty is in acting in masses 
for the purpose of quelling riots or insurrections, and keeping order on the 
occasion of state processions, state parties, and other public occasions. 
A subordinate, but not unimportant, part of their duty as connected with the 
preservation of the public peace is attending at Police Courts and giving 
evidence against offenders. "' 
No mention of any kind of 'detective duties' in made in this section, and the 
involvement of Metropolitan Police constables in the detection and prosecution of 
criminal offenders is shown as arising directly from their peacekeeping duties and 
as being confined to them giving evidence as witnesses. The Committee then 
reports that 'Other distinct branches of duty are attached to the police force by Act 
of Parliament, as for example, ' - giving a list of other such duties required of the 
police force - before pointing out that, 'These duties form a separate branch, 
having little in common with the ordinary duties of the police. " Again there is no 
mention in the Report at this point of the Detective branch among the list of 
'distinct branches' of the Force. 
Clearly the Committee had found no Parliamentary authority for the employment 
of constables on 'detective duties' under any legislation, otherwise it would have 
been mentioned at this point in the Report. By default therefore, the Committee's 
finding must be that not even Mayne's strictly limited employment of men in 
plain clothes in a Detective Branch engaged solely on the investigation of 
exceptional cases of crime, or on government enquiries, was authorised by statute. 
The Committee does not even note the 1842 agreement between Mayne and his 
Secretary of State Bruce to 'experiment' with a Detective branch. 
The Committee deal with the detective aspect of the activities of the Force under 
the entirely separate heading of the 'Detective Force'. It gives a fairly good 
account of Richard Mayne's Divisional based system of crime investigation, 
saying, 
17 Report of the Departmental Committee, etc (18681 op. cit. page 10 
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'the superintendents of every division are allowed to employ a certain 
number of constables in plain clothes to make enquiries and hunt up 
offenders. 
These plain clothes men receive the same pay as ordinary policemen, and 
are not employed continuously in plain clothes, but are changed from time 
to time. ' 
The Committee failed to recognise the strictly limited remit of these locally 
employed detectives but confirmed Richard Mayne's assertion in his 1842 letter 
that, 'The organisation of the Police was made in the first instance without any 
direct provision for the performance of... detective duties. "' The Committee 
endorse his view, reporting that, 'In the original constitution of the police no 
provision was made for the establishment of such a force. "' It also echoes the 
view of the 1822 and 1833/34 Select Committees by adding that, 'The English 
jealousy of any police force at all would not hear of anything approaching to what 
was called the "spy system""' Equally, the Committee make no mention at this 
point of any statute authorising or empowering the constables of the Metropolitan 
Police to make inquiries into reports of crime or other offences, such as were 
granted by the magistrates to their 'discontinued' officers and as was 
recommended by the Royal Commission of 1839. This surely, would be the 
place for any such finding. The Committee merely accept that what it called 
'Obvious necessity"' had led to a gradual increase in the level of crime 
investigation activity undertaken by Metropolitan Police constables. 
The Departmental Committee does not explore the nature or extent of that 
'obvious necessity', though had it discovered Mayne's 1842 Memorandum it may 
have identified its cause. In his Memorandum Mayne had pointed out to his 
Home Secretary that his 'divisional system' had emerged, 'When [after the Acts 
of 1839] the entire responsibility of the detection of criminals was gradually cast 
upon the police'. " Fergusson's Committee simply reports the establishment of the 
16 person, full-time detective force they found in Mayne's reluctantly introduced 
permanent detective ranch without further amplification or explanation. " 
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Neither its findings nor its lack of them troubled the Committee. Nor was it in any 
other way deflected from its intent to increase and expand the detective work of 
the police. The Committee pressed on to recommend the establishment of a 
centralised, full-time detective force within the Metropolitan Police 'under the 
control of a special superintendent and under the immediate command of the head 
of police. "' 
The second important point about this Report is familiar but bears repetition. The 
Committee's order of reference from the Secretary of State gave it no authority to 
consider the organisation of crime investigation in the Metropolitan Police Force. 
Mr. Secretary Hardy's publicly announced order to the Committee mentions only 
his wish for information about the structure and organisation of the Force at a time 
when he proposed greatly to enlarge it. He gave Sir James Fergusson and his 
colleagues no public remit to review its employment of detectives. Even when 
answering a Parliamentary question shortly after the appointment of the 
Committee, Hardy gave no hint of the possibility of a reorganisation of the 
detective work of the Metropolitan Police. In fact, he does not mention the 
enquiry then being conducted by Sir James Fergusson at all. 
On that occasion, in answer to what would probably be instantly recognised by 
modern Parliamentarians as a 'Planted' question from Viscount Enfield about 
plans to increase the size of the Metropolitan Police Force, Hardy says; 
'I have to state that I discovered last November that the police had an 
amount of work cast upon them which prevented their obtaining what I 
consider essential rest in order to do their work efficiently. In consequence 
I authorised an addition of a thousand constables to be made to the force. "' 
Yet despite this answer in Parliament, the Committee Hardy appointed to report 
on the consequences of the increase in the strength of the Force devotes 
considerable energy to radical recommendations about the system for the 
employment of full-time detectives. It could not so far depart from its ostensible 
remit without the encouragement, or at least the connivance, of its sponsor. The 
suspicion must be therefore, that the creation of a large full-time detective force 
was always part of the Committee's purpose. Furthermore, its internal 
Departmental format ensured that that aspect of its work could be concealed from 
both Parliament and the public. And so it proved. 
21 ibid. pages21122 
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At the cost of belittling Mayne's great achievements, and no doubt swept along by 
the political aftermath of the Brett murder and the Clerkenwell bombing, the 
Committee put forward proposals for a far-reaching centralisation and expansion 
of the detective activities of his Force. The recommendations suited their 
sponsor's ends perfectly. Hardy and the Home Office not only had a much 
strengthened and better organised Force in London but they also had their 
counter-insurgency unit. 
In a final flourish, which is of some significance in the history of the professional 
police detective, the Committee even went to the trouble of offering a 
revolutionary remedy for any legislative or regulatory difficulties lying in the path 
of their proposals as well as for Mayne's opposition. In a long forgotten, 
eventually ignored, but significant recommendation the Committee, 'propose 
that, as soon as practicable the police force should be placed by Act of Parliament 
absolutely under the control of the Secretary of State' thus once more 
fundamentally contradicting the intention of the legislators of the original Act that 
had founded the Metropolitan Police. "' 
Aftermath 
There can be little doubt that Richard Mayne found the outcome of Sir James 
Fergusson's inquiry totally unacceptable. His views on policing are incompatible 
with both its conclusions and its recommendations. Its criticisms of his personal 
conduct of affairs must have caused him great pain. Whether the resultant stress 
was a factor in his untimely death shortly after the publication of the Committee's 
Report is impossible to determine. It would be remarkable if he did not feel 
subject to unfair attack toward the end of his life. 
But his loss, the coincident replacement of Secretary Hardy by a new man, 
Henry Bruce, in the same month, coupled with continuing public disquiet over 
the Fenian threat, probably explains why Sir James Fergusson's Report does not 
occupy the place it ought in the history of the development of the modem British 
police service. In the circumstances it would, perhaps, have been felt insensitive 
to draw too much attention to a document so critical of Richard Mayne and his 
conduct of his office. More probably, the Home Office might not have wished to 
advertise either it plans to counter Fenianism, or the Committee's radical 
recommendations about the future structure of the Metropolitan Police Force. 
27 Report of the Departmental Committee, etc (18681 op cit. page 17 
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In any event, and in a pattern that was to become familiar, the Home Office did 
not publish Fergusson's report, or release it to Parliament for scrutiny by MP's. 
Mr. Harvey Lewis MP put a Question in the House to the Home Secretary on 8th 
June 1868 about this Home Office Committee Report. He asked if the Secretary 
of State would lay a copy of it 'upon the Table of the House' for the information 
of MPs. Hardy declined to do so, saying 'for the reason that the witnesses were 
informed that their evidence would not be made public. "' 
By taking that stance, Hardy departed the Parliamentary view of the founder of 
the Metropolitan Police Force, Robert Peel, on these issues. When faced, on 
28th May 1830, with a similar question in the House about those employed in the 
Force, Peel said; 
'All the orders which have been issued, both general as well as secret ... I 
should be most willing to lay on the Table of the House. There is no sort 
of information connected with the Police that I am not ready to give.... I am 
convinced that the efficiency of the Police would be increased in proportion 
as it is exposed to the scrutiny of the House. "' 
But then Peel's New Police did not, at that stage, include a detective department. 
Nor did he have any plans to create one. 
Mayne's death also explains why the detective proposals of Fergusson's 1868 
Committee were not subject to the informed and committed public opposition 
they merited. The death of Mayne, Hardy's concealment, and his replacement by 
a new Secretary of State, overshadowed the Report. But those circumstances did 
not dilute or delay its implementation. In the untimely and unexpected absence 
of Mayne, and after the departure of the Hardy from the Home Office, the new 
Commissioner, Lt. Colonel Edmund Henderson, carried into effect much of 
Fergusson's recommendations for the detective branch of the Metropolitan Police. 
More significantly, the spirit of the Committee's work lived on to have a 
revolutionary influence on the development of the professional police service. 
Yet the constables of the Metropolitan Police Force still lacked any statutory 
power or authority for their involvement in the investigation and detection of 
crime, other, that is, than when they acted under the control and directions of one 
of the magistrates of the metropolis. 
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Ibbetson and the Criminal Investigation DeDartment 
Sir Richard Mayne died, in post but at home, on Boxing Day, 1868. He could not 
have chosen a more unfortunate moment. Mayne had had sole command of the 
Force for 13 years following the retirement of Charles Rowan (also 'Sir') on P 
January 1850, and the death of Rowan's successor, Captain Hay, in 1855. 
Mayne's loss came at the end of the year in which Gladstone first mobilised the 
new electorate produced by the Reform Act of the previous year to lead the 
Liberals into power with a comfortable majority. The new administration 
embarked on a vigorous programme of change. Its Home Secretary, Henry 
Austin Bruce, played his full part. A test of his fitness for high office came 
almost immediately. Seventeen days after his appointment, he heard of Mayne's 
sudden passing. 
Just when continuity was vital, Mayne's death removed the last link with the 
founders of British professional policing. Peel himself resigned from the 
Commons in 1846 and died after a fall from his horse on Constitution Hill in 
1850. Samuel March Phillipps, the Home Office mandarin who saw the Force 
through its formative years, departed on pension in April 1848, and Rowan had 
passed on in 1852, a mere two years into his retirement. Even the original 
Receiver of the Metropolitan Police, John Wray, a powerful and independent post 
in the organisation, went in 1860. None of the original 'top team' remained to 
protect the founding traditions of the Metropolitan Police. The new Home 
Secretary faced an immediate crisis with no precedent, procedure or experienced 
guide to help him. 
His solution was to make the only ever Acting appointment to the 
Commissionership in the history of the Force. After a four day interregnum 
Bruce asked the senior of the two Assistant Commissioners, Colonel D. W. P. 
Labalmondiere, to be Acting Commissioner. He then embarked on a search for 
a permanent successor to Richard Mayne. 
It proved difficult to find someone not only able but willing to step into Richard 
Mayne's shoes. Eventually Bruce settled on a man already within his 
Department, Lt. Col. Edmund Henderson, the Surveyor-General of Prisons since 
1863. Henderson, a soldier by training and a Royal Engineer by profession, had 
risen to prominence in government service in the Convict Department. He had 
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made a good impression as Superintendent of the last British penal colony in 
Western Australia, and subsequently in the top prison job within the Home 
Department itself. 
The Home Office had every reason to hope that the arrival of Henderson in the 
Commissioner's office would ease the implementation of the recommendations of 
Fergusson's Committee. That is probably a sufficient explanation for his 
selection, although the official record throws little light on what process, if any, 
led to him being offered the post. His long background in the prison service 
certainly contained nothing to prepare him for the protective and peacekeeping 
responsibilities of his new command. If anything it seemed likely to bias him 
against prevention in matters of crime and toward detection, prosecution and 
punishment. If that was indeed the reason for his appointment those who chose 
him were destined to be disappointed. 
Implementation of the Fergusson Report 
Henderson found Mayne's small headquarters detective branch already in 
existence on his arrival in the Commissioner's office on 1P February 1869. As a 
result of his predecessor's reluctant acquiescence to the promptings of his 
Secretary of State in 1842 the branch now had a respectable tradition behind it. 
In the twenty or so years prior to Henderson's appointment detectives had 
gradually become an integral, if small, part of the Metropolitan Police Force. 
Henderson also found a radical Home Office Departmental Report about the 
structure and organisation of his new Force lying on his desk awaiting action. It 
included important changes in the size, nature and importance of the detective 
aspect of his responsibilities. 
In his first year Henderson created the devolved structure for the Force 
recommended by Fergusson's 1868 Committee. Four District Superintendents 
became an intermediate layer of command between headquarters and divisions. 
In addition, and no doubt under the urgent promptings of the Home Off ice, he 
increased considerably both the numbers and the pay of the officers attached to 
the Detective Branch. He also raised the rank of the off icer in charge to 
Superintendent, and appointed three new Chief Inspectors to it. Six first class 
sergeants joined the strength together with an additional second class sergeant. 
At the same time he significantly modified Richard Mayne's 'divisional' system 
by supplementing it with 
lbbetson 133 
'a detective sergeant and a number (fixed in every instance by the Chief 
Commissioner) of constables, permanently stationed in each division,... [to 
whom] ... The investigation of all crime in the division in the first instance is 
entrusted. " 
To his credit however, and perhaps to the disappointment of his sponsors, 
Henderson did not group the detectives together into a separate division, nor he 
did not do away with the key principle that local divisions should be responsible 
for the proper investigation of crimes occurring on their patch. Under 
Henderson, as under Mayne, local Superintendents remained responsible for 
deploying constables to crime investigation even though some of those constables 
were now employed permanently in such work 
In other matters, Henderson did not implement Fergusson's concept of direct 
entry into the detective force. Nor did either he or the Home Office follow up 
the proposal to bring in legislation to put the Force 'absolutely under the control 
of the Secretary of State'. Both were quietly dropped or ignored. But even that 
partial and incomplete implementation of Fergusson's 1868 Report set a precedent 
that coloured all subsequent views of the role of the Metropolitan Police. It also 
had a significant impact on the development of policing throughout the nation. 
After an initial flurry of activity, the organisation and control of crime 
investigation and detection drifted off the list of the Commissioner's priorities 
until almost a decade later. Then in 1877 all Mayne's misgivings about the 
corrupting consequences of establishing a permanent detective branch in the Force 
came spectacularly home to roost. His vindication came late, but it was 
complete. A scandalous case of corruption involving the headquarters detectives 
of the Metropolitan Police burst on the pages of the broadsheets. 
The case originated with the conviction of two major criminals, William Kurr and 
Harry Benson, for a fraud against a Madame de Goncourt and others. Their 
method was a version of the time-honoured 'get-rich-quick' confidence trick of an 
'infallible' horse race betting system dressed up with all the usual flourishes of 
hints of insider-information and owner-involvement. When Kurr and Benson 
landed in prison, they made serious allegations of police corruption. Their target 
was a group of the most senior detectives in the Metropolitan Police; three of the 
Report of the Departmental Commission to inquire into ... the Detective Force of the Metropolitan Police (1878). Public Record Office, HO 45166692, page jv 
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Chief Inspectors who were attached to the Detective branch at Scotland Yard as a 
result of the implementation of Fergusson's 1868 recommendations. 
On Tuesday 20'h November, 1877 at the Central Criminal Court, at the conclusion 
of what came to be popularly called the 'Turf Fraud case' or the 'Case Against the 
Detectives', Chief Inspectors Druscovich and Palmer and Inspector Meike1john, 
together with a solicitor named Froggart, were convicted on an indictment for a 
conspiracy to prevent the apprehension and conviction of persons charged with 
crime. The Court sentenced each of the police officers to imprisonment for two 
years. The jury acquitted a third Chief Inspector of the Detective branch, Clarke, 
on the same indictment! 
The lbbetson Commission 
With committal for trial proceedings in the 'Turf Fraud case' going on at Bow 
Street Magistrates Court, Disraeli's Home Secretary, Sir Richard Assheton- 
Cross, appointed another internal Home Office enquiry. This time it took the 
form of a Departmental Commission. The earlier Fergusson Committee had 
concealed its purpose. The new Commission displayed no such reticence. Its 
terms of reference specifically directed it 'to inquire into the State, Discipline and 
Organisation of the Detective Force of the Metropolitan Police'. Assheton-Cross 
selected Sir Henry Selwyn lbbetson Bt., MP to be Chairman. ' 
Henderson had every reason to expect the Commission to be critical of the lack of 
interest he and his senior colleagues had taken in the activities of their high 
ranking detectives. Newspaper reports of the committal proceedings at Bow 
Street Magistrates Court showed that the detectives appeared to have been 
accountable only to each other. Fortunately the corruption seemed to be confined 
to the small body of headquarters detectives at Scotland Yard. Henderson could 
expect that the Commission would focus its enquiry, and its criticisms, on those 
officers rather than the divisional detectives employed locally by Superintendents. 
The Commission might even decide to do away with those headquarters officers. 
At the very least it must recommend that they be more closely controlled and 
directed. Henderson acted quickly to pre-empt the Commission's deliberations 
and neutralise the bad press his Force was getting. 
2 The Times Wednesday 21" November, 1877page9coL 2 
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Henderson's resPonse 
Before the Commission had time to begin its work, Henderson produced a report, 
dated 14 th September 1877, in which he undertook to reorganise his detectives to 
make the supervision of their work more effective. ' Heproposedtodosoin 
ways that would preserve and protect the principles of Mayne's divisional system. 
Returning to hitherto neglected aspects of the Report of Fergusson's 1868 
Committee, Henderson said that he would now form, 
'a Special Detective Division under the control of a Superintendent, 
stationed at the Commissioners Off ice, selecting the best men in the 
existing Detective Force and leaving the remainder to act as patrols in their 
respective Divisions, a work in which they have rendered excellent 
servi e. 2 
Bending somewhat in the direction he thought the Committee was likely to go, 
and building on the District structure which the 1868 Committee had also 
introduced, he went on to 'propose to appoint four District Inspectors, one to each 
District for the general charge of the Detectives in the District. ' He hoped 'that 
the alterations I now submit will result in the better supervision of the work of 
Detectives both by the District and Divisional Superintendents and also from the 
Commissioner's Office, '. He concluded by suggesting that the Commission's 
work be delayed to allow it to consider the effects of these changes. 
Insofar as his latter plea succeeded, Henderson achieved his objective. Following 
receipt of his report, the Chairman put back the start of the Commission's 
deliberation until after the end of the Assizes on 3 rd November. Subsequent 
events throw some doubt on the Chairman's motives, however. Hiq consent to a 
delay may have had more to do with the presence of two well-known and active 
QC's on the Commission than with any wish to give Henderson's reorganisation 
of his detectives a fair run. 
When the Commission began its delayed deliberations, it called Henderson to give 
evidence. His examination covered two days, I 9th and 20th Decemberl 877, and 
not totally unexpectedly begot a rough ride. He now had nearly 10 years 
practical experience of the effect of the implementation of Fergusson's 1868 
recommendations on the full-time employment of his men in the investigation of 
crime. And he now confounded any sponsors he might have had on his 
ibid. item 19 
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appointment by making no effort to conceal the low opinion he had formed of the 
value of his detectives. Considering the nature of the case that had caused the 
appointment of the Commission he no doubt expected its members to share his 
view. In exchanges that begin to reveal how much the Detective Branch had 
changed under his command, Henderson was asked if detectives ought not to be 
better paid. He replied, 
'Yes; if their numbers were limited I should not object to see them much 
better paid than they are at present, but I do not think that the general body 
of the force have the same exalted opinion of the detectives as the 
detectives themselves. " 
Later, when asked about the expenses incurred by detectives in obtaining 
information about criminals he said, 
'As to paying people for information which the ... [detectives] ... are very 
fond of talking about, I must say that I have never known a case in which 
information has been much worth.... You authorise your officers to bribe 
people, and you are very much surprised that they fall themselves 
occasionally under temptation. " 
He also said on the same subject, that 'I do not believe very much in a system of 
obtaining information. " And in a remark which Mayne would have heartily 
endorsed, and which many a later senior police officer might echo, he said that 
'the necessity for detectives to drink with evildoers is rubbish. " 
Finally, on the central issue of the usefulness of detectives Henderson was even 
more forthright. 
'But when you come to the details of the detection of crime ... there are 
certainly not more than half a dozen cases out of the whole lot that might 
not have beenjust as well done by men in uniform, and better too,... I 
confess that my own experience is rather against keeping those men 
continually in plain clothes, as you must do with men who belong to the 
regular detective force. " 
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Colonel Labalmondiere, the long serving Assistant Commissioner (and former 
Inspecting Superintendent and latterly Acting Commissioner of the Force), gave 
evidence to the Commission two days later on 22d December. As someone who 
had served 12 years with the Force under Richard Mayne and 10 years with his 
successor, Labalmondiere was in a unique position. He could remind the 
Commission of the arguments against the employment of full-time detectives 
engaged in the investigation of crime that the first Commissioners had put 
forward, and which they would no doubt have forcefully repeated. He might 
have reminded the Commission of the founding principles of the New Police and 
of the reasoning behind thejoint first Commissioners vigorous defence of them. 
But he did not. Instead, he did not demur from the Commission's praise of the 
central ised detective force maintained by the Dublin authorities. " Hewent 
further, and positively agreed that there would be benefit in centralising London's 
detectives. " Labalmondiere's career with the Metropolitan Polie had not much 
involved him in crime detection, so his failure to support his Commissioner might 
therefore be excused on that ground. But, in any event, his opinions probably 
made no real difference to the outcome of the Commission's inquiry. 
Considering the nature and extent of the corruption exposed in the 'Turf Fraud 
case', Henderson had every right to expect that the Commission would share his 
low opinion of his detective officers. For the same reason, he could anticipate 
that his views on the usefulness of the central detective unit would be reflected in 
the Commission's Report. He was to be severely disappointed in both respects. 
The lbbetson Report 
Only by looking at the proceedings of the Commission from the perspective of its 
final report does the reason become apparent. Members generally frame their 
questions as propositions based on the assumption that a centralised and separate 
department was the best way to improve the performance of detectives. Indeed 
one of the members, Colonel Fielding, gives the game away at one point by 
referring to such a proposal as 'Sir Henry's plan'. " The Chairman, Sir Henry 
Ibbetson, himself made the same mistake (if that is what it was) when questioning 
a witness about the command structure for detectives. " 
10 ibid. page 244 at 6048 
It ibid. at6104 
12 ibid. page 219 at 5374 
13 ibid. at 5389 
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Clearly, the Commission had, like its 1868 predecessor, made up its mind before 
witnesses were examined. The corruption that had been the immediate cause of 
its appointment solely involved men permanently employed in a centralised 
detectiveunit. The Commission not only did not diminish or remove that unit, 
they decided greatly to increase it, and its influence and standing in the Force. 
When lbbctson's Report appeared, it began by setting out an account of the 
evolution of the detective activities of the Force. The Commission does its 
credibility no service by misunderstanding this aspect of the history of the 
Metropolitan Police. Even allowing for Labalmondiere's silence, its grasp of the 
essential locally-based continuity that characterised the development of criminal 
investigation and detection in the Force is lamentable. Surveying the condition of 
the Force the Commission made brief reference to Mayne's approach to the 
detection of crime, saying without further expansion that, 'in the earlier days it 
had been the custom for men to be taken out of uniform for a month at a time in 
plain clothes to inquire into particular crimes as they arose. ' It then 
misrepresented Henderson's modification of that system by saying that, 'in 1869 
this system was abandoned and the present divisional system established. "' 
Far from abandoning the locally-based approach to crime investigation, 
Henderson had merely modified Mayne's already well-established 'Divisional' 
system by adding a few full-time detectives to it. He had however, left local 
Superintendents in control of those detectives and had not shifted responsibility 
for police involvement in crime detection from them. In accord with Mayne's 
view, Henderson's small group of Scotland Yard detectives merely provided 
support to divisions. 
Compounding and confirming the impression that it did not fully appreciate what 
it was looking at, under the heading 'Duties of Detectives', the Commission 
noted that, 'The duties of the divisional detectives are divided into the enquiries 
into crimes reported to have occurred in the Division and the patrolling of the 
streets in plain clothes when not so engaged. ' while 'the duties of those at the 
Scotland Yard branch are very different. "' 
On the duties of those latter officers, the Commission reported that: 
14 Report of the Departmental Commission etc .... (1878)opcitpagetv Is ibid. page v 
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'With one or two exceptions the officers of that body, unless specially sent 
by the Chief Commissioner to take up some case already inquired into, do 
not occupy themselves in preventing or arresting the ordinary class of 
crime. 
They are principally engaged in either Government or official enquiries, 
naturalisation cases, searching for missing persons or on what are called 
the higher classes of crime such as heavy forgeries, murders, turf frauds, 
loan office and post office swindles. "' 
In its report therefore, although it had earlier claimed that Mayne's 'divisional' 
system had been swept away, the Commission nevertheless describes much the 
same division of responsibilities as between local ly-employed and centrally-based 
detectives as had existed in Mayne's time, and which was a main feature of his 
crime detection arrangements. The only important change made by Henderson 
was to add a few full-time detectives to each division. Those officers 
supplemented, rather than replaced, the constables put out in plain clothes for 
crime investigation and detection purposes as required by local circumstances. 
Even that difference was not significant in practice, however. The permanence 
of Henderson's additional full-time detective officers was not certain. Just like 
all their predecessors they were selected by divisional Superintendents from 
among their own local uniform patrol constables, to whose ranks they could be 
returned at any time. And Henderson, in his evidence to the Commission, 
evinced a strong aversion to constables being employed too long in detective 
duties. " 
Remarkably, the Commission even seems to confirm Henderson's jaundiced view 
of the value of his detectives. The Scotland Yard contingent, from whom the 
'Turf Fraud' conspirators emerged, was the most permanent under his 
Commissionership. The Commission noted that; 
'Their [the Scotland Yard detectives'] Superintendent never even sees the 
reports of crime from the different divisions except in the case of one of the 
central officers being employed. ' 
16 ibid. page v to vi 
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In confirmation of Henderson's view of the value of these headquarters detective 
officers, the Commission then went on to report that when employed to deal with 
divisional cases, their success rate was miserable. 
'In 69 enquiries in the past two years only 19 persons have been arrested, of 
whom 3 were discharged. "' 
These comments also show that as late as 1878 the Detective Branch at Scotland 
Yard had no overall responsibility for crime investigation and detection in the 
Force. 
Emergence of the CID 
The Commission failed to understand the system on which it reported. It also 
ignored facts that demonstrated the truth of Henderson's aversion to the full-time, 
centralised employment of his men in the detection of crime. Nevertheless its 
Report plunged into the creation of a highly centralised, separate, full-time 
professional detective force. 
While its inquiry displays manifest weaknesses and omissions, the Commission's 
recommendations are explicit and coherent. They set a pattern for the 
organisation of criminal investigation in London that became the model for police 
criminal investigation departments throughout the nation for almost 100 years. 
The Commission concluded that, 'the first condition of any improvement is ... the 
establishment of a united and distinct force, for that particular branch of police 
work. "' 
Echoes of Peel's plea to the House of Commons in April 1829 for the reform of 
the fragmented approach to policing which characterised the 'watch and ward' 
predecessors of the Metropolitan Police are uncanny. On both occasions, lack of 
unified action is identified as the problem. Again the diagnosis is a lack of 
communication between the units and individuals involved. Once more the 
solution is to centralise and unite the organisation and appoint a suitably reliable 
and qualified candidate to have charge of it. The Commission decided to, 
4strongly recommend that an Assistant Commissioner, who should be a 
lawyer having magisterial experience should be placed at the head of the 
18 Repoil etc, op cit. page vi 
19 ibid. pages xv to xvii 
lbbetson 141 
Detective branch, ranking next to the Chief Commissioner and having 
charge of the whole force in his absence. ' 10 
The recommendations of lbettson's Commission thus complete the destruction of 
the ancient division of responsibility between locally elected constables and 
royally appointed magistrates. The faulty drafting of the 1839 Metropolitan 
Police and Metropolitan Police Courts Acts had narrowed the distinction. The 
consequent emergence of the professional police detective after 1842 then blurred 
it. And the 1878 lbbetson Commission obliterated it by proposing that a lawyer 
with magisterial experience should be recruited into a senior operational role in 
ranks of the Metropolitan Police Force to command its crime investigation and 
detection duties. 
The culture of professional policing 
But the 1878 Ibbetson Home Office Departmental Commission went beyond 
those administrative changes, profound in effect though they were. It 
transformed the culture of policing. After lbbetson the investigation of reported 
crime and the identification, detection and prosecution of criminal offenders 
became, not just one of the functions performed by the professional police service, 
but its pre-eminent activity. In a recommendation whose consequences were to 
resonate throughout the whole subsequent history of the modern police service, 
the Commission proposed that 'a detective should rank higher in his class than a 
preventive man' and that his pay should be 'considerably in excess of the other 
branch of the service. ' 
The profundity and persistence of that cultural change in professional policing can 
be detected even today. In an article in 'The Times' on 4"' August 2003, its 
Legal Editor, Frances Gibb, reports the success of a serving police officer in being 
placed first in an examination to qualify as a solicitor. The officer gave birth to 
triplets during her course but still completed every part of it, making her 
achievement quite remarkable enough to justify its announcement in 'The Times'. 
However, despite decades in which the police service had treated and paid 
uniformed and detective officers as equivalents, and indeed fostered and 
encouraged interchange between them in a effort to have their work seen as 
merely different but equally important aspects of policing, in the biographical 
background to the article the officer is described as having gained 'a 2.1 degree in 
20 ibid. page xvi 
Ibbetson 142 
genetic pathology and virology' and to have then 'joined the police force and 
worked her way upfrom a bobhy on the heat to a detective. ' In fact, of course, 
the off icer had merely decided to specialise in that branch of the service rather 
than the many others open to her. But the shadow of lbbetson lingers on in the 
public mind. 
The Ibbetson Commission also finally struck down the principle that a detective 
should be locally appointed and controlled, saying that recruits to the detective 
branch, 'should be selected entirely by the head of the detective department and 
his chief officers . '2' The only point on which it agreed with Henderson was on the 
question of detectives being engaged on patrolling. Accepting his view, the 
Commission proposed that the duties of the 'detective force' should continue to 
include patrolling in plain clothes. " 
Sir Henry's report went to the Home Secretary on 25'h. January 1878. ByApril 
Instructions to the Metropolitan Police Force had incorporated its main 
recommendations. Metropolitan Police Office Police Orders of 6 th April 1878 
begin by saying, 
'From Monday next, April 8 th the whole of the Detective Establishment 
will form one body under the director of Criminal Investigation. "' 
The Order details the new ranks and pay scales of the 'detective force', 
implementing the Commission's recommendations about their enhanced status. 
Already, in the previous month, C. E. Howard Vincent, a witness to the Ibbetson 
Commission, had become the first Director of Criminal Investigation at Assistant 
Commissioner level and he went to work with a will. By 1886, at the end of 
Henderson's reign as Commissioner, the Metropolitan Police Force employed 313 
detectives wholly on criminal investigation duties. They included a headquarters 
department at Scotland Yard composed of 32 officers under the command of a 
Chief Superintendent. Divisions had a further 281 full-time detective officers 
nominally attached to them. In practice, those officers answered directly to 
Scotland Yard. 
The contrast with Richard Mayne's view of the priorities and purposes of policing 
could hardly be more stark. He and his fellow first Commissioner, Charles 
Rowan, had always seen the New Police as a purely preventive force, reducing 
21 ibid. pagexvi 
22 ibid. pagexv 
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crime by the deterrent and interventionist effect of their uniformed presence on 
the streets. Richard Mayne clung fiercely to that view of the functions of the 
police throughout his long tenure of the Commissioner's office. He held that 
crime detection was a peripheral part of the work of a 'street police' related only 
to its 'quick and fresh pursuit' responsibilities, and with no place beyond that in 
the role and structure of policing. 
When, after 1839, he agreed that some of his constables should be engaged in the 
identification and detection of offenders in support of the magistrates of the 
metropolis, he ensured that they should do so only under their direction and 
control. Even under the most severe pressure from Government and the press, 
he kept his own complement of detectives down to a minimum - just 16 officers 
out of a maximum total of some 8,960 - and all under his direct command. "' Yet 
within ten years of his death, and despite the strong reservations of his successor 
Henderson, the detective function expanded to cover all crime reported in the 
metropolis and had emerged as one of the major activities of the police. It 
actually took 'precedence of the uniform or preventive branch of the service. "' 
And the proximate cause of that profound change in the status of the detective in 
policing was a serious case of corruption involving the most senior and powerful 
detectives in the Force. 
The practical effect of Ibbetson's Report, and its obvious intent, was to separate 
the detective from the ordinary uniformed police officer. The recommendations 
giving sole right to select new detectives to those already in post in the new 
criminal investigation department, or 'CID' as it rapidly became known, saw to 
that. Yet by the Commission's own account that was the root of the scandal that 
had first caused it to be appointed. It was precisely that separation of detectives 
from the main stream command structure, their inward-looking isolation and lack 
of outsider supervision that had opened the door to corruption. Henderson 
warned the Commission of the corrupting effect of leaving professional police 
officers too long in detective work. Its answer was to create a career structure 
that guaranteed a detective a whole police career in plain clothes, and solely under 
the command of other detectives. 
24 Report of the Committee on the Metropolitan Police Force etc. (18681 Public Record Office 110 
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Significance of the 'Turf Fraud case' 
lbbetson's Report and its transformation of the Detective Branch of the 
Metropolitan Police into the first modern Criminal Investigation Department is the 
most obvious and direct consequence of the 1877 Turf Fraud case. But the trial 
and conviction of the Turf Fraud conspirators has another importance not fully 
recognised or even much noticed in the literature on British policing 
The Turf Fraud case began when, in the course of their work, the detectives 
involved formed an association with Kurr and Benson, both of them active major 
criminals, that developed into a corrupt conspiracy in which the criminals 
acquired immunity from prosecution for their offences in return, in this case, for 
cash and other financial rewards. Many other such conspiracies were to follow 
that precedent, and were to include benefits far wider than those gained by the 
Turf Fraud conspirators. A supply of information about criminals' plans, 
associates and contacts; the identity of the perpetrators of undetected or imminent 
crimes; and even a share of the proceeds of crime or of the rewards offered for the 
return of stolen property, came in time to be the currency of such arrangements. 
These conspiracies against the public became and remain depressingly common 
in the history of the full-time professional detective. The Turf Fraud case is not 
notable in the nature or scale of the corruption involved. The old Bow Street 
officers had a considerable reputation for this kind of closeness to, and co- 
operation with, the criminal classes. 26 The case caused a scandal among public 
and politicians at the time because of the rank and prominence of the police 
officers involved, and for that reason it has frequently been the subject of 
subsequent commentary and analysis. But its true significance in the history of 
British policing is quite different. The case is important because it is an 
unmistakable indication that a major change had taken place in the views, 
practices and purposes of the Metropolitan Police since its foundation, and 
specifically, in the degree to which the Force had become involved in crime 
investigation and detection, and in the identification and prosecution of criminal 
offenders. 
How and why that change took place is not clear from the public record and is yet 
another issue not much discussed in the literature on British policing. But by 
26 Reith, C. (1943) page 49 
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adopting 'the method of bold conjecture"' chosen for this research some 
conclusions about the processes that brought detectives to pre-eminence in British 
policing will be drawn. 
The Commissioners' contribution. 
In their evidence to the 1838 Select Committee on the Police Offices, from whose 
Report the Acts of 1839 emerged, Rowan and Mayne asked, among other things, 
for two changes. First, that the officers employed by the magistrates to assist 
them in the executive aspects of their crime investigation, detection and 
prosecution work be 'replaced' by their constables. That was accomplished by 
three provisions in the 1839 Acts. One 'discontinued' the plain clothes detective 
officers employed by the magistrates, while another directed that warrants and 
summonses issued by the magistrates of the metropolis for execution in the capital 
could only be addressed to the constables of the Metropolitan Police Force. The 
Commissioners were then directed to make a sufficient number of their constables 
'available' to assist the magistrates in their work. Rowan and Mayne's other 
request was that 'common informers' be removed from the courts system in the 
metropolis. That was effected by the provisions of the legislation that restricted 
the laying of 'informations' about offences before the magistrates to the person 
aggrieved or a constable. 
The effect of these provisions was to remove both the plain-clothes magistrates' 
'Runners' and common informers from any active role in the criminaIjustice 
system of the capital. That indeed, seems to have been the intent. The problem 
is however, that although both groups enjoyed an unsavoury reputation, they also 
served a useful purpose and there were good reasons for their existence. The 
1839 Royal Commission on the Establishment of an Efficient Constabulary Force 
had noted the unsatisfactory provisions made for the prosecution of criminal 
offenders, and the wide-spread reluctance of victims of crime to go the trouble 
and expense of pursuing offenders through the courts. The Royal Commissioners 
reported that much harm was done to the criminal justice system thereby, and that 
the situation posed a serious threat to law and order as well as an inducement to 
corruption and unlawful collusion. The magistrates' detective off iccrs and 
common informers were a response to that problem, and the pressures that had 
given rise to them did not disappear after 1839. They persisted and in fact, 
increased. 
27 Poppcr, K. F- (I 979)page 81 
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Consequently Rowan and Mayne's successful effort to remove the magistrates' 
officers and common informers from the criminal justice system in London had an 
effect they did not anticipate or intend. It left their constables as the only 
possible alternate source of the essential public services formerly provided by 
those disreputable characters. The Metropolitan Police Force was therefore 
bound to have to take up such duties however objectionable the Commissioners 
might find them. 
A changed magistracy 
At the same time the post-I 839 magistrates of the metropolis were equally bound 
to encourage that development. They not only had to avoid what the 1838 Select 
Committee had described as, 
9 objectionable, namely ... the Magistrate interesting himself in the detection 
of that criminal whose case he has to decide upon afterwards. ' 
but 1839 also marks the start of a period of rapid change and growth in their 
powers and responsibilities. The Metropolitan Courts Act greatly widened the 
range and scope of their jurisdiction, and 
'In 1855 the Criminal Justice Act permitted all minor larcenies to be tried 
summarily ... Alongside the creation of the new police 
force, the expansion 
of summary justice was arguably the most important factor in increasing the 
ability of the courts to handle the bulk of crime in an increasingly urbanised 
society. "' 
Increasing workloads combined with reluctance to involve themselves in criminal 
detection and prosecution gradually, and perhaps imperceptibly, caused the 
magistrates of the metropolis to shift their work of investigating crime and 
detecting criminals to the Metropolitan Police constables who, by statute, had 
replaced their former officers. After the coincidence of Fergusson's Report and 
Mayne's death in 1868 nothing and no-one in the hierarchy of the Metropolitan 
Police stood in the way of that process. Assistant Commissioner Labalmodiere 
may have noticed the development and drawn attention to the difficulties it could 
cause but he did not do so, as hi's evidence to Ibettson's Commission shows. 
Henderson himself could not be expected to see either the significance or the 
implications of it. He almost certainly never discussed policing or its problems 
and purposes with Mayne before his predecessor's unexpected death. 
28 Storch, R. D. (1 980)page 33 
lbbetson 147 
The rapid increase in the involvement of Peel's New Police in crime investigation 
and detection in the early years of Henderson's Commissionship is therefore 
probably no more than might be expected in the circumstances. But it culminated 
in the constables of the Metropolitan Police becoming the successors to the 
magistrates' officers of the capital; crime investigation and detection emerging as 
a second function of British policing; and, the 'Turf Fraud case'. That is its true 
significance. 
Concealment 
Fergusson's Report in 1868 produced the career police detective. Time and 
circumstances allowed his activities to expand and evolve. The Turf Fraud case 
in 1877 marks the point at which he can first be recognised in his modem form. 
With Ibbetson's creation of his stronghold in the Criminal Investigation 
Department in 1878 all memory of the New Police as a purely preventive force, 
with only a minor part to play in the detection and punishment of offenders, 
beginstofade. Henceforward the detective became a key figure in the structure 
of the police service and occupied a central role in its activities, although there 
continued to be no formal legal or regulatory basis for his work. 
As with the earlier Fergusson report of 1868, Parliament gave no scrutiny to these 
fundamental changes in the structure and purposes of the New Police. Sir 
William Fraser MP put down a Question for Home Secretary Assheton-Cross in 
the House of Commons on 26'h February, 1878. Following the precedent set by 
his predecessor, Hardy, Assheton-Cross said, in relation to lbbetson's Report, 
that, 
'he had received a report, which, of course, in his opinion deserved to be 
corrected. Some of these had been corrected already, and the rest were 
under consideration by the Secretary of State; but it would be obviously 
unwise, until certain points had been corrected, that these matters should be 
published so that advantage could be taken of them. "' 
The Home Secretary spoke in these vague and inconclusive terms more than a 
month after the date printed on the final version of the Ibbetson Report, a copy of 
which rests in the Public Record Office. A radical re-organisation of the 
Detective Branch of the Metropolitan Police into a new Criminal Investigation 
Department was in progress even as he spoke. Eight days after the Home 
29 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)(1878) Third Series vol. CCULVVIIIcol 377 
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Secretary's reply to Sir William Fraser, Henderson published the Metropolitan 
Police Order announcing the appointment of Howard-Vincent. The Order 
announced the transformation of the Detective Branch into a separate criminal 
investigation and detection department (CID) with a pre-eminent position in 
British policing. No further mention of the Report appears in the proceedings of 
Parliament. " 
30 ibid. vols. CCMIX CCXI and CCXLI 
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Consolidation 
Fall of Henderson 
Having presided over a fundamental change in the role of the New Police, Henderson 
fell from office eight years later in 1886. On Monday 8h February that year a 
meeting in Trafalgar Square attracted many of the 'dangerous classes' so feared by the 
Victorian establishment. The meeting degenerated into a confused riot that spread 
westwards from the Square in shop-looting and general tumult. Preparations made 
for the meeting and the response of the Metropolitan Police to the outbreak of disorder 
fell far below the need. As a result, the crowd got the upper hand of the large body of 
constables employed on the event. Henderson himself was present at the Square at 
the time, but not in charge of the police arrangements. That was deputed to District 
Superintendent Robert Walker, a 74 year-old veteran. His method of riot command 
and control was to get himself so embroiled in the crowd that he could neither receive 
nor transmit any orders. His contribution to the police operation was to get his pocket 
picked while the crowd broke into mayhem at the centre of the nation's capital. ' 
There was evidence of confusion in the arrangements for the event; of failures in 
communication and leadership; and of indecisiveness in dealing with the disturbances 
and their aftermath. Initially government was too occupied with a resurgence of the 
Irish question to pay much attention to the failings of Henderson and his Force. 
Ministers sought to let the matter drop quietly because 'there was considerable friction 
between the Home Office and Scotland Yard. ' at the time. Consequently 'there was 
some foundation for the supposition that Sir Edmund Henderson's dispositions and 
orders had been disallowed and countermanded' by his masters at the Home Off ice. 2 
Public confidence was badly shaken however, when it emerged that no deep social 
distress or continental-style insurgency lay behind the riot. It soon became apparent 
that police loss of control of the meeting was due to mere incompetence. A change of 
government just two days before the Trafalgar Square incident brought a new 
Secretary of State, Hugh Childers, to the Home Office. The coincidence worked 
against Henderson. Childers received the Seals of Office for his new post on the 
Saturday preceding the riot. At a subsequent meeting in his office with a delegation 
of trades people anxious to ensure no repetition of the Trafalgar Square disorders, lie 
Report of a Committee to Inquire and report as to the Origins and Character of the Disturbances which 
t 
tookplace in the Metropolis on Monday 8 February ýl 886) Parliamentary Papers (Cmnd4665)p. 426 
2 The Police Review and Parade Gossip - Obituary. 16'. December, 1896 Metropolitan Police Museum. 
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said that, 'I was here to take over the duties of the office between II and 12 noon on 
Monday', ` i. e. while the meeting in the Square was in progress. 
The new Secretary of State was therefore able to distance himself from any 
responsibility for the failure of the arrangements made between the Metropolitan 
Police and his predecessor. When public disquiet rose over the handling of the 
incident, he ordered an enquiry into the disturbances that started workjust one week 
after the event. This was however, to be no lbbetson or Fergusson-style 
departmental inquiry reporting behind closed doors. Childers asked for, and got, a 
Select Committee of Parliament to deal with the Trafalgar Square incident. It is 
notable that the Home Office chose a publicly accountable Parliamentary Select 
Committee to deal with Henderson's handling of a single meeting in Trafalgar Square, 
when both Fergusson's and lbbetson's internal departmental committees had been 
considered perfectly competent to examine and decide fundamental issues of the 
structure and purpose of the whole Force. That inconsistency in approach is surely 
enough to indicate the relative importance of policing activity as opposed to police 
organisation in both the public and the political mind, and of the differential degree to 
which government and its officials were prepared to expose either issue to public 
debate and scrutiny. 
Childer's Select Committee 
The Report of Childer's Select Committee condemned the police response to the riot, 
criticising, 'the lack of overall leadership, the poor communication between different 
sections of the force and the inflexibility of the police response to an unexpected 
occurrence. ' In addition, 'It identified, as the main single fault, the lack of 
arrangements made for managing the mob after it had broken up, "' concluding that, 
'had the police authorities shown greater resource, acting upon a good and well 
understood system, the mob might have been effectively headed, and easily broken 
up at an early period of their progress. ' ' 
Childers held office forjust 6 months. In that short time he managed to produce a 
report that forced Henderson to resign his post. There is little doubt that Henderson 
was sacrificed to assuage public disquiet. The decision to appoint a Select Committee 
says much about the political sensitivity surrounding the Trafalgar Square riot. But in 
fact no real injustice was done. Henderson had devoted much time and effort to the 
perfection of the uniform, preventive and protective, branch of the Service, placing 
3 Public Record Office HO 144IA42380C 
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little value on the investigation and detection of crime. It is not altogether unfitting 
therefore, that it was a failure of his Force in its prime peacekeeping role that cost him 
his post. It was the aspect of policing on which he had put the greatest emphasis. 
Henderson resigned in March 1886. His departure did not bring about any general 
review or reconsideration of the organisation or duties of the Metropolitan Police. 
Nor did it trigger any public debate about the role, structure, or functions and purposes 
of the Force. The aftermath of the Trafalgar Square incident produced no move to try 
to clarify or change government or public expectations about the services provided by 
the professional police. Childer's Select Committee Report deals solely with the 
failure of the Metropolitan Police as the prime peacekeeper in the capital, and 
produced only suggestions aimed at improving its performance in that role. 
Sir Charles Warren 
The dismissal of Henderson and the appointment of an even more militaristic figure to 
the Commissionership mollified public disquiet and political unease. The new man, 
General Sir Charles Warren, took up leadership of the Force on 29'h March 1886, the 
day Henderson's resignation became effective. He had been a member of the Select 
Committee that had brought about Henderson's fall, and it was reasonable that he 
should suppose his recall from service in Africa indicated that he was expected to 
shake-up the Force in the light of the Select Committee Report. 
A strong willed, opinionated and energetic soldier, Warren's appointment could only 
re-emphasise and reinforce the militaristic policing associated in the public mind, 
however unfairly, with Henderson. At the same time Warren brought his own 
combative and imperious style both to the post of Commissioner and to his 
relationship with the Home Office. The tensions of that latter relationship, and the 
attitudes of the Home Off ice that it revealed, are important to an understanding of the 
subsequent development of the full-time professional police detective. 
Warren made it clear at once that he would have no truck with the involvement of 
$civilians' in the running of his Force, not even those very senior civil-service 
officials who were employed within it. He developed a particularly intense dislike for 
the Receiver for the Metropolitan Police, a civilian member of the top command of the 
Force who ranked equally with the Commissioner and had responsibility for its budget 
andresources. The object of his animosity, Richard (later Sir Richard) Pennefather, 
had been appointed Receiver in 1883. He was only the third holder of this important 
post. His position, like that of the Commissioner, had a statutory base and had, 
since 1829, acted as an independent financial and administrative check on the 
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Commissioner's control and direction of the Force. The Receiver was, and is, widely 
regarded as the Home Office's 'man' in the organisation. 
Pennefather was not only vested with legal ownership of all Force property but also 
had a responsibility for all monies spent by the Force, with authority to ensure that it 
was applied to proper purposes. Since almost anything Warren might choose to do 
involved expenditure, Pennefather had the power to oversee, and occasionally veto, 
much of Warren's activity. This immediately rankled with the new Commissioner. 
The problem was also not helped by Warren's objection to the intervention of the 
equally new Under-Secretary at the Home Office, Godfrey Lushington, and his 
subordinate officials, in his contacts with the Home Secretary. They had the 
annoying habit of subjecting the Commissioner's correspondence with his Home 
Secretary to their usual bureaucratic procedures and supporting Pennefather in the 
process. Warren found all this irksome in the extreme and in strong contrast with his 
experience of a very different relationship with off icials at the War Office. 
The acrimony and friction of these personal and professional relationships is a 
significant factor in the history of the development of the British professional police 
detective. In addition, the public record of Warren's dealings with his Home Office 
and its officials provides direct evidence of the attitudes and purposes of those in 
government responsible for the evolution of British professional policing into its 
present form. 
Warren and the Home Office 
Signs that Warren's uneasy relationship with the Home Office officials and his 
Receiver had begun to go seriously awry came as early as the beginning of 1887 and 
can be detected in a long (24 page) letter from the Commissioner to the Home 
Secretary, Henry Matthews, dated 9"' April. ' In it Warren complained that his 
understanding was that 'no official could intervene' between him and his Home 
Secretary, yet 'this intervention still occurs ... [which] ... paralyse his efforts on behalf 
of the efficiency and re-organisation of the Police Force. ' He directed his critical 
shafts at both his Receiver and Lushington's men in this respect. 
The letter provoked Lushington into preparing a briefing note for Matthews on 18"' 
April 1887 which reveals the acrimony of the growing dispute! In a beginning that 
says much about Lushington's attitude toward Warren and his Force, the Under 
Secretary says; 
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'The papers in this box will convince you how rapidly matters in the Met. 
Police Department are coming to a deadlock. ' 
His reference is to the 'Met. Police Department' rather than the 'Force' which is its 
proper title, and the significance of that choice of nomenclature is revealed in his next 
sentence where he sets out his view of the proper relationship between his Home 
Office and the police. He says, 
'It is impossible for that Department to be properly carried on, if the Comm. 
and the Receiver do not work together in some degree of han-nony, or if the 
Comm' does not fully recognise his subordination to the HO. ' 
Lushington's view is simple. The Metropolitan Police Force is just another 
Department of the Home Office, no different from all the others, and equally 
subordinate to the Home Secretary and his officials. He therefore advises Matthews 
that he should write to Warren to say, 
'that in the exercise of all his functions without exception as Comm". of Police, 
he is subject to the instructions of the S of S and that these instructions must 
ordinarily be conveyed to him by official letter signed by the Under- 
Secretary'... [and that all] ... applications ... [from the 
Commissioner] ... must pass 
off icially through the HO ... [to be dealt with] ... as all other off icial 
correspondence ... and that in this respect no proposal 
for change can be 
entertained. ' 
He ends his note to his Home Secretary by recommending, as a sop to Warren, that 
Matthews might say that if the Commissioner thinks there is an exception to these 
rules then he should submit a memorandum so that it can be 'carefully examined'. 
The extent of Lushington's influence over his Home Secretary in these matters is 
unmistakable On the day the briefing was delivered a note in Matthews hand 
endorses Lushington's advice with a simple 'I agree'. A letter closely following the 
lines advised was sent to Warren on 23 rd April 188V 
The doctrine of subordination of the Metropolitan Police to the Home Office, and the 
status of the Force as merely one among many 'departments' under the control of the 
Secretary of State, set out in this 1887 note between the top official of the Home 
Office and the Home Secretary is not supported by any argument or justification based 
on reference either to law or to precedent. To the contrary, the founding Act of 1829 
had been carefully framed to avoid the criticism that the New Police were, or could 
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become, an agency of government power, and Fergusson's Departmental Committee 
had earlier noted and confirmed the independence of the Metropolitan Police from 
Home Office control. Fergusson had actually recommended that the situation be 
corrected by an Act of Parliament to put the police 'absolutely under control of the 
Secretary of State', a recommendation that had however, never been acted upon. Yet 
somehow Lushington seems to have come to the conclusion that the Metropolitan 
Police Force was just another subordinate department of the Home Office sub ect, i 
through officials, to the directions of the Secretary of State. 
Unsurprisingly Warren did not take this response to his complaints quietly. He 
accepted the invitation to submit a memorandum and commissioned his Legal Adviser 
(Mr. Davies) to prepare a paper that would summarise the law on his relationship with 
the Home Office and make proposals on how business between them might best be 
conducted. On 7 Ih June 1887 he submitted the resultant 150 page 'Scheme' with a 
covering letter addressed directly to the Secretary of State. ' 
On its affival at the Home Office Warren's 'Scheme' is described as 'a curious 
document'" but its first part (up to page 144) is, by common consent, a good 
summary of the law on the respective duties of the Secretary of State and the 
Commissioner of Police. At that point however, the style of the 'Scheme' changes. 
It turns from legal description to demands and clearly goes too far. Warren (for a 
change in handwriting at this crucial point seems to indicate his hand directly in, or 
behind, the content of this later section) wants everything written or said to the 
Secretary of State that touches on the management of his Force to be 'laid before the 
Commissioner for his remarks. "' He wants any 'official proposals affecting the 
Metropolitan Police ... referred to the Commissioner 
for his observations before 
receiving the final determination of the Secretary of State. "' He demands that 'any 
disapproval or other intervention of the Secretary of State ... [be 
communicated] ... bearing the autograph signature of the Secretary of State. 
"" 
Clearly, in the light of Lushington's letter of 23d. May which, in accordance with 
normal practice, would have been written with the full approval of the Home 
Secretary, the Home Office would not be prepared even to discuss these proposals, as 
Warren must surely have realised. It must also be said that the discontinuity between 
the first part of Warren's 'Scheme' setting out the law, and the later section 
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demanding changes in procedures, is complete. The description Warren gives of his 
legal relationship with the Home Office in no way conflicts with (but at the same time 
does not necessarily support) the existing arrangements about which he wishes to 
complain. 
While Warren's 'Scheme' was in preparation and before its arrival at the Home 
Office, Lushington sent a letter to Warren on 23d. May in which he said, 'once for all' 
that Warren should accept letters from him as expressing the views the Secretary of 
State, a missive that undoubtedly sharpened the dispute. "' 
On I O'h July, three days after the 'Scheme' arrived at the Home Office, Lushington 
prepared yet another briefing for his Home Secretary on the state of affairs at Scotland 
Yard. " Ina long Memorandum that makes no mention of Warren's 'Scheme' he 
begins by telling Matthews that; 
'I have to call your attention to these various papers; they show a state of things 
in Scotland Yard which urgently requires the personal interposition of the S of S 
and I feel it my duty to speak to you on the subject without any reserve. ' 
He then lists five (or perhaps six) incidents in which Warren is said not only to have 
usurped the functions of his Receiver, but also to have failed to comply with the 
instructions of the Secretary of State on the proper procedures to be followed. 
Lushington urges Matthews to stop Warren taking over the functions of the Receiver 
'regardless of both the statute and the regulations of the S of S'. He says that 'this 
state of things seems to me to be intolerable'; that, 'the Commissioner has some 
inflated notion that his Department stands on some peculiar footing of independence 
different from that of other departments subordinate to the Home Office'; and that 'he 
recently disputed the sufficiency of the Under Secretary's signature as authenticating 
official instructions. ' 
Lushington has no doubt about what needs to be done. His Memorandum says, 
'It is plain that there is only one way to restore matters to a proper footing. 
This is for the S of S to see the Commissioner and give him plainly to 
understand that he must alter his conduct: that so far as concerns subordination 
to the Home Office the Department of Met. Police is no way different from any 
of the other departments (e. g. the Prison Department) subject to the authority of 
the S of S: that the Comm'. must be prepared at any time to give to the Under 
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Secretary such explanations, whether written or oral, as he may require, in order 
to lay the matters properly before the S of S. ' 
Lushington does not mention Warren's 'Scheme' at this or any other point in his 
Memorandum, nor does he give any indication that he had read it, but the style and 
tone of his remarks to Matthews reveal the personal nature of his dispute with the 
Commissioner. Lushington is clearly exasperated by Warren's disregard of proper 
Home Office procedures; his circumvention of normal channels of communication; 
and his tendency to act without consultation. But he is outraged by Warren's refusal 
to accept Lushington's position as the voice of the Secretary of State, and the gate- 
keeper of access to him. Warren in his 'Scheme' may have gone too far to one 
extreme, but Lushington goes equally too far in the opposite direction. Warren at 
least quotes the statutes in an attempt to justify his demands, even where they do not 
in fact fully support him. Lushington disdains any source of authority other than 
himself. His off ice as Under Secretary of State seems sufficient for him to assume 
that he can direct the Commissioner 'to give ... such explanations as 
he may require' 
and to issue instructions to the Commissioner on behalf of the Home Secretary. 
The official record is not clear on whether Matthews took Lushington's advice on this 
occasion. No note of the suggested meeting with the Commissioner is attached to the 
file now stored in the Public Records Office. The indication is that Matthews thought 
better of confronting his Commissioner at that stage, leaving Lushington to continue 
to monitor and record Warren's indiscretions. 
That picture fits well with the next item on the file, a letter from Home Secretary 
Matthews to Warren four months later on 30'h October, 1887. "' By now Matthews 
had a sufficient stock of ammunition to convince him he ought to try to settle matters 
with his troublesome Commissioner. He tells Warren that this later information, 'has 
confirmed an impression left upon my mind by other incidents, that you do not fully 
appreciate the limits to your authority as Commissioner of Police, or your relations to 
the Home Off ice'. 
Matthews then lists five 'incidents' in which on the Home Office (i. e. Lushington's) 
view Warren had exceeded his authority, particularly where Warren appeared to have 
independently issued instructions to his men or had written to magistrates in the 
metropolis on policing matters. Matthews says, 'I need scarcely remind you that 
under the Metropolitan Police Act no Order as to the General Government of the 
Force can be made by the Commissioner except with the approbation of the Secretary 
16 ibid. item I (papers) 
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of State', which is a true reference to the relevant provision in the 1829 Metropolitan 
Police Act, showing that he must have had his attention drawn to the legislation on his 
relationship with his Commissioner. 
But he is not content to leave the matter there. The Home Secretary goes on to say 
that, 
'Apart from this, the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police is in the same 
position with relation to the Secretary of State as the Head of any other Home 
Office Department: and no rule is better understood in the Civil service than 
that the head of a Department is not at liberty to take a step involving public 
policy without first obtaining instructions for the Secretary of State, or other 
superior authority' 
This is the view argued by Lushington in his earlier July Memorandum, but Mathews 
does not seem to be prepared to take the line of action advocated in that document, i. e. 
to see Warren 'and give him plainly to understand [his] subordination to the Home 
Office'. Instead, the Home Secretary closes his letter with a mollifying assurance 
that he would always consult Warren before giving him instructions on matters of 
'public policy', and that he would, 'attach the fullest weight to any representation 
coming from you. ' 
The very next day, Ist November, Warren's reply was despatched. 17 Hetookspace 
and trouble to deal with the whole of Matthews' list of causes for complaint. In each 
case he quotes the relevant statute which, he thinks, justifies his action. Inparticular 
he points out to his Home Secretary that the constables under his command are 
themselves possessed of powers and duties under the law, with which not even he 
could interfere. But on the main issue he is trenchant. He says; 
'You say also that the Commissioner of Police is in the same relation to the 
Secretary of State as the Head of any other Home Office Department; I beg 
your attention to the fact that I am in no way whatever under the direction of tile 
Home Office; in some matters I am directly under the authority of the Secretary 
of State; in other matters I have my duties and responsibilities defined by Act 
of Parliamentjust as a Constable, a magistrate or a Judge has, and I know of 
no power by which I can be deprived of those duties and responsibilities as long 
as I remain Comm". and the Act continues in force. ' 
17 ibid. item 2 (papers) 
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It should be remembered that Warren had not yet had a response to the proposals set 
out in his 'Scheme', and it takes careful reading to realise that at a critical point in his 
letter he makes distinction between the authority of the Home Office and that of the 
Home Secretary himself. He accepts, as he must, that Secretary of State Matthews 
has authority over him in some matters. The 1829 Metropolitan Police Act provided 
that the new Justices (Commissioners) appointed to control the Force should act 
'under the authority of the Secretary of State' for some purposes. But Warren rightly 
rejects the idea that he is part of, or subject to, the Home Office hierarchy as 
Lushington would have it. Unfortunately, that important subtly is lost in the 
combative manner of its expression. 
Two days after receiving Warren's letter, on 3 rd November, Matthews replied. His 
irritation at Warren's defiance is apparent. He rejects all Warren's appeals to law and 
disputes Warren's version of events in detail. He repeats his view that, 'the 
Commissioner of Police is in the same relation to the Secretary of State as the Head of 
any other Home Office department, for instance, the Chairman of the Prison 
Commissioners, ' again, at this point, drawing on the wording of Lushington's July 
briefing Memorandum. But he then goes beyond Lushington to say; 
'I conceive that in all matters concerning the performance of your duties under 
the Metropolitan Police Act you are liable to receive instructions from the 
Secretary of State, to which you are bound to conform, whilst in certain 
matters you cannot act without the authority of the Secretary of State' 
before concluding with a slightly more conciliatory paragraph acknowledging 
Warren's specific powers and duties under the law, and his own wish to interfere as 
little as possible in the 'administration of the Force'. 
Significance of dispute 
These exchanges are extraordinary. Their content owes much to some bitter personal 
relationships, between Warren and his Receiver, between Warren and Lushington, and 
eventually between the Commissioner and his Home Secretary. It is unfortunate that 
Matthews allowed himself to be drawn into all this, but drawn lie was, and surely into 
error. It was never the intention of Parliament that the Metropolitan Police Force 
should be under the control of the Secretary of State, as Fergusson's 1868 Committee 
identified. Nor that any government minister should, 'in all matters concerning the 
performance of the Commissioner's 'duties under ... the Act', be able to issue 
'instructions ... to which ... [he is] ... bound to conform'. That would put government in 
a position to employ the Force for its own partisan ends if it so chose, which was 
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precisely the fear that so aroused the 1833 Select Committee on the Popay case, and 
caused Rowan and Mayne to declare that they would refuse to obey any such order, 
and resign if it was ever given. 
As was anticipated earlier, the true value of these exchanges lies in the light they 
throw on the attitudes and opinions of those in power in government and the civil 
service in the 1860s and 1870s when the Fergusson and Ibettson Home Office 
committees were creating a criminal investigation department within Peel's New 
Police. In that period, and especially under Lushington and Matthews, the openly and 
strongly stated view of the Home Office was that the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police Force was merely one among many heads of department within 
the Home Office, answerable to and under the directions of the Secretary of State to 
exactly the same degree as any of them, and accordingly subject to the direction and 
control of the Secretary of State and his staff. 
That view directly contradicts the intention of Parliament in setting up the 
Metropolitan Police Force as it is expressed in the debate on the passage of the Act of 
1829 and in the wording of the legislation itself. It is significant that in neither 
Lushington's memorandum of I Oth July 1877 nor in Mathews letter of Yd November 
1877 to Commissioner Warren is any attempt made to justify that view of the 
relationship between the Secretary of State and the Commissioner(s) of Metropolitan 
Police Force, either by reference to law or to precedent. Since Warren had recourse 
to quotations from law at every point in the dispute the conclusion must be that no 
legal justification or precedent was put forward by the Home Off ice because no such 
support for its position was available or ever existed. 
Unfortunately, with Mathews' letter of P. November 1887 and Warren's 'Scheme' of 
7'h. July 1887 lying unanswered on the desks of their respective recipients, tile issue 
of the relationship between government and the emerging professional police service 
must, perforce, be left for other, and wider, research. There is neither space nor 
need to explore it further here since it is the significance of the disputes between 
Commissioner Warren and the Home Office for the involvement of Peel's New Police 
in the investigation and detection of crime that is of interest. Pursuit of that line of 
enquiry now requires a step back in time to the start of Warren's occupation of the 
Commissioner's office. 
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Triumph of the Detectives 
Warren's departure 
The ramifications of Warren's resentment of 'civilian interference' in the running 
of the Force and his abrasive relationship with the Home Off ice and its officials 
touched directly on the place and provenance of his detectives. On his 
appointment, Warren found James Monro, a former high official in the Indian 
(Bengal) Civil Service, as Assistant Commissioner of the Criminal Investigation 
Department. This post was the successor to the Director of Criminal 
Investigation role first created in 1868 for C. E. Howard-Vincent. Monro had 
come direct from India into the Metropolitan Police Force in July 1884, following 
Howard-Vincent's decision to pursue a Parliamentary career. To have a former 
career Indian civil servant as one of his key operational subordinates linked 
Warren's disputes with the Home Office to his day-to-day command of the Force 
and played an important part in the emergence of the professional police 
detective. 
All went reasonably well between the new Commissioner and his head of 
detectives for the first 18 months or so, despite some overspill from the rumbling 
dispute between Warren and Lushington. There was however, a constant 
undercurrent of tension between Warren and Monro over the degree of 
independence Monro assumed in his dealings with the Secretary of State. The 
problem was that Monro's immediate predecessor, Howard-Vincent, had enjoyed 
a direct personal relationship with his Home Secretary. ' When Monro succeeded 
Howard-Vincent as head of the CID his position had been rcgularised to make 
him an Assistant Commissioner of the Force and hence, directly under the 
command of the Commissioner. Some of the warmth of that earlier closeness 
between the head of CID and the Home office nevertheless remained as a 
contrast to Warren's factious contacts with officials. 
The difference became a specific cause of friction between Warren and Monro 
when, as is described in the previous chapter, Warren's battle with the Home 
Office intensified toward the end of 1887. Matters finally came to a head at the 
beginning of 1888 in a confrontation that reflects little credit on either man, but 
whose legacy provides an important piece of evidence about the introduction of 
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criminal investigation departments into British professional policing. The details 
of the dispute are complex, convoluted and unimportant in themselves, and can be 
viewed in a single bulky file now in the Public Records Office. ' 
For the present purposes it is enough to note that the relatively simple process of 
finding a replacement for Monro's deputy (Chief Constable Williamson) during a 
prolonged period of absence due to illness (Williamson began to suffer from 
intermittent fits of fainting), degenerated into a ferocious confrontation between 
Warren and Monro. The problem arose in January, 1888 while the main dispute 
between Warren and the Home Office remained unresolved. All the principal 
players in the conflict between Warren and his despised 'civilians' were drawn 
into the fray, with tempers on all sides being inflamed by the wider dispute. 
An increasing acrimonious exchange between Warren and Monro over the 
selection and appointment of the latter's temporary deputy culminated in a stiff 
request from Warren that Monro should forward 'copies of any correspondence 
that has taken place between you and the Home Office ... [together with] ... any 
record of communications verbal or otherwise of the subject of an Assistant to 
you or the appointment of [your deputy]. 93 When Monro flatly refused to 
comply' Warren issued a formal written instruction that henceforward Monro was 
to keep a record of all correspondence or verbal communications with the Home 
Off ice, and to 'let me have them every day in order that I may know what 
transpires" an order that so affronted an incensed Monro that he declined in 
writing either to accept or to obey it. ' 
Warren's furious response on 7th May 1888 1 was to withdraw his support, not 
just for the appointment of a temporary deputy for Monro but for any addition to 
his top team at all -a volteface he compounded two days later in a letter to the 
Home Secretary in which he complained that, 
'Mr Monro appears with the last few days to have been acting 
independently of the control of the Commissioner, and in correspondence 
which I enclose of this days date, declines to furnish me in future with 
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copies of all coffespondence which passes between himself and the Home 
Office... ' 
He told the Home Secretary that 'I cannot exercise my responsibility while an 
Assistant Commissioner asserts his independence. " 
Under Secretary Lushington no doubt saw the irony of Commissioner Warren 
complaining about the 'independence' of one of his subordinates, but nevertheless 
did his duty and found a way through the messy business. On the basis of his 
advice, Home Secretary Matthews informed Warren that despite earlier notice to 
the contrary Monro was not, in fact, to have a new temporary deputy, at the same 
time advising Monro to pass all matters of importance through the Commissioner. 
Any hope the Secretary of State may have had that his action might get Warren 
and Monro to rub along together was disappointed. Following his falling out 
with Warren, Monro left the Metropolitan Police in August 1888 to take up an 
appointment as 'Head of Detectives' within the Home Office. In that post he sat 
on the sidelines through the subsequent period of difficulty Warren and the 
Metropolitan Police had with the Whitechapel murders (popularly known as the 
'Jack the Ripper' case). He therefore avoided the public and Parliamentary 
opprobrium that fell on the Scotland Yard detectives formerly under his 
command. 
Warren and the CID 
The incident of Monro's temporary deputy was an altogether nasty episode 
between Warren and his head of CID, the significance of which extends beyond 
its outcome. With Monro out of the way, Warren decided to embark on a root 
and branch review of his large Criminal Investigation Department. He saw that 
action as serving several purposes. It was first and foremost a reassertion of his 
command over his Force and a means to reclaim control of his detectives from the 
hands of 'civilians'. At the same time it was a welcome and timely way of 
responding to the adverse publicity the detective part of his Force was getting in 
the 'Ripper' case. From the perspective of the involvement of Peel's New Police 
in the investigation and detection of crime however, the importance of Warren's 
decision is that it opened a further window on the processes by which criminal 
investigation departments became established in the British professional police 
service. 
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As part of his review, Warren wrote to the Home Secretary, Henry Matthews, on 
5 th November 1888. ' He refers to 'a Report of the Departmental Commission 
appointed on the 18 th August, 1877', i. e. lbbetson's transformation of the 
detective branch into a full-scale criminal investigation department during 
Henderson's Commissionership. Warren's letter is worth quoting at length. It 
gives a good impression of the tone he generally adopted in his dealings with the 
Home Office. More importantly, it throws light on inner workings of tile 
processes by which full-time detective departments were built into the structure of 
British professional policing. 
Referring to Ibbetson's then ten-year old 1878 Departmental Commission Report, 
Warren says; 
'I have to say that this Report appears to be quite unknown in the 
Commissioners Office as a document, and never appears to have been 
brought to the notice of the Commissioner for any action to take place on it. 
Yet for all this the greater part of the recommendations have been more or 
less carried out. So far as this office is concerned a new Criminal 
Investigation Department sprang into being without any action on the part 
of the Commissioner, and its origin is involved with mystery. Under the 
Statute the whole of the changes ought to have been first proposed by the 
Commissioner. ' 
In confirmation of the conclusions reached earlier on the dubious value and 
relevance of Ibettson's Report, Warren continues by saying: 
'I enclose a copy of the Report which I have annotated; but I have to 
observe that the Report shows a rather imperfect knowledge of Police 
requirements, discipline and organisation ... It is therefore very difficult to 
say in a few words exactly what has been done or even to describe it; in fact 
some persons might say that the divisional system was never altered since it 
was first started, while others might say that it has been entirely 
transfortned'. 
He concludes his letter with an oblique dig at Monro, by this time safely installed 
in the Home Office. 
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'I think we have every prospect now, with Mr. Anderson as Assistant 
Commissioner to help me, of obtaining a real Detective Department 
efficient to an extent which has never as yet been contemplated; ... thoughif 
the Criminal Investigation Department does not succeed at the end of two 
years from now in giving satisfaction in a general way to all, except those 
connected with criminals and rogues, I think it may fairly be said there is 
something wanting in its organisation, and the whole system should be 
considered. ' 
In the context of the provenance of the British professional police detective, this 
letter is significant in three ways. It graphically describes the irregular manner of 
the creation of the Criminal Investigation Department at Scotland Yard. It 
reveals how little thought government gave to that radical innovation in policing. 
And it shows in the clearest possible way the lack of any serious public or 
political attention to the decisions involved. 
By the time of these events and in contrast to the verbal dealings that 
characterised Rowan and Mayne's relationship with their successive Secretaries 
of State, government was becoming bureaucratised. Contact between ministers 
and officials was now much more commonly noted and the record filed. Yet in 
founding the full-time professional police Criminal Investigation Department 
Warren reports that the Home Secretary (Sir Richard Assheton-Cross) dealt 
directly with Howard-Vincent. The man in charge of the Force, the 
Commissioner, Sir Edmund Henderson, took no part, giving only 'verbal 
concurrence' to what took place. That manner of proceeding is surprising in the 
circumstances. Assheton-Cross had sponsored lbbetson's controversial Report 
and had, no doubt, a hand in ensuring that it reached the 'right' conclusions. Yet 
when it came to the implementation of his Commission's recommendations, it 
would appear that Assheton-Cross was content to keep his Commissioner at arm's 
length from what he must have known was a controversial development. 
Warren's letter also demonstrates that his predecessor Henderson, whose evidence 
to lbettson's 1878 Commission was scathing on the value of the professional 
detective, equally clearly washed his hands of the implementation of the Report. 
By Warren's account he seems to have been content to leave that work to the new 
Director of Criminal Investigation and the Home Secretary who appointed him. 
But Warren was wrong to think that Henderson took no direct part in those 
activities. 
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In fact Henderson enclosed a plan for the creation of the Criminal Investigation 
Department at Scotland Yard when he wrote formally to the Home Office on 3 rd 
March 1878, following the publication of Ibbetson's Report. He addressed his 
letter, not to the Home Secretary himself, but to Lushington's predecessor as 
Under Secretary, the Ton. Sir. A. Liddell. ' 
'I have the honour to submit for the consideration of Mr. Secretary Cross, a 
Memorandum embodying the views of the Director of Criminal 
Investigation [Howard-Vincent] and of myself on the future organisation of 
the Detective Force in the Metropolitan Police, and I have to request the 
sanction of the Secretary of State for the numbers of officers and rates of 
pay as herein set forth. "" 
A note on the papers says 'Scheme approved 6/4.78. Corres. referred privately 
to Comm'. of Police 6/4.78'. Warren was right to conclude that Henderson had 
little to do with the implementation of the 1878 Report. But he cannot claim to 
have had no hand in it at all. 
Resignation of Warren 
Whatever Warren's cause or motive in raising the provenance of his Criminal 
Investigation Department, his timing and his manner in presenting the issue were 
bound to cause offence. The context was the long-running dispute with the 
Home Office exacerbated by public dissatisfaction with the performance of his 
Force in the Ripper case. His observation that Ibbetson's Report 'showed a 
rather imperfect knowledge of police Requirements', coupled with his assertion 
that the 'whole of the changes ought to have been first proposed by the 
Commissioner' could only strike ajarring note with Lushington and his 
colleagues. And the implied criticism of Monro in Warren's expressed hope of 
now 'obtaining a real Detective Department efficient to an extent which has yet 
never been contemplated' was surely intemperate given that tile object of his 
critical shaft was at that moment occupying a senior position in the Home Off ice. 
But it was surely his promise that the 'whole system should be considered' if its 
performance did not improve 'at the end of two years from now' that must have 
most alarmed the Home Secretary and his senior advisers; politically, personally 
and strategically. Politically, because criticism of the conduct of the Ripper case 
was not confined to Warren and his men. Matthews was 'unpopular with all 
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political parties ... and his resignation was eagerly canvassed in 1888' over the 
failings of the Metropolitan Police detectives. " Warren's suggestion that he 
might disband or reform the CID could well be seen as a pre-emptive attempt to 
divert criticism away from himself. It could then only fall on Monro and perhaps 
then on Matthews. Personally, because the tone and contents of Warren's letter 
was a re-assertion of his independence and his authority over his Force (or at least 
the detective part of it), and hence a rejection of the Home Office view of his 
'subordination' to the instructions of the Secretary of State. Strategically, 
because Warren's threat to his CID would undo, or at least expose to public 
scrutiny, the convert effort of the Home Office to transfer the work of the 
'Runners' to the New Police. 
It is a matter of regret therefore, that Warren did not last long enough in his post 
to see through his intention to review, reform and perhaps disband his CID. He 
was on the brink of bringing to a head the whole issue of the presence of 
detectives in policing when he fell into a trap of his own construction. When the 
three issues of his long-running and increasingly bitter conflict with the Home 
Office; his explosive dispute with Monro; and public disquiet over the 'Ripper' 
case, were coupled with the ill-judged and combative tone and content of his 
letter on the Criminal Investigation Department, a crisis ensued in which he 
offered his resignation in what looks very much like a fit of outraged 
exasperation. 
On the 8"' November 1888, just three days after he had delivered his letter on the 
CID and before he had had any reply, Warren received a letter from one of the 
Home Office officials, E. Leigh-Pemberton. " Ile informed Warren that the 
Home Secretary had seen an article in 'Murray's Magazine'. InitWarrenhad 
made some vaguely critical comments with regard to previous government 
policies on the Metropolitan Police. Leigh-Pemberton drew Warren's attention 
to, and enclosed, a copy of a nine-year old instruction issued on 27"' May 1879; 
that is, almost seven years before Warren's appointment to the Commissioner's 
Office. The instruction directed that no officer of the Home Department should 
publish any work relating to the Department without prior sanction from the 
Secretary of State. 
11 Begg, Fido and Skinner (1991)page 287 
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The missive infuriated Warren. It asserted Lushington's long-fought claim that 
Warren was no more than, and in the same category as, any other Home Office 
official. It also came, not from the Home Secretary as Warren demanded in his 
'Scheme' and had frequently asserted with vehemence any such communication 
ought to have originated, nor even from Lushington, the Under Secretary, who at 
least claimed the right to speak for the Secretary of State, but from an official 
whom Warren would regard as well below him in both rank and importance. 
Against the background of all the strains and pressures between Warren and the 
Home Office, timing and tactics sharpened the impact of the admonition. To 
have such a minor matter raised at such a time by such a lowly minion among his 
opponents brought Warren to the end of his habitually short fuse. He dashed off 
a strongly worded letter of resignation that very evening, in a hand shaking with 
rage. That he had much more than merely his article in 'Murray's Magazine in 
his mind as he wrote is evident from the injudicious opportunity he took to ignite 
the long-smouldering debate about his relationship with Home Office. Ile 
included the belligerent assertion that the Secretary of State, 'had not the power 
under the Statute of issuing orders for the Police Force', " concluding with an 
offer to resign that the Home Office were more than grateful to accept. 
Lushington's influence is clearly visible in the affair. A minute in his hand 
appears on Warren's resignation papers. In it Lushington forwards to his Home 
Secretary copies of a preliminary exchange of notes between Warren and another 
Home Office official, Ruggles-Brise, on the subject of the 'Murray's Magazine' 
article, saying, 
'Please see the attached letter from the Commissioner to Mr. Brise, marked 
Private. 
If this impudent letter does not open the eyes of the Secretary of state to the 
fact that the Commissioner is, and has long been out of hand, in a state of 
complete insubordination, ignoring the authority of the S of S, nothing I 
can say will be of any avail. "' 
Examination of these same resignation papers reveals Lushington as the source of 
the complaint that Warren's article in Murray's Magazine had breached a 
departmental instruction, and also shows that Warren's letter on the CID was 
13 ibid. item 4 
14 ibid item 3 (papers) 
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seen by Home Office as yet another example of his insubordination. These 
papers also record that it is Lushington who suggests that Leigh-Pemberton, rather 
than himself or the Home Secretary, should write the resignation-precipitating 
letter of admonition. 
The inference to be drawn is of a direct connection between Warren's letter of 5t" 
November 1888 on the irregular manner in which the Criminal Investigation 
Department had been created and the possibility that its future might be 
'considered', and the disciplinary action instituted by the Home Office over an 
article in Murray's Magazine which had the predictable result of Warren's 
resignation. A mere three days separate the two events; Lushington's hand can 
be detected in both, and the outcome suited his, and his Secretary of State's, 
purposes admirably. They were both finally rid of a troublesome Commissioner. 
If, as seems likely, the Murray's Magazine incident was a riposte to Warren's CID 
missive it could not have been better aimed or delivered. 
In a debate in Parliament on the Report of Supply, Metropolitan Police, shortly 
after these events, Secretary of State Matthews refers to his conflict with Warren. 
He reveals his mind when he tells the House that, in his view, 
'It would be totally unconstitutional that there should be a police force in 
such a town as London, the commander of which force should hold 
irresponsible authority, and be able to disregard the instructions of the 
person who had to answer in Parliament for the conduct of the men under 
his command. "' 
Henry Matthews ignores the early history of a professional police force in London 
in these remarks. It was precisely the possibility of the New Police coming under 
government control that had so exercised the minds and aroused the fears of 
ordinary citizens and those who represented them in the House when Peel first 
brought his proposals to Parliament. Equally Matthews seems to have forgotten, 
or not been properly briefed about, Henry Fergusson's recommendation in his 
Home Office Departmental committee Report of 1868 that Parliamentary time be 
found for legislation to bring the Metropolitan Police under the control of the 
Home Secretary. " No such action had been taken. Since that advice emanated 
from his own department, Matthews has no excuse for being unaware of it. Ile 
Is ibid. item 712 
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was surely wrong therefore, to claim that he had authority to issue 'instructions' to 
the Commissioner about the 'conduct of the officers under his command'. 
But despite Warren being clearly in the right in the content, if not the tone, of both 
his CID and his resignation letter, the Home Office was more than grateful to let 
him return to his military career. Unfortunately for him, and for historians who 
may have wished to promote or protect his reputation, he subsequently covered 
himself with controversy at the battle for Spion Cop during the Boer War, " and 
was removed from command of the 5 th Division to the governorship of 
Bechuanaland in April, 1900 to live out the remainder of his life under a 
permanent cloud. 
The Importance of Warren 
Warren was not long in the Commissioner's office and he has since largely been 
disregarded, even ridiculed. But historians ought to be grateful to him. His 
conflict with his political masters over the appointment of a deputy for Monro and 
the provenance of his CID caused those in government who had responsibility for 
policing to reveal their minds and their intentions for the police service. 
Nowhere else in the public record is the Home Office view of the emerging police 
service more clearly displayed than in the documents and papers created during its 
disputes with Warren. Under Secretary Lushington, in particular, is revealed as 
a strong partisan of the detectives; as a prime mover in the effort to subordinate 
the police service to government control; and as the sponsor and protector of a 
criminal investigation department within the Metropolitan Police. In the incident 
of Monro's deputy he went so far as to support the head of the criminal 
investigation department in his defiance of a direct (and lawful) order from the 
Commissioner on an important issue. 
Arrival of Monro 
It cannot be by happenstance that Warren's successor in the Commissioner's 
office on 3rd. December 1888 was James Monro Esq., CB, the former 'civilian' 
Assistant Commissioner and now full time 'Head of Detectives' at the Home 
Office, from whom Warren had so recently parted on fighting terms. The senior 
Assistant Commissioner was Colonel R. L. 0. Pearson. The Home Secretary 
overlooked him on this occasion. 
17 Doyle, Sir Arthur C. (1900) Chapter 15 
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Monro's experience of police work was mostly Indian, and confined to the 
headquarters detective branch at home. He was said to have displayed 'a flair for 
detective work"' and predictably proved to be a compliant Commissioner, at least 
at the outset. He was also the strongest exponent yet of the importance of 
detectives in the work of the professional police. With the appointment of Monro 
the Home Office replaced a troublesome Commissioner with one much more to 
their taste. They also buried the last real threat to the existence of the British 
police detective. 
The reversal in the fortunes of the Criminal Investigation Department caused by 
Monro's appointment was immediate and complete. Under Warren the future of 
the whole system of detectives was under threat of being 'considered' if its 
performance did not improve. Even its provenance and legality might have come 
into question had Warren survived as Commissioner. Yet within a month the 
new Commissioner sent a report to Henry Asquith, the equally new Secretary of 
State who had appointed him, seeking 'a large augmentation of the staff of the 
Criminal Investigation Department'. He said that, 'The proposal was considered 
by me more than a year ago' and he enclosed a copy of a report he had prepared 
on the sub . ect dated I Vh November, 1887, that is, while he was the Assistant 
Commissioner in charge of the CID under Warren's command. " 
Monro ignored the adverse view of the value of detectives taken by his 
predecessors and based his bid for an expansion of his detective strength on 
arguments that were to become familiar in the subsequent rise and expansion of 
the CID. He cites pressure of work caused by growing public expectations of his 
detective force. He assures the Home Secretary that, 'in any scheme to improve 
our criminal administration I am sure we shall be thoroughly supported by public 
opinion. ' 
He naturally omits any mention of the need for detectives to prove their value 
through an increase in their performance in dealing with crime and criminals. 
That view of the CID died with the departure of his predecessor, Warren, and was 
not resurrected for almost a hundred years. Monro adopts instead what was to 
become a standard approach of British chief police officers to any question of an 
increase in police manpower. He merely says that since the purpose of detectives 
is to catch criminals and the public demand is for the capture of more criminals, 
18 Petrow, S (I 993)page 96 
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then having more detectives must not only be a 'good thing' but also what the 
public wants. A line of argument whose circularity and fatuity was only noticed 
by ministers and officials when Prime Minister Thatcher's 'value for money' 
revolution hit the public services almost a century later. 
Broadly, Monro proposed to have CID officers available at every station in the 
Metropolitan Police area, with a room dedicated to their use. In addition and 
entirely unsurprisingly, he sought to appoint an Assistant Chief Constable to 
deputise for the head of the Criminal Investigation Department when necessary. 
Monro costed his proposals for the expansion of the CID, including the 
recruitment of anew deputy head of the CID, at some E14,000 per annum. Inthe 
event, and in a pattern that also became familiar, the Home Office subjected tile 
proposal to its bureaucratic procedures and on 4 1h May 1889 gave Monro E5,000 
to spend as he thought fit on additions to his detective strength. " 
The arrival of Monro concluded the last major chapter in the development of tile 
modem police service. It marked an end to all opposition to the addition of the 
criminal investigative and detective functions formerly performed by the old 
magistrates and their officers to the role of the professional police. Allthose 
activities, including association with criminals and informants to facilitate crime 
detection, now fell exclusively to the successors of Peel's New Police. Members 
of Criminal Investigation Departments and those senior police officers responsible 
for them lost all sense of there being anything unusual or controversial about tile 
employment of detectives within the professional police service, or their 
engagement in the investigation, identification, detection and prosecution of 
criminal offenders. Never again would the question of their validity in, or 
usefulness to, policing be raised. With the aid of lbettson's 1878 Report, CID 
officers quickly became, in their own estimation as well as that of tile public, the 
elite of the police service, a position they occupied beyond the scandals of the 
1960s. 
Following the Municipal Reform Act of 1835 towns began to acquirc the new 
style of regular police forces. Counties followed with the passage of the County 
and District Constabularies Act of 1839 (2&3 Vict. cap. XCIII) which provided 
for the appointment of constabularies under Chief Constables in every county 
where the justices wished it and the Home Secretary approved the arrangements. 
All commentators agree that, 
20 Public Record Office HO 45IA4946317 
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'They were largely modelled on the Metropolitan pattern. Anincreasing 
uniformity followed, since the watch committees which controlled tile 
municipal police received subsidies which depended on their forces 
conforming to standards required by the Home Office. "' 
Given the views of the Home Office discovered by this research, it is not 
surprising that those 'standards' should include the maintenance of a full-time 
criminal investigation department along the lines initiated in the Metropolitan 
Police. 
Finally the County and Borough Police Act of 1856 (19&20 Vic. c. 69) 'made it 
compulsory for all counties and boroughs to establish police forces', " as well as 
establishing an Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). These Inspectors had, and 
still have, a programme of visits to police forces. They visit in order to assess 
whether or not the force should continue to receive the government funding that 
early became a major element in local police budgets. No police force could long 
withstand the threat of the withdrawal of government grant. 
Inspections thus rapidly became the principal means by which the Home Office 
guided and shaped the development of the professional police service. Under 
penalty of loss of funding, HM Inspectors required every police force in Britain to 
accept responsibility for the investigation and detection of crime and the 
prosecution of criminal offenders, and to maintain a criminal investigation 
department for that purpose. 
11 Chesney, K(1970)page32 
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13 
The Dual Role of Professional Polici!! g 
The preceding chapters complete the 'simple, direct history ... of the ... British 
professional police service' promised earlier. It has been established that the function 
of criminal investigation, identification, detection and prosecution formed no part of 
the original purposes of British professional policing. That task was added to the 
purely preventive and protective duties of Peel's New Police at a much later date, thus 
creating the present dual crime preventive and crime detective role of the British 
police service. It has also been found that government through the agency of the 
Home Office originated, fostered and completed the transfer of responsibility for the 
investigation and detection of criminal offenders from the magistrates of the 
metropolis and their officers to the Metropolitan Police Force during the 1860s and 
1870s. It then used the budgetary power inherent in its constabulary Inspectorate 
system to spread criminal investigation departments to every British police force. 
The Home Office and the dual role 
There can be little doubt when and how the functions, and then the role, of the British 
police service changed. It happened in the three decades between the passage of the 
Metropolitan Police and Metropolitan Police Courts Acts of 1839 and the 'Turf Fraud 
case' of 1877 with its consequence in the report of Ibbetson's Home Office 
Commission the following year. In that period, Mayne's 1842 'Memorandum relative 
to the detective duties of the police' and Fergusson's 1868 Committee laid a 
foundation for the detective within the police service on which Ibbetson's 
Commission report built his stronghold in the Criminal Investigation Department. But 
it is also clear that neither Mayne's Memorandum nor the Fergusson and Ibbetson 
Home Office inquiries were the cause of the addition of crime investigation, detection 
and prosecution to the functions of the Metropolitan Police and consequently the 
creation of a dual crime prevention and crime detection role for the whole British 
policeservice. They were merely landmarks in the process by which Home Office 
officials brought that change about without Parliamentary or legislative sanction. 
Fortunately for those officials, and perhaps unfortunately for our criminal justice 
system, the public at large, then as now, showed little understanding of these matters 
and less interest in them. In the period under review crime and criminality were 
growing fast and the threat of the Fenians effectively neutralised all the old public 
fears about the development of a 'spy system' based on Peel's New Police. The 
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creation of a body of detectives to supplement and complement the existing preventive 
and protective work of the constables of the Force seemed a natural and 
uncontroversial development. In reality however, the development was a 
transformation in which professional policing underwent major organisational and 
structural change in the 1860s and 70s, which greatly expanded both its purposes and 
its activities, without any correspondingly comprehensive alteration in the law. This 
is so even though the findings of the 1839 Royal Commission and Fergusson's 1868 
Report provided clear evidence that preparatory legislative action was needed. An 
examination of contemporary documents and records shows that responsibility for that 
departure from normal Parliamentary and democratic processes rests with Home 
Off ice, both politicians and officials. Those records also identify the principal actors 
in that irregular activity. 
Under-Secretary Lushington 
Of the Home Off ice officials in the period of the emergence of the modem police 
detective the most interesting in this regard is Liddell's successor as Under- Secretary, 
Godfrey Lushington. Lushington qualified as a barrister in 1858, and joined the 
Home Office as its Counsel in 1869 just after the implementation of Fergusson's 
Departmental report. He became Assistant Under-Secretary in 1876, this time just 
before the establishment of Ibbetson's Committee. Finally he took the top job as 
Under-Secretary in 1885 before retiring ten years later in the calmer days of Colonel 
Sir Edward Bradford's Commissionership. 
Lushington occupied important and influential posts in the Home Office throughout 
the development and emergence of the professional detective. Ile was Legal counsel 
to the Home Secretary at the time of the first establishment of the Detective Branch ill 
the Metropolitan Police. He was a senior member of the Office when the Force 
instructions relating to the appointment of those officers were drafted and published, 
As a barrister he was in a position to advise the Secretary of State about the legality of 
that action, and the transformation in the role of the police within the criminaljustice 
system that it represented. Indeed, as Counsel to the Home Office that must surely 
have been one of his functions. But no direct evidence has yet been discovered to 
show that he made any such contribution. 
We can be fairly certain however, that he did not advise against that significant 
development in the functions of the New Police. He certainly did not oppose or 
obstruct the expansion of the Criminal Investigation Department when lie had the 
opportunity to do so as Under-Secretary in the later stages of his career. And lie 
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showed no sympathy with the problems of the senior officers of the New Police, nor 
did he support their aims. On a personal level he could be extremely difficult. Sir 
Robert Anderson, Assistant Commissioner (CID) during the Whitechapel murders, 
records in his memoirs that, 'With his many excellent qualities Godfrey Lushington's 
intervention and influence as Under Secretary were generally provocative, and his 
manner iffitating. " Coming from a fellow member of the London Bar, such a 
comment is more likely to be an understatement rather than an exaggeration of 
Lushington's attitude toward his professional police colleagues. 
He was no friend to them as his correspondence with, and attitude toward, 
Commissioner Warren amply demonstrates. Indeed, Lushington's view was that the 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police should recognise and accept his, 
'subordination to the Home Office'. His remarks in the internal minutes attached to 
Warren's resignation papers are particularly revealing in this respect, as has already 
been noted. Other examples of his unhelpful attitude toward his police colleagues are 
available in the public record. It is shown for instance in his dealings with Warren's 
claim for expenses on his taking up the position of Commissioner in 1886, ' and his 
comments on the contentious issue of military aid to the Metropolitan Police in 
3 February 1888. 
The available Home Office papers do not record Lushington's attitude toward the 
specific issue of the performance of the 'detective duties' of the magistrates' officers 
by the Metropolitan Police Force. But his occupancy of the higher levels of the 
Home Office hierarchy coincided with the addition of a detective function to British 
policing and he must therefore at least have acquiesced in that fundamental change in 
the responsibilities of the police. During his bitter disputes with Commissioner 
Warren in 1887 and 1888 his fiercest comments on his adversary's behaviour are 
reserved to the moment when the Commissioner first turned his full attention to his 
Criminal Investigation Department. Warren wrote to the Home Office querying its 
origins and just two days later Lushington decided that a relatively harmless article by 
Warren in the November edition of Murray's magazine should be the subject of a 
confrontational admonition. He then chose to delegate that task to ajunior member of 
his staff. 4 The result was one that he must have been able to anticipate, and which lie 
therefore must be suspected of having wished to provoke. At this distance in time 
from these events conjecture cannot be anything other than speculation, but 
I Anderson, Sir R (1910)page 129 
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Lushington's behaviour must open him to the suspicion that he was seeking to protect 
the detective department in the Metropolitan Police Force from too close public or 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
Lushington, in his character, in his views, in his opportunities and by his actions 
appears to be the most likely candidate for the role of sponsor of the professional 
detective amongst the Home Office officials involved in that development. But he 
could not have succeeded in that purpose alone. The leaders of the professional 
police service also played a part. 
The first Commissioners 
Rowan and Mayne, the joint first Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, 
unintentionally laid the first foundations for the modem police detective and his home 
in the Criminal Investigation Department. They did so in a campaign to eliminate all 
their competitors in the policing of the metropolis which successfully removed the 
'Runners' employed by the magistrates and common informers from the capital's 
criminal justice system. The Commissioners regarded the suppression of these people 
as not only eminently sensible but also morally justified. In their view both groups 
contained individuals who, as the Eight Report of the Royal Commission on tile 
Criminal Law describes it, took advantage of the 'wide door to bribery, collusion and 
illegal compromises' left open by the absence of a public prosecutor. In seeking to do 
away with or replace such people the Commissioners clearly felt themselves to be 
performing a needed public service. 
Unfortunately, the Commissioners never understood that, when performed with 
integrity, their targets played a vital role in the policing of the capital, and in the 
criminal justice system as a whole. In particular, the acquisition of reliable information 
about, and informants among, active criminals and their associates, and the 
development of an accurate understanding of the workings and interrelationships of 
criminal sub-cultures, matters in which both the 'Runners'and common informers had 
long experience and considerable skill, are an indispensable element in any effective 
system of crime detection and punishment. These duties could not be discontinued 
without effective replacement which, regretfully and due to the adverse attitudes of the 
Commissioners toward such work, was what happened after 1839. To that extent, 
Rowan and Mayne must bear some responsibility for the emergence of the dual role of 
the modern police service. 
In their defence however, even when the Commissioners took positive action to 
introduce detectives into their Force in 1842 they did so reluctantly, under pressure 
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from the Home Office and as an experiment. In all, the direct contribution of the first 
Commissioners to the emergence of the police detective was either unintended or 
made under protest. At the very worst therefore, it was a mistake for which they 
should not be too heavily criticised. 
Henderson 
On the other hand, all the decisive steps in the appearance of the modern detective 
occurred in Henderson's time as Commissioner. He implemented Fergusson's 
recommendation for the formation of the first Detective Branch and was still in post 
when the Branch was expanded into a full-blown Criminal Investigation Department 
in 1878. Henderson was therefore the Commissioner who oversaw the incorporation 
of a criminal investigation and detection function into the role of Rowan and Mayne's 
New Police. On the evidence of his letter of 3rd March 1878 to Liddell, when he 
sought Home office authority for the employment of the detectives required to man 
the new Criminal Investigation Department created by C. E. Howard-Vincent, he did 
more than acquiesce in that development. He took an active part in it. 
However, no direct evidence has been found to show that he either initiated or 
sponsored the creation of a Criminal Investigation Department within his Force. 
Examination of the relevant documents assigns that role to the Home Office and its 
officials. Henderson may therefore be able to make a mitigating plea of superior 
orders but he cannot escape all criticism. He has 'negative responsibility" i. e. his 
liability arises from his failure adequately to oppose the development. 
Had Henderson anticipated and adopted Warren's stance toward his Home Secretary 
when the formation of a CID was first proposed in 1868, or when tile 1878 Ibbetson 
Commission recommended the centralisation of the system of criminal investigation, 
he may have saved Rowan and Mayne's original design for the New Police. By 
adopting Warren's stoutly independent approach to the dictates of tile Home Office lie 
may at least have preserved the 'divisional' system. Its locally controlled 
investigation of crime as a discretionary activity for the police service might then have 
become the pattern for the development of modern policing. But lie failed to oppose 
or expose the radical changes proposed by Lushington and the Home Office, of which 
he had full knowledge. On the same basis, he must also accept responsibility for his 
subsequent indifference to the enlargement in size and enhancement in status of the 
criminal investigation department within the Metropolitan Police with all that 
followed from it. 
5 Fuller, S (2003)page 189; and Honderich, Ted (1995)page 772 
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But Henderson's inactivity is not his only, nor even his most significant, contribution 
to the emergence of the detectives as an integral part of the modern police service. 
He has a personal and direct responsibility for the destruction of Rowan and Mayne's 
vision of the New Police as a purely protective and preventive force, and for its 
replacement by a definition of the role of the professional police service that includes 
the investigation and detection of criminal offenders. His direct culpability in this 
respect arises from his publication and promulgation of what later generations of 
policing professionals were to call the 'Primary Objects'. 
The 'Primary Objects' 
Some time after his appointment, Henderson put in hand work to codify and 
consolidate the growing number of instructions issued to the Force. For the first time 
since 1829 all the Instructions applicable to the work of constables were separated out 
and gathered together in a single book. Other, more general, Instructions to the Force 
were codified into a second, larger volume for the information and direction of senior 
ranks. Who, or what, first prompted this mammoth task is unclear, but the need for it 
isnot. In his Report to the Home Secretary for the year 1872 Henderson mentions 
these two new volumes of instructions. He says that, 
'A work of very considerable importance affecting the daily and hourly 
responsibilities of the Police has been completed during the year in the 
consolidation of all the Police Orders issued since the formation of the force in 
1829 and now extant. They have been arranged under alphabetical heads and 
with a comprehensive index and will prove a great boon to the service 
generally ... A small Instruction Book has also 
been prepared in concise form 
and issued for the use of candidates and constables, and a compendious 
Instruction Book bearing on the personal duties of Sergeants and Constables on 
matters connected with the general working of the Service. Acopywillbe 
supplied to every man. " 
In contrast to the practice adopted by Rowan and Mayne, Henderson did not attach a 
copy of the contents of the new Instruction Books to his Annual Report to his Home 
Secretary for the information of Parliament. This is an odd, and unexplained, 
omission. His Annual Report for the year has no fewer than 54 Appendices on other, 
much less significant, subjects. The Home Secretary in post at the time was Henry 
Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for the year 1872, Parliamentary Papers page 3: 
1873 (C. 839), =. 291, page 2 
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Bruce. Parliamentary Debates in the period give no indication that Bruce mentioned 
the new Instruction Book in the House, or even that he was aware of it. ' 
The 1873 Instruction Book 
It is fortunate for the history of the British police service that copies of Henderson's 
Instruction Book for constables, first issued on 28 th April 1873, have survived. ' His 
Instruction Book is important because it contains the first fundamental departure from 
the 1829 definition of the role of the professional police set down by Rowan and 
Mayne with the 'approbation' of Robert Peel. Significantly, and in contrast to 
Rowan and Mayne's invariable practice, the new definition does not form part of the 
main body of the Instructions. It appears as a Preface to them, a feature unknown in 
any earlier version. Its status is therefore, ambiguous. Whether or not this novel 
Preface is a General Instruction to the Metropolitan Police made and published under 
the Commissioner's powers set out in the 1829 Act is uncertain. What is clear 
however, is that whatever its formal status Henderson's statement of the role of his 
Force replaced Rowan and Mayne's earlier Instruction on these matters since their 
version does not appear in the new codified and collected Instruction Book. 
Rowan and Mayne derived their wording from the legislation that founded the 
Metropolitan Police Force. It was clearly a General Instruction to the Force and 
appeared in its proper place among their other Instructions. It said that; 
'It should be understood, at the outset, that the principal object to be attained is 
'the Prevention of Crime'. 
To this great end every effort of the Police is to be directed. The security of 
persons and property, the preservation of the public tranquillity, and all the 
other objects of a Police establishment, will thus be better effected, than by the 
detection and punishment of the offender, after he has succeeded in committing 
the crime. " 
Those words were 'laid on the Table of the House' and entered into tile Parliamentary 
record. All subsequent versions of the Instructions to the Force issued in Mayne's 
lifetime repeat them without variation. 
By a subtle process of re-wording and re-arrangement of Rowan and Mayne's original 
statement, the Preface to Henderson's new Instructions abandons the principle that the 
7 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) ThirdSeries vols. CCA7V, CM CCWI, C= CCxv1 and CCkv11 
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prevention of crime was always to be preferred to the detection of offenders. In its 
place is the view that the purpose of policing is both to prevent and to detect crime. 
So was bom the phrasing that every recruit to the professional police service was 
subsequently required to commit to memory. It was, and is, universally known to 
them as the 'Primary Objects' and was to be an unchallenged statement of the role of 
the British professional police service for more than one hundred years. 
'The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime, tile next 
that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. 
To these ends all the efforts of Police must be directed. The protection of life 
and property, the preservation of public tranquillity, and the absence of crime 
will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful and whether the 
objects for which the Police were appointed have been attained. "' 
Taken at face value, it might be objected that the subtle change of wording between 
Rowan and Mayne's definition of the purposes of policing and Henderson's Primary 
Objects is of little significance, or even trivial. After all, Rowan and Mayne's 'route 
papers' and 'divisional' systems assigned constables to the investigation of reports of 
crime and the detection of offenders. But the true nature and extent of the 
transformation in the functions and purposes of the professional police service 
represented by the Primary Objects, and its place as the first formal statement that 
Peel's New Police now had a dual, two-function, role in British the criminal justice 
system, is not to be found in the words it uses but in its effect and consequences. 
Those are most clearly to be seen in the 1877 'Turf Fraud case', already identified as a 
landmark event in the history of the police detective. 
In publishing his 1873 'Primary Objects', or allowing it to be published in his name, 
Henderson must accept a heavy responsibility of the destruction of the original 
purposes and functions of the New Police, and its replacement by the dual crime 
prevention and crime detection role that came to be applied to the modern British 
police service. But by what or on whose authority did he issue that pivotal change in 
the definition of policing? 
The law and the dual role. 
In 1873 the only proper category into which publication of Henderson's 'Primary 
Objects' could fit was, as it always had been, Section 5 of the Metropolitan Police Act 
of 1829. That Section divides responsibility for the issue of instructions to the 
10 Metropolitan Police Instruction Book etc. (I 873). op cit, Preface 
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Metropolitan Police Force between the Commissioners and the Secretary of State, a 
duality of authority that is a feature of this Act. 
Systematic division of power between a government minister and the head(s) of a 
public body is notjust a quirk of this statute. It is an important principle of it that 
reflects contemporary concern to take every possible precaution to prevent the New 
Police becoming an instrument of government repression or of partisan politics. At 
the same time the legislators wanted to put the Secretary of State in a position to 
account to Parliament for the conduct of the new organisation. In drafting the Act an 
attempt was made to create a relationship between the Commissioners and the 
Secretary of State which met both objectives. The duality of responsibility approach 
is the chosen method. Unfortunately, as in the dispute between Commissioner Warren 
and the Home Office officials under Lushington, it left room for differing 
interpretations. 
Section 5 of the Act empowered the Commissioner(s), 
'sub . ect to the approbation of one of His majesty's Principal Secretaries of U 
State .... [to] ... frame such orders and regulations as they shall 
deem expedient, 
relative to the general government of the men to be appointed members of the 
Police force. ' 
The duality of responsibility of the Act is achieved in this section by the provision for 
retrospective 'approbation' by the Secretary of State of actions decided upon, or 
indeed already taken, by the Commissioners. There is no doubt that the addition of a 
full-time detective role along the lines of the functions formerly performed by tile 
officers employed by the magistrates of the metropolis and by common informers to 
the duties of the constables of the Force (which is the effect of the 'Primary Objects') 
is a matter 'relative to the general government of the men appointed to be members 
of the Police force'. It would seem that any such changes in the orders and 
instructions to the Force ought to originate with the Commissioners as Warren 
asserted during his dispute with his Home Secretary. Only then, under the duality of 
responsibility principle, need their Instruction be subsequently subject to approbation 
by the Secretary of State. This is not what happened with the 'Primary Objects'. 
In that case the process which led to the publication of that new definition of the 
purposes of policing began with the errors and omissions of the Metropolitan Police 
and Courts Acts of 1839. The consequent Home Office pressure on Mayne in 1842 
resulted in his 'experiment' with a detective branch. On that base the 1868 Home 
Office Departmental Committee under Fergusson constructed the headquarters 
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Detective Branch with its sprinkling of full-time detectives on Divisions. Henderson, 
the Commissioner of the day, implemented those recommendations with no apparent 
enthusiasm, delegating the work to a subordinate, C. E. Howard-Vincent. Five years 
later Henderson published the 'Primary Objects', not because he deemed it expedient 
under his statutory powers, nor, it would seem, as a formal Instruction, but as an 
unprecedented Preface to a newly collated edition of the Force Instructions. This is 
neither the manner nor the process for the issue of instructions envisaged by the 
legislators. Publication of the Primary Objects did not result from a decision of the 
Commissioner either to announce or to establish a change in the nature of the 
functions of the Force. It merely expressed what had already long since taken place 
at the behest of the Home Office. 
If that is a true account of the appearance of the 'Primary Objects', then those 
responsible could conceivably argue that it was not a 'general instruction' to the 
Force under the provisions of Section 5. That would also conveniently explain their 
decision to make the publication in a Preface and, incidentally, account for there being 
nothing in the public record to show that Henderson's redefinition of the functions of 
his Force received 'approbation' from the Secretary of State. 
But on that interpretation the 'Primary Objects' is indeed not a lawful Instruction to 
the Force under the relevant legislation and cannot therefore, of itself, authorise the 
change in the nature and functions of the Metropolitan Police that it describes. And 
since the new Instruction Books contain no other description of the role and purpose 
of the Metropolitan Police, then after 1873 the Metropolitan Police Force and those 
parts of the emerging British police service that followed it as a model would be left 
with no authoritative description of its duties and responsibilities at all. 
The opposite view, i. e. that the 'Primary Objects' is a general instruction to the Force 
under the Act, is equally problematic. The process by which the crime investigation 
and detection duties of the magistrates and their officers were added to those of tile 
Metropolitan Police can readily be shown to have begun prior to the issue of tile 
'Primary Objects' - by at least five years. Consequently, any attempt to bring that 
new definition of policing within the scope of an instruction under the Act must 
involve some sort of reverse process in which the Home Office initiates and brings 
about a change in the duties performed by the constables of the Metropolitan Police 
that is then retrospectively formalised by an Instruction issued by the Commissioner. 
The problem with that process is first, that it is unprecedented, and second, that it is 
arguably also unlawful. 
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Precedent 
At the outset of Peel's New Police the process was indeed that all changes in the 
general Instructions to the Force originated with, and were proposed by, the 
Commissioners. Only afterward did they receive approbation by the Home Secretary. 
Parliamentary Papers include copies of all General Orders issued to the Metropolitan 
Police Force during the first two years of its existence. " Only one such Instruction 
issues directly from Sir Robert Peel. It refers to the arrangements for appointments 
to, and within, the Force, a matter reserved to the Secretary of State by Section 4 of 
thel829Act. That Section provides that, 'a sufficient Number of fit and able men 
shall, from time to time, by the direction of one of His Majesty's Principal 
Secretaries of State, be appointed as a Police Force for the' Metropolis. This is a 
specific power granted to the Secretary of State to give directions to the Force found 
nowhere else in the Act. 
Parliamentary Papers also show how the founders of the New Police divided the 
responsibility for the issue of Instructions. Peel's only instruction deals with the 
appointment of officers to 'superior rank'. Rowan and Mayne's Instructions include 
the original definition of the functions and purposes of the Force, as well as its 
founding structure and organisation. Mayne quite properly followed that precedent 
when he initiated the Instructions that formed the Detective Branch in 1842, albeit 
under pressure from the Home Office. He proposed an 'experiment' and his Home 
Secretary, Graham, then agreed to it. 
For the sake of completeness at this point it should be said that even this seemingly 
proper first step in the introduction of the duties of the magistrates and their detective 
officers into the role of the New Police is open to question as a result of yet another 
curious quirk in the drafting of the 1839 Metropolitan Police and Courts Acts. Prior 
to the passage of those Acts, Rowan and Mayne had complained to the Home Office 
that the dual structure of the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act required joint action by 
both Commissioners in any and every case. They found this hopelessly complex and 
inefficient. They sensibly asked that the legislation be amended to allow one 
Commissioner to act on behalf of both. When the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 
was drafted a provision was included intended to that effect. The Interpretation 
Clause of the Act said, among other provisions, 'that all Things herein authorized to 
"Parliamentary Papers (505)AWIII. 405 (1830) and (340) V111.265 (1830-31) 
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be done by the Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis may be done by either of 
them. "' 
The problem is that this Clause begins with the words 'And be it enacted, That in the 
Construction of this Act', and its relevant part includes the word 'herein'. At the time 
of the passage of the 1839 Act it was not recognised that this form of words meant that 
the 'single Commissioner' provision applied only to those powers and duties of the 
Commissioners specified in the 1839 Act, and not those granted and given in 1829. 
Thus the Interpretation Clause did not apply to many of the most important powers of 
the Commissioners, including their authority to issue General Instructions to the 
Force; a category into which the setting up of a Detective Branch undoubtedly fell. 
And, as was noted in an earlier chapter, the letter of 1842 in which Richard Mayne 
acquiesced in the formation of a Detective Branch is signed by him alone. 
The Home Office cannot claim to have been unaware of this additional Interpretation 
Clauseproblem. It was noticed in 1855 when the Law officers were asked to 
comment on a Memorandum from Richard Mayne asking whether it might be possible 
to divide the powers and duties of the joint Commissioners appointed under the Act of 
1829. " Mayne did not get on well with Charles Rowan's successor, Captain Hay, and 
wanted to reserve all important decisions to himself. In dealing with that request 
(which the Home Office vehemently opposed) officials discovered, to their horror, 
that 'acts must have been done by one Comm. over and over again without lawful 
authority'14 due to the faulty drafting of the Act of 1839. The mistake was only 
finally corrected in 1856. " 
In sum therefore, the legislation and all precedent, including precedent in relation to 
the instructions on the employment of constables as detective officers, points in a 
single direction. It indicates that any general instruction to the Force ought to be 
proposed by, and originate with, both Commissioners and only afterward be approved 
by the Secretary of State. By that criterion only one step in the process that led to Ole 
formation of the Criminal Investigation Department in the Metropolitan Police was 
correctly taken, i. e. Mayne's establishment of the Detective Branch in 1842. And 
even that action is open to question on technical grounds arising from tile faulty 
drafting of the Interpretation Clause of the 1839 Metropolitan Police Act. 
12 Metropolitan Police Act 1839 (2&3 Victoria cap. 47) section 78 
13 Public Record Office OS 6093 item 12 
14 ibid. 
Is 19Victoria 2, cV(1856) 
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The problem with Henderson's 'Primary Objects' and the revision of the definition of 
the purposes and objectives of policing that his new Preface to the Instructions to the 
Force represents is that, contrary to both legislation and all precedent, it is 
retrospective. It improperly purports to regulate changes in the 'general government 
of the men appointed to be members of the Force' that had already taken place, and 
which had not been originated by the Commissioners themselves. 
The Commissioners and the Home Secretary 
If it is accepted that Section 5 of the 1829 Act does not supply the necessary authority 
for the issue of Henderson's Primary Objects then Section I of the Act is the only 
other possible source. As with Section 5, it displays a duality of responsibility. Its 
importance in this context justifies its extensive reproduction. 
'Whereas Offences against Property have late increased in and near the 
Metropolis; and the local establishments of Nightly Watch and Nightly Police 
have been found inadequate to the Prevention and Detection of Crime, by 
reason of the frequent unfitness of the Individuals employed, the Insufficiency 
of their number, the limited sphere of their Authority, and the want of 
connection and co-operation with each other. And whereas it is expedient to 
substitute a new and more efficient system of Police in lieu of such 
Establishment of Nightly Police within the limits herein-after mentioned, and to 
constitute an office of Police which, acting under the immediate authority of 
one ofHis Majesty's Principal Secretaries ofState, shall direct and controul 
(sic) the whole ofsuch system ofPolice within these limits. Beittherefore 
enacted by ... That it shall be lawful for His Ma esty to cause a new 
Police 
Office to be established in the City of Westminster and to appoint two fit 
persons as Justices of the peace... to execute the Duties of a Justice of the Peace 
at the said office'. 
Two things of significance arise from this preamble to the Act. First, tile preamble 
describes the new organisation as being 'in lieu of the Nightly Watch and Nightly 
Police of the metropolis. It does not replace the whole of the policing arrangements 
for the capital. In particular it will be remembered that the magistrates and their 
police offices, with their responsibility for the investigation of reports and allegations 
of crime, and the detection and prosecution of offenders, remained in place with all 
their powers and prerogatives specifically preserved in this Act. Clearly that has 
major implications for the range of activities that the new organisation had 
Parliamentary authority to perform. 
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Second, the preamble distinguishes between the power to take action in the new 
organisation and the authority required for that action. The Act puts the New Police 
'under the immediate authority' of the Secretary of State. But it is the Justices of the 
new Police Office who act under that authority to direct and control the whole of the 
new organisation. The original Justices were Rowan and Mayne. Their successors 
are the Commissioners, including both Henderson and Warren, who inherited all their 
powers and privileges laid down in the Act. Such powers include their authority to 
issue such General Orders to the Force as 'they shall deem expedient for rendering 
such Force efficient in the discharge of all its Duties'. 
Whether or not Section I provides an authority for the changes in the duties of the 
Metropolitan Police Force that led to the 'Primary Objects' therefore depends on the 
relationship between 'the immediate authority' of the Secretary of State and the power 
of the Justices ('Commissioners') appointed to direct and control the Force. 
Unfortunately this is an issue on which the wording of the 1829 Act is imprecise. The 
first part of the Section 1, quoted earlier, goes on to say that the Justices appointed to 
the new Office to 'execute the Duties of Justice of the Peace' within it, should also 
execute 'such other duties as shall be herein after specified, or as shall be from time to 
time directed by one of His Majesties Principal Secretaries of State ... for the more 
efficient administration of the Police'. 
The preliminary point to be made about this part of the Act is that it deals with the 
authority of the Secretary of State to alter the duties of the Commissioners. It does 
not refer to the duties of the constables they employ. Warren, in his dispute with the 
Home Off ice made the strong point that his constables had duties and responsibilities 
under the law with which he could not interfere. In addition there is an immediate 
limitation on the extent of the Secretary of State's authority to change the duties of tile 
Commissioner(s). It is that the change must be 'for the more efficient administration 
of the Police. ' Thus any power of the Secretary of State to alter tile duties of the 
Force as a whole under this Section will have to be exercised through the 
Commissioners and apply to the administration of the Force. Under the statute lie 
cannot directly command the Force or give orders to any of its constables, as Warren 
rightly pointed out in his resignation letter in November, 1888. 
Turning then to the powers of the Commissioners, Section I also deals with their 
status and the extent of their authority. In effect it is a proviso limiting their powers 
as Justices of the Peace for the metropolis. It says, 
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'that no such person shall act as a Justice of the Peace at any Court of General 
or Quarter Sessions, nor in any Matter out of Sessions, except for the 
Preservation of the Peace, the prevention of Crimes, the detection and 
committal of offenders, and in carrying into execution the purposes of this 
Act'. 
The 1829 Act thus makes an important distinction between the Commissioners and tile 
other Justices appointed for the metropolis. The Commissioners and their constables 
are not just another magistrates' police office along the lines first developed by the 
Fieldings and later enshrined in the Act of 1792 and its successors. In confirmation 
of that important distinction the 1829 Act also says at Section 42 that, 'Provided 
always, and be it enacted, that nothing in this Act contained shall affect or alter' the 
legislation dealing with the Police Offices of the Metropolis under the control of the 
magistrates. The effect of these provisions is to prohibit the Commissioners from 
exercising any of the criminal investigative, detective and prosecution powers and 
functions granted to the otherjustices of the metropolis i. e. the magistrates of the 
police offices. 
That view of these issues is also clear in the Parliamentary record. Parliament 
renewed, unaltered, the separate police offices legislation from which the London 
magistrates derived their powers and authority at the same time as it passed the 
Metropolitan Police Act. The obvious intent is to create two different types of 
Cpolice' establishments in the metropolis, with different duties and responsibilities. 
Indeed, and in confirmation of the point, the legislation dealing with the Police Off ices 
specifically mentions the 'apprehension of offenders' in setting out the duties of the 
magistrates of the metropolis and hence, of the officers they employed. Section 15 of 
the original 1792 Act which first set up the Police Offices provided that, 
'the Justices to be appointed may ... retain and employ a sufficient number of fit 
and able men ... to act as Constables ... which said constables ... shall obey all 
such lawful commands as they from time to time receive from the said Justices 
for the apprehending [ofl offenders' 
The constables employed by the Commissioners under the 1829 Metropolitan Police 
Act were not given this duty to apprehend offenders. Equally significantly, nor did tile 
1829 Act bind the constables of the Metropolitan Police to obey tile commands of 
their Commissioners for that, or any other, policing purpose. Which clearly suggests 
that Parliament regarded the New Police as 'constables' in the Saxon tradition, rather 
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than intending them to be agents of the Justices (Commissioners) on the Norman 
model of the Bow Street Runners and other magistrates officers. 
Later Acts in the regular series of renewals of the Police Offices legislation make that 
distinction even more explicit. For example, an Act passed in 1823 (3GeoIV 
cap. 55), empowered the Chief Magistrate at the Bow Street Police Office to 
administer an oath to the officers employed in his Office to: 
'execute the Office of Constable ... and each of such Persons, 
being sworn, 
shall have Power to act as a Constable for the Preservation of the Peace, and for 
the Security of Property against felonious and other unlawful Modes of 
obtaining the same' 
The Commissioners of the new Metropolitan Police Force and the magistrates of the 
police offices both well understood the statutory distinction between them. Rowan 
and Mayne could not, and did not, take up the investigative and detective functions of 
magistrates into reports of crime either when offered to them by the 183 8 Select 
Committee or after the 1839 Acts had 'discontinued' the Bow Street Runners. Rowan 
and Mayne never knowingly permitted the constables of the Metropolitan Police to 
associate with criminals or otherwise undertake the detective duties of the magistrates 
officers. At the very earliest stage of the New Police, when Peel's Metropolis Police 
Improvement Bill was before Parliament, his Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, 
said in the House of Lords in answer to a question during the debate in June 1829, 
that, 'The Justices (Commissioners) were to have no power beyond what was 
necessary to protect the peace of the country and to carry this measure into effect. "' 
A Select Committee of Parliament, of which Sir Robert Peel was a member (the 
'Popay' committee), also considered the issue of the employment of the constables of 
the Metropolitan Police in plain clothes on crime detection in 1833. I'llat Committee 
resolved, 
'That it is the opinion of the Committee that with respect to the occasional 
employment of policemen in plain clothes, the system as laid down by tile 
heads of the Police Department affords no just matter of complaint while strictly 
confined to detect Breaches of the Law and to Prevent Breaches of the Peace , 
should those ends appear otherwise unattainable; "" 
16 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) New Series vot XYI cot 1752 
17 Parliamentary Papers (1833) (627) Vol. XII page 407 
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In addition, the first book of Instructions issued to Force by Rowan and Mayne told 
each constable they he was only responsible 'for the security of life and property, 
within his Beat, and for the preservation of the peace ... during the time he is on duty. "' 
It must be clear then that, even if they wished, neither the Secretary of State nor the 
Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police had authority under the relevant legislation 
to direct the constables of Force to undertake the criminal investigative and detective 
functions and duties of the magistrates of the metropolis or their plain-clothes officers. 
The conclusion must be that Henderson's action in publishing his 1873 'Primary 
Objects' was unlawful or at the least ultra vires given that by the time the 'Primary 
Objects' appeared the magistrates of the metropolis no longer exercised their former 
duties in this respect. 
The Courts 
Additional evidence to support that conclusion is available elsewhere in the history of 
the criminal justice system. Throughout the nineteenth century the courts refused to 
recognise Peel's 'New police' as having any part to play in the identification, 
detection and prosecution of offenders, apart that is from bringing immediately 
detained persons before the magistrates and giving evidence at any subsequent trial. 
For example, ' In 1838 Patterson J threatened with dismissal from the force an officer 
in the habit of interrogating prisoners. "' and, 'Prior to Jervis's Act [Indictable 
Offences Act, 1848), ajustification offered by thejudges for [that] rule was that police 
questioning was a usurpation of the function of the examining magistrate, without any 
of the safeguards which attended a magisterial examination. '" 
Following the passage of Jervis's Act the judges modified their view of this type of 
police activity, but they still did not approve of it. They argued that since the courts 
could not question a prisoner (which was the case at the time), no inferior officer of 
justice should do so. At the same time; 
'Another question was that of how far [police] officers might legitimately 
question persons against whom there was suspicion, but who had not yet been 
arrested. To this the judge's answer was that, once an officer had taken the 
decision to take a suspect into custody, it was not proper for him to put 
questions to him. Until that point was reached a suspect might be questioned 
18 Metropolitan Police Museum Instructions, 1829, page 38 
19 Bentley, D (19981 page 230 
20 ibid. 
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after a proper caution, although even here the power should be exercised 
sparingly. "' 
The essential point, for the purposes of this discussion of the lawfulness or otherwise 
of the adoption of the criminal detective duties of the magistrates and their officers by 
the constables of the Metropolitan Police, is that at the time those duties were being 
transferred to the Force the judges did not regard its constables as having any special 
role to play in the detection and prosecution of criminal offenders. That is so even 
after the passage of Jervis's Act in 1848 which somewhat loosened that restriction on 
the conduct of constables. Had the judges considered Peel's New Police to have any 
special or particular lawful authority to investigate crime or pursue criminals they 
would certainly have mentioned that special position in theirjudgements on such 
matters. No such statutory or legislative provision has been discovered that predates 
the publication of the Primary Objects in 1873. 
Conclusion 
There are three grounds therefore, on which to argue that both the publication of the 
'Primary Objects' and the creation of a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) 
within the Metropolitan Police that it represents was either unlawful or ultra vires. 
First, no Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police originated or deemed expedient 
either step under the provisions of the Act of 1829. Second, the relevant parts of 
that Metropolitan Police Act strictly limit the power of the Secretary of State to 
change the duties of the Commissioners. Specifically, he is precluded from directing 
them to take up the criminal investigative and detective functions of the magistrates of 
themetropolis. Finally, neither the Secretary of State nor the Commissioners had 
power to direct the constables of the Metropolitan Police to take up any duty other 
than those laid down in the Act of 1829. Nevertheless, despite these apparent 
statutory prohibitions, the criminal investigation and detection duties of the 
magistrates emerged as the pre-eminent activity of the Metropolitan Police. The 
evidence is that it did so not because the Commissioners either wished it or deemed it 
expedient, but rather as a response to overwhelming pressure from the Home Office. 
No record has been found of that change in the functions of the professional police 
service ever having been brought to the attention of Parliament for approval or debate. 
Nor was it included in legislation. The decision to transfer the detective duties of the 
magistrates officers to the constables of the Metropolitan Police appears to have made 
entirely within the Home Department. It was then implemented using the devices of 
21 ibid. page232 
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internal departmental committees and an administrative change in the form of the 
Instructions issued to the Force rather than by any publicly accountable means. Tile 
evidence is that the Home Office then deliberately screened those actions from 
scrutiny by Parliament. 
Toward the present problems of British policing 
However, the intention is not to condemn those responsible. The methods used in this 
research 'recognise that only a minority of social institutions are consciously designed 
while the vast majority have just "grown" as the undersigned results of human 
actions. "' Hence the working assumption is that criminal investigation departments in 
their modem form emerged within the professional police service as a result of 
attempts by hard-pressed and often ill-informed officials and politicians to find 
solutions to the problems of crime and disorder associated with industrialisation and 
urbanisation. No large-scale social movement, conspiracy or process is identified as 
accounting for the development. And no motive has been attributed to the actors 
involved other than a simple desire to deal with the immediate problems they faced. 
The contrast with the approach of much of the existing commentary and academic 
literature to this subject is, in this respect, complete. 
22 Popper, K. R. (2002) page 59 
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Findings and Conclusions 
The preceding chapters describe the process by which the British professional 
police service developed its present dual role. That dual role consists of two 
functions: 
a) uniform patrolling to prevent and deter crime and disorder and protect 
citizens from harm ('peacekeeping' by 'peacekeepers'); and, 
b) plain clothes work to investigate incidents and reports of crime and identify 
criminal offenders with a view to their prosecution and punishment ('crime 
detection' by 'detectives') 
The first function was laid down by Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne, the joint 
first Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, in 1829. The second was added 
by Commissioner Henderson's 'Primary Objects' Instruction to the Force in 1873. 
It should not be assumed that either the existence or the nature of the dual role of 
modem police officers is widely recognised or understood, even within the 
profession of policing. Henderson's definition is commonly attributed to 
Richard Mayne even in otherwise credible and reliable academic literature on 
British policing, ' and confusion on the issue can be found at the highest levels of 
the policing profession. For example, in a Handbook on the Principles of 
Policing issued to every Metropolitan Police officer in 1985 the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Service quotes Rowan and Mayne's 1829 version, ' while in 
a Foreword his Commissioner quotes Henderson's 1873 Primary Objects. ' Both 
give their source as 'Sir Richard Mayne, 1829'. 
Clearly, this research opens a new perspective on the history and development of 
the professional police service in Britain and raises a range of previously 
unconsidered issues and problems. Not all of them can be addressed here. The 
findings and conclusions drawn are therefore focussed on the research purpose set 
out in the Abstract and Introduction. 
Findings 
Tile following findings have been made: 
I e. g. Smith, P. T. (1985) Chapter 3 page 6112; Moylan (1929) Chapter lIpage 34 
2 Laughame, A (I 985)page 9110 
3 ibid. page 6 
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i) At the foundation of the British professional police service in 1829 the 
function of the investigation of criminal offences to detect offenders in 
order to prosecute them before the courts was the prerogative and 
responsibility ofjustices of the peace and any officers they employed for 
that purpose. 
ii) The legislation of 1829 on which the professional police service was 
founded did not remove that function or responsibility from the justices 
or their officers, nor did legislators intend that the constables of the 
newly-formed professional police service should take it up. 
iii) That function and responsibility of the justices and their officers for the 
investigation and detection of crime was subsequently transferred to the 
professional police service by administrative means and without 
parliamentary or other legislative authority in the period prior to 1888. 
iv) That transfer was effected primarily by the Home Office and its officials 
and only secondarily by the Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police 
Force. 
v) As a consequence, the definition of the role, purposes and activities of 
the professional police service was improperly changed from Rowan and 
Mayne's original 1829 peacekeeping definition to the present dual 
peacekeeping and detective role first published in the 'Primary Objects' 
Preface to Henderson's 1873 edition of the Instructions to the 
Metropolitan Police Force. 
Conclusions 
The broad finding of this thesis is that the British police service has, improperly 
and, as will be argued, to its detriment, been given a dual role consisting of both 
peacekeeping and detective functions. In the light of that finding the present role, 
organisation and management of modern policing have been examined and the 
following four specific conclusions drawn. 
1. On corruption 
The addition of crime detection duties to its peacekeeping 
purposes and functions has introduced persistent corruption 
into British professional policing. 
This conclusion reflects the first of the reservations expressed by Mayne in his 
1842 'Memoradurn relative to the detective powers of the police' when his Force 
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was under pressure by the Home Office to take up the detective functions of the 
magistrates and their officers. He said then, 
'That these [former Bow Street detective] officers had advantages in tracing 
out some sorts of cases is true: - the Commissioners believe it is well 
known, that, by at least some of them, a communication was kept up with 
thieves or their associates, from who occasionally they received 
information that led to detections, that might not otherwise have taken 
place. Upon the propriety of returning to such a system, the 
Commissioners will make no observation, as, in a moral point of view it has 
been repeatedly denounced. ' 
Despite Mayne's misgivings the Home Office built the Criminal Investigation 
Department with its apparatus of criminal intelligence, investigation and 
detection, into the Metropolitan Police Force. The effect, evidenced by the 1877 
'Turf Fraud case', was to draw Peel's New police into the 'detective duties' of the 
magistrates' officers and common informers, so opening a nation-wide door to 
the corruption also associated with those activities 
Mayne's prediction that the involvement of the New Police in detective work 
would create a potential for corruption was consistently supported by the early 
Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police. Mayne's successor as Commissioner, 
Edmund Henderson, shared his view and said so when giving evidence to 
Ibbetson's Home Office Departmental Committee in 1878. Sir Charles Warren, 
who followed Henderson into the Commissioner's Office, was never directly 
concerned with the issue of corruption, but he embarked on a review of the whole 
idea of a criminal investigation department within the Metropolitan Police Force 
in 1888. He promised that its 'whole [future] position would be reviewed' if its 
performance did not improve. Only his precipitate and premature resignation 
prevented him from fulfilling that ambition. 
Even the normally supportive London 'Times' gave early warning of the 
corrupting effect detective work was likely to have on the professional police 
service. In a leader published while the 'Turf Fraud' conspiracy case was before 
the courts, 'The Times' said: 
'A Detective Force may be necessary, but, we repeat, it is a very unpleasant 
necessity, and the danger that attends its employment is clear ... If the 
temptation of his [the detective's] life are too strong for him and lie forgets 
to any degree his true allegiance, the mischief he may do is well nigh 
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incalculable. The most potent weapon ofjustice is turned against justice. 
It is the rogue who escapes and the honest man who are baffled and 
confounded. The want of security, the dread of the presence of a spy, is 
transferred to the wrong camp. All this may happen at any time, and from 
the nature of the case must happen some time. 14 
One of the most effective recent Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, and a 
man whose intellectual standing and devotion to the integrity of the service is 
undoubted, was Sir Robert Mark. He confirms the truth of 'The Times' 
prediction in his autobiography published in 1978, one hundred years after 
lbbetson's Report on the 'State, Discipline and Organisation of the Detective 
Force'. Having dealt with some of the more serious allegations of corruption 
made against the modem police service, Sir Robert reminds his readers of his 
Dimbleby Lecture given at the British Broadcasting Corporation's headquarters 
five years earlier, on 3d November 1973 almost exactly one hundred years after 
the publication of Henderson's 'Primary Objects'. Dealing with the criminal 
prosecution process he then said: 
'It is hardly surprising that a policeman's belief in its fairness should 
decline as he gathers experience, or that he should be tempted to depart 
from the rules. The detective is the person most affected because it is he 
who regularly bears the brunt of the trial process. In theory he's devoted 
only to the cause ofjustice. He likes to think of himself as having no 
personal interest in acquittal, conviction or sentence and that his career is 
not affected by the outcome of his cases. In practice this is a gross over- 
simplification. Most detectives have a strong sense of commitment. It 
would be unnatural if they did not feel personally involved in some of their 
cases and it would be untrue to suggest that they are not sometimes 
outraged by the results. All are under occasional temptation to bend tile 
rules to convict those whom they believe to be guilty ... A few may 
sometimes be tempted also to exploit the system for personal gain. A 
detective who finds general acceptance of a system which protects the 
wrongdoer can come to think that if crime seems to pay for everyone else, 
why not for him? " 
4 The Times 15* August 18 77page 9 col. e 
5 Mark, Sir R(1978)page 157 
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Confirmation of Sir Robert's views and conclusions is readily available in the 
steady flow of popular literature on cases of police corruption. ' Equally, present- 
day researchers in policing have found that the culture and organisation of 
policing as it relates to crime detection can inculcate an ethos of corruption and 
deviance among police officers. As Punch (1985) says: 
'dilemmas in producing satisfactory work - owing to pressure for results, 
ambiguous legislation, vulnerability to legal sanctions and precarious 
bargains with criminals, informants and lawyers - can lead to short-cut 
methods, lies, covering-up, falsification of evidence, and intimidation of 
suspects. These ... can aid in deciphering deviance as rooted 
in the 
everyday, organizational reality of policing. "' 
The problem of corruption resulting from the dual peacekeeping and detective 
role of the modem police service extends beyond the behaviour of individual 
officers. The dual role also acts to exacerbate and magnify corruption's 
damaging effects. Any disrepute associated with detective work inevitably 
contaminates every police officer, not only throwing doubt on the credibility of all 
police evidence in cases before the courts, but also discrediting, and thus 
weakening, the standing, status and credibility of those engaged in the 
peacekeeping and protective activities of the service. 
2. On the management of policing 
A dual peacekeeping and detective role generates irresolvable 
problems for the efficient and effective management of 
policing. 
This conclusion is suggested by the second of the reservations raised by Mayne in 
his 'Memorandum' of 1842. When discussing the difficulties that an addition of 
the detective duties of the magistrates officers to the responsibilities of his Force 
would bring, he said; 
'The Commissioners are aware that there is some danger in establishing 
such a Branch of Police, to whom the duties of a detective character would 
more immediately belong; of causing a relaxation of the exertions of the 
Police in general for the same purpose, which have hitherto been successful 
to so great an extent; - and it may be difficult to define the exact point of 
6 Laurie, P. (1970); Cox, B. et al. (1977); McNee, Sir D. (1983) Chapter 9; Jennings, A. et al (1990) 
7 Punch (1985) Introduction, page 3 
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time and the exact circumstances under which the advantage of pursuit by 
the whole body of the Police is to be abandoned. ' 
In the context of his time and as he understood the responsibilities of his 'street 
police', Mayne's purpose in these remarks was to draw attention to the problem 
he would have in deciding when the 'quick and fresh pursuit' of an offender by 
his patrolling constables should be abandoned and the case handed over to a 
specially employed detective. But he also here first raises a wider problem for the 
management of a dual role police service that remains troublesome to this day. 
How much time and effort should the police devote to the prevention of crime, 
and how much to its detection? 
That this is a real and continuing problem for police managers, and that it has 
adverse effects on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing has, in recent times, 
been most notably confirmed by Lord Scarman in his Report of an enquiry into 
the Brixton Disorders in 1981 (Cmnd. 8427). 
In his Report Lord Scarman identifies and discusses the dual role of the modem 
police service. He says: 
'the primary duty of the police is to maintain "the Queen's Peace" which 
has been described as the "normal state of society"... since it is inevitable 
that there will be aberrations from normality, his second duty arises, which 
is, without endangering normality, to enforce the law" 
Lord Scarman, following it would seem the lead of his colleagues among the Law 
Lords, ' describes the second of the two functions of the police as 'law 
enforcement' rather than 'crime detection'. However, his 'aberrations from 
normality' will include, and indeed largely consist in, breaches of the criminal 
law. The view of the dual role of the police developed by this research is 
therefore narrower than, but consistent with, Lord Scarman's. 
In the next paragraph of his Report, Scarman confirms that difficulties are caused 
by the existence of the two police functions he identifies. 
'The conflict which can arise between the duty of the police to maintain 
order and their duty to enforce the law, and the priority which must be 
given to the former, have long been recognised by the police themselves, 
8 Scarman (198 1) paragraph 4.57 
9 R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner exParte Blackburn (1968) 1 All E. R. page 769 at 1, and 777 
atD 
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though they are factors to which commentators on policing have in the past 
often paid too little attention. ' 
The conclusions of the Scarman Report then go on fully to substantiate Mayne's 
view that serious problems are caused by requiring the police to act both as 
peacekeepers and as detectives. Lord Scarman's finding in relation to the Brixton 
disorders was that a police operation to identify, detect and arrest street robbers, 
which was fullyjustified in crime reduction and detection terms, was also the 
principal cause of a three-day riot that caused widespread destruction of buildings 
and other property, as well as hundreds of injuries to police and public. The 
Scarman Report is therefore, a most authoritative account both of the inherent 
conflict between the police activities of crime detection on the one hand and 
peacekeeping on the other, as well as of the priority of peacekeeping in the 
present dual role of the service. 
In its internal structure the modem police service further illustrates the 
perceptiveness of Scarman's findings and Mayne's earlier advice. Every modem 
police force can be seen to be broadly divided into two friendly but competing 
camps. One, the uniform branch, is composed of officers engaged in 
peacekeeping, crime deterrence, and community protection; the other, the criminal 
investigation department (CID), holds plain clothes detectives waging war on 
crime and criminals. As Banton (1964) has described it; 
'A division is ... apparent between specialist 
departments (detectives, traffic 
officers, vice and fraud squads, etc. ) and the ordinary patrolman. The 
former are 'law officers' whose contacts with the public tend to be of a 
punitive or inquisitorial character, whereas the patrolmen ... are principally 
'peace officers' operating within the moral consensus of the community'" 
The problem not fully discussed by Banton or other commentators is that the two 
groups have conflicting objectives, tactics and strategies. Detection and 
prosecution as an objective depends upon criminals committing, or at least being 
allowed to attempt to commit, crimes. As Richard Mayne put it in his 
Memorandum in 1842 referred to earlier, 'detective duties', 
'causes the officers to allow a number of cases to remain unnoticed in order 
that now and then in a case of great notoriety, the parties or their associates 
whose cases have been connived at on other occasions, may be induced to 
give the information. ' 
10 Banton, M (I 964)page 6 
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Public protection and peacekeeping on the other hand, aims to deter or prevent all 
crime in any circumstances. A dual peacekeeper and detective role thus creates a 
perpetual dilemma for the managers of the police service since there is no easy 
compatibility between police actions designed to keep the peace and those 
intended to detect and arrest active criminals; an issue exemplified in Lord 
Scarman's Report. Equally, the selection, training, equipment, deployment and 
even clothing and hours of duty required for peacekeeping and public protection 
are entirely different from those needed for the detection of criminal offenders. 
Moving individual police officers from one task to another is therefore extremely 
difficult and impossible at short notice. Certainly no individual officer can 
perform both tasks effectively at one and the same time. As a result, behind a 
public front of unity peacekeepers and detectives engage in incessant inter- 
departmental competition for influence over force policy and access to resources. 
This is notjust an example of corporate politics. It is a manifestation of the deep 
structural divide recognised by Lord Scarman. 
When public or politicians are consulted on these matters however, they 
invariably demand that the police service provide both effective peacekeepers and 
successful detectives. Indeed, they find it difficult to distinguish between, let 
alone prioritise, the two activities. That is because, first insofar as they are 
aware, no other agency can, or ever did, supply either essential service; and 
second, there is a vague, unexamined but generally accepted feeling that tile two 
activities are connected in that they are both assumed to contribute to the 
reduction of crime and disorder, and to the control of criminality. It is thus tile 
duality of the policing role which generates the insoluble dilemmas faced by the 
managers of the police service. How are they to decide the priority to be given to 
eachfunction? Which should come first, catching criminals or keeping the 
peace? And, to return to Mayne's question with which this section began, in 
pursuing both when should one activity stop and the other start? 
3. On police and community relations 
A dual peacekeeping and detective role hinders the creation 
and maintenance of good relations between police and public. 
As a result of the development of their dual role in the period after 1839 
professional police officers now act both as guardians and as prosecutors of the 
public they seek to serve. In that dual role the police service is required to 
present itself as responsible both for the protection and support of all citizens, and 
Findings and Conclusions 200 
for the detection, prosecution and punishment of those same citizens if and when 
they commit crime. The two functions are understandably difficult to reconcile, 
both by police officers and by the public they seek to serve, creating formidable 
obstacles to mutual trust and the free flow of advice and information. Examples 
include not only the Brixton disorders in London in 1981 on which Lord Scarman 
reported, but also the recent difficulties faced by the Metropolitan Police in 
dealing with the murders of Stephen Lawrence and Damilola Taylor and their 
continuing aftermaths, and those still afflicting the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(now the Police Service of Northern Ireland) as a result of its investigation of the 
Omagh bombing. 
The Stephen Lawrence inquiry conducted by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny, 
whose Report was presented to Parliament in February 1999, " is a good 
illustration of the complex, interlocking community relations difficulties created 
for the police service by its dual role. Sir William's terms of reference were: 
'To inquire into the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence on 
22 April 1993 to date, in order particularly to identify the lessons to be 
learned for the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes. ' 
Two issues relevant to this research arise from the Inquiry. First, the Inquiry is a 
further example of the negative effects the dual role of the police can have on its 
relationship with its diverse communities. It shows that damage can be done to 
the peacekeeping function of the police by an adverse feedback from a failure in 
its detective activity, especially where that activity relates to crime across social 
or ethnic divisions. 
Second, the Lawrence inquiry seems to have taken little or no account of the 
effects and consequences of the duality of the police role in reaching its 
conclusions and recommendations. This is surprising since the Inquiry quotes the 
Scarman Report extensively and uses Lord Scarman's observations and 
conclusions to sharpen and justify many of its criticisms of police action. " Itis 
unfortunate therefore, that Sir William did not give full weight to Lord Scarman's 
warning that the dual role of the police and the conflicts that can arise from it ' are 
factors to which commentators on policing have in the past paid too little 
attention' 
11 Macpherson (1999) 
12 ibid. Chapter 46 
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That oversight must raise the possibility that the Lawrence Inquiry may have 
reached judgements about the conduct of the Metropolitan Police as a whole, and 
of the behaviour of individual officers carrying out their separate peacekeeper and 
detective functions, without taking full account of the difficulties caused by their 
dual role. That does not however, reduce the significance of the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry as an indicator of the severe difficulties the police have in 
establishing and maintaining good relations with minority communities. In fact 
and rightly, the Inquiry paid considerable attention to the broad issue of 
police/community relations. 
Commenting on those aspects of the Inquiry, John Lea first notes that: 
'Scarman ... called for training aimed at an understanding of the cultural 
background of ethnic minority groups ... Macpherson found however, 18 
years later that not a single officer questioned ... in 1998 had received any 
training of significance in racism awareness and race relations. "' 
But he then recognises that, 'The [police) strategy of liaison with 'respectable' 
members of minority communities stretches back to the Community Relations 
Councils of the 1960s"' 
In effect, MacPherson found and reported that, after more than 30 years of effort 
the leaders of the police service had failed to solve, or even much ease, the 
problem of the relationship between the police service and all the diverse 
communities it seeks to serve. At best there had been no identifiable 
improvement. A fuller appreciation of the problems caused by the dual role of the 
police may have helped the Inquiry to explain why this is so. 
The Scarman Report and the Lawrence Inquiry are important landmarks in tile 
history of the relationship between the modern police service and its public. 
Both enquiries arose directly from the detective function of the police. Both 
reach highly critical conclusions about the effect of that activity on the 
peacekeeping work of the police service and its relationship with its communities. 
John Lea's criticisms shows, if nothing else, how long and yet how ineffectively 
the professional police service has struggled with that seemingly intractable 
problem. 
13 Mathews and Young (20031 page 53 
14 ibid. page 54 
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4. On performance measurement 
Dual peacekeeper and detective functions militate against 
accurate or reliable measurement and assessment of police 
performance. 
The debate on police performance and its measurement began in earnest with 
Prime Minister Thatcher's 'value for money' revolution during her premiership in 
the 1980's. Under that regime both government and public began to require the 
police service account for the resources allocated to the support of its crusade 
against crime. The demand was for measurable results from the public money 
spent on policing. Departing from every precedent, Thatcher's Cabinet set out to 
link police budgets to performance. In retrospect most chief police officers and 
other informed observers will recognise that the turning point for policing came in 
November 1983 with the publication of Home Off ice Circular number 114/83, 
entitled 'Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service'. 
This Circular made the first explicit connection between the resources devoted to 
policing and the performance of the police service in dealing with crime and 
disorder. With its appearance the less rigorous regimes previously enjoyed by 
many Chief Constables ended. From now on they would have to show that their, 
'force's existing resources are used to the best advantage' before making any 
application for an increase. To do so they would have to satisfy Her Majesty's 
Inspectors of Constabulary, all of them ex-senior Chief Constables and Home 
Off ice appointees, that 'resources are directed in accordance with properly 
determined objectives and priorities"' 
Later the Circular reinforced the point saying that, 
'The Home Secretary therefore attaches importance to the determination of 
objectives and priorities in the police service, and to the allocation of 
resources and the deployment of police and civilian manpower in a way 
that will most effectively and efficiently secure those objectives and 
priorities. "' 
Sir Lawrence Byford, then Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, spoke 
about the impact of the Circular on Chief Constables in a seminar at the National 
Police College the following year. He said that, from the issue of the Circular, 
Is Home Office Circular 114/83 para. 4 
16 ibid. para. 6 
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'It follows that there needs to be thorough planning, and effective 
deployment of manpower in accordance with those plans, and, above all, 
on results - on getting them and, equally importantly, on being able to 
demonstrate that you have got them. "' 
The decades of the 1980s and 1990s saw the full flowering of the resultant 
'policing by objectives' management style in the police service, and the 
consequent attempt to develop performance measurement for policing. To begin, 
chief officers and others turned to Henderson's 1873 Primary Objects as the 
accepted definition of what the police service seeks to achieve. By that definition 
the primary purposes of policing are to prevent crime, and to detect and punish 
offenders. Unfortunately even the Home Office had elsewhere already come to a 
conclusion reached by Rowan and Mayne in 1838; the prevention of crime was 
not something wholly within the power of the police to achieve. 
It had done so in another equally important circular issued in 1984 dealing with 
the Home Office view on the problem of crime prevention. " Echoing, without 
acknowledging, Rowan and Mayne its first paragraph reads, 
'A primary objective of the police has always been the prevention of crime. 
However, since some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control or 
direct influence of the police, crime prevention cannot be left to them alone. 
Every individual citizen and all those agencies whose policies and practices 
can influence the extent of crime should make their contribution. 
Preventing crime is a task for the whole community. ' 
A clear implication of this Circular is an acceptance by the Home Off ice that no 
police force or unit is in control of, or able directly to influence, all the factors that 
determine the level of crime in the area for which it is responsible. Yet its earlier 
(1983) Circular proposed levels of crime as a fair or proper measure of police 
efficiency or effectiveness, and demanded that improved performance against 
crime should be a significant criterion in the allocation of resources. 
Coincident with the issue of these two Circulars, a Prosecution of Offenders Bill, 
also sponsored by the Home Office, was before Parliament. Its effect (perhaps 
unintended) was further to reduce the opportunities to measure police 
performance. The Bill contained radical proposals. Despite all the effort made 
17 National Police College 21 st. Senior Command Course Seminar, Closing Address, 22ndAugust 
1984 
Is 'Crime Prevention', Home Office Circular 8/1984 
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by the Home Office to transfer the detective duties of the magistrates officers to 
the professional police in the 1860's and 1870's, the Bill now proposed to 
remove the conduct and control of prosecutions of offenders against the criminal 
law from the functions of the police. An independent Crown Prosecution Service 
would undertake the process of bringing offenders before the Courts. 
Unfortunately the prosecution and punishment of offenders are two of the very 
few aspects of policing whose outcome can be measured with any accuracy. The 
Home Office decided to remove that responsibility from the police just when the 
service most needed a simple and reliable means tojustify its budgets. " 
The search for a new role 
The outcome of the pressure of the Thatcher Government for financial efficiency 
and effectiveness in policing was to propel the service into a search for a new 
definition of its role, one that would carry it forward into its new performance- 
related environment. The crusade for economy became a search for purpose 
simply because neither chief police officers nor Home Office ministers and 
officials were able to derive practical measures of police performance from the 
Primary Objects. Yet another new definition of the purposes of policing was 
needed 
Unfortunately, the issue of what to include in such a definition and what to omit 
degenerated into a long and sometimes acrimonious dispute. The Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and other interested parties examined it 
exhaustively. The debate generated so little light that a high-powered Home 
Office Committee was appointed in December 1993, under the title of the 
'Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks', to clarify the question. The 
Committee's terms of reference were; 
'To examine the services provided by the police, to make 
recommendations about the most cost-effective way of delivering core 
policing services and to assess the scope for relinquishing ancillary tasks'" 
In the Introduction to its Final Report, the Review Committee refer to the White 
Paper on Police Reform (Command no. 2251). The Committee notes that the 
White Paper says, 
'that the Government considered that it would be useful in future to def ine 
more clearly what the police service should regard as its core 
19 Prosecution of Offenders AM 1985 
20 Home Office (1995) page 7, para. 1.2 
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responsibilities and those things which are to a great extent ancillary to 
their main responsibilities"' 
In effect, in 1993, one hundred and sixty-four years after its first foundation, 
government decided to try to lay down precisely what the professional police 
service ought to be doing, and what role it should play in society. 
The outcome may be predicted. After two years' work the Committee concluded 
its proceedings in 1995 with 26 recommendations in 'specific areas ... [of 
policing] ... where some change in working arrangements look potentially 
beneficial to the police service in freeing up resources which could be used in 
other ways. '". However, the Committee had to admit that; 
'6.5 It is not expected that any of the changes recommended - even if 
they were all to be implemented - would alter the nature of the police 
service offered to the public. The changes under discussion here are often 
concerned with inter-agency relationships rather than with the police 
service's relationship with the public. "' 
Regrettably, the Review Committee could not complete its task of defining the 
core responsibilities of the police as the Government's White Paper had hoped. 
The consequences of that failure are best seen in the development of individual 
statements of purpose and values by police forces. The reaction of the 
Metropolitan Police, the founding model for the professional British police 
service, illustrates the spread and depth of the resultant confusion about the role of 
the police. Rowan and Mayne's Metropolitan Police Force is now the 
Metropolitan Police Service. It was among the first to issue a 'Statement of 
Common Purpose and Values' to fill the need for a new basis on which its 
performance might be publicly assessed. The current definition of the role of the 
Metropolitan Police as it is reproduced on its website "'is: 
21 ibid. para. 1.1 
22 ibid. Conclusionspage 25, para 61 
23 ibid. para. 6.5 
2A httpl/www. met. police. uk/about/mission. html 
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MPS Mission, vision and values 
MAKING LONDON SAFE FOR ALL THE PEOPLE WE SERVE 
Our Mission Our Values Our Vision 
To make places safer To treat everyone fairly 
To cut crime and the fear of To be open and honest 
To make London the 
safest major city in the 
crime To work in partnership world 
To uphold the law To change to improve 
Such statements clearly do not provide any sort of measure by which police 
management decisions and actions can be compared, assessed or objectively 
judged, nor do they assist in estimating the relative efficiency or effectiveness of 
various police units. In truth, they share all the limitations of the 'Primary 
Objects' without its admittedly vague and impractical ground-level priority- 
setting benefits. 
While police forces were struggling with the problem of the definition of their 
role, government pressed on with the specific issue of police performance 
measurement, but now from a different direction and with another perspective. 
In 1997 a Labour government came to power after 13 years of Thatcher's 
Conservatives. It made a radical and energetic start to its first term of office. 
Among its reforming initiatives was a review of the public services, and 
particularly their funding arrangements, under the title of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review (CSR). Included in that review was the police service and its 
host department, the Home Office. 
However, despite the appearance of a vast and ever-growing monitoring and 
budgetary bureaucracy within the police service and more than five years of the 
CSF, identifiable progress in terms of the development of useful, applicable and 
reliable measures of police performance has been negligible. Even to discover 
where government is in its search for measures of the value for money gained 
from spending on policing presents a formidable and frustrating challenge. 
Thirteen policing performance indicators are indeed to be found on the current 
Home Office website in the section entitled 'The National Policing Plan 2003 - 
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2006', at paragraph 10.3 under highlighted headings. " For the purposes of this 
discussion the precise wording of those indicators is unimportant. " What matters 
is the source or sources from which they are drawn and on which they depend. 
That information is not included in the Plan itself. It is to be found in the Home 
Office Annual Report, and specifically in the performance measures agreed with 
the Treasury and set for the achievement of the Home Office's Public Service 
Agreement (PSA) 'targets' I and 2 relating to policing. ", 
There, finally, it will be discovered that the base on which the current system of 
measurement and assessment of police performance principally rests is three-fold: 
the British Crime Survey; the Home Office Statistical Bulletin, and the annual 
report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, all of which have been 
available, and have been used for these purposes since before Prime Minister 
Thatcher's launch of the idea of value for money in policing in 1983. Four'other 
indicators' are mentioned in the National Policing Plan but for various reasons 
they are not included in the performance measures used for PSA 'targets' I and 2. 
In effect, no new measures of the value for money obtained from the public funds 
devoted to policing have been developed or agreed in the entire twenty-year 
history of the policy. 
The lack of progress in the search for a viable and useful replacement for the 
'Primary Objects' which this reveals needs no further emphasis. What can be 
said however, is that the present annual police planning and reporting process, 
with its heavy focus on crime detection and prosecution, is a complex, convoluted 
bureaucracy that must represent a serious, continuing, but not yet assessed or 
measured, drain on police manpower and resources. Those with sufficient 
stamina and determination can best gain a sense of the full extent of the 
burgeoning weight of that bureaucracy by a visit to the 'Police Best Value 
Indicators 2003/04' page of the Home Off ice website. 1' 
In all, a survey of recent developments in the management of the police service 
identifies its dual role as a significant and continuing obstacle to the measurement 
or assessment of police efficiency and effectiveness. That objective requires, as 
a preliminary, a clear understanding of what the police service can do, and a 
statement firmly based on that understanding which sets out what it is then 
expected to achieve. Unfortunately, neither that understanding nor any policing 
25 http: //www. policereforrrLgov. uk/docstnalýpoLplanO2. pdf 
26 ibid pages 35 to 37 
27 httpY/www. policerefonyLgov. uk/docs/perform]2. html 
28 http: //Www. homeoffice. gov. ukldocs2lpolicebvidefinitions2OO3-04. pdf 
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objective that can properly be derived from it presently exists in any generally 
agreed or accepted form. 
It remains now to consider and develop recommendations for action that can 
provide a solution to the problems and issues just discussed. 
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Recommendations 
The conclusions set out in the preceding chapter identify four major problems 
presently facing the British police service. They are; persistent incidents of 
corruption; inefficiency in the management of policing; difficulty in maintaining 
long-term good relations between police and public, especially in the case of 
minority communities; and, lack of effective and reliable measures of police 
performance. This thesis attributes those problems wholly or in part to the dual 
peacekeeping and detective role of the police. An outcome of this research is 
therefore a prediction that the major problems it identifies will persist so long as 
British police officers retain their present dual role. An appropriate, acceptable 
and effective end to that dual role is therefore the objective of the 
recommendations presented. 
Policing reform 
In view of the primacy and primordiality of peacekeeping in the functions of 
British policing identified by this research, action to end the dual role of modern 
police seivice should involve the removal of its detective function as defined. 
What is required for a resolution of the problems now facing the police service is 
a return to an option that was available to the Home Off ice in 1839. Government 
should accept the recommendations the First Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Establishment of an Efficient Constabulary Force, appoint a public prosecutor 
and revert to Rowan and Mayne's 1829 purely peacekeeping definition of the role 
of the police. 
The effect of that reform would be to give back to the police service its intended 
original role. It would keep the peace, prevent crime and disorder, protect 
citizens from harm, and respond to calls for assistance from the public. In the 
tradition of their Saxon constable forbears the overriding duty of police officers, 
at all times and in all circumstances, would be to safeguard the persons and 
property of all citizens. In that role police officers would continue to have the 
'quick and fresh pursuit' duties described by the 1839 Royal Commission and will 
respond to reports of crime from the public. Their duty to prevent crime would 
be restricted to the 'preventable' category adopted by Peel's New Police, as 
described by Mayne in his evidence to the 1833/4 Select Committee on the Police 
of the Metropolis on 2 nd July 1833, i. e. they would be held accountable only for 
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those crimes or offences that could have been prevented by a body of uniformed 
patrolling constables. 
Those immediate duties would mark the limit of police responsibility for the 
control of crime and criminality and involvement in the prosecution of offences 
against the criminal law. Police officers would seek to detain offenders only 
where they are present or immediately identifiable. Even then, the police would 
only take that action where it was needed to keep the peace or to protect the rights 
and liberties of other citizens. Consideration would have to be given to whether 
the reformed police service will need to be equipped with specific powers of 
enquiry to carry out that limited involvement in the detection of offenders. 
Responsibility for the subsequent investigation of reports or allegations of crime, 
however defined and from whatever source, and for the identification, detection 
and prosecution of offenders against the criminal law will revert to its Norman 
origins with government, which will be required to identify or create agencies to 
undertake all the processes required, including gathering intelligence on crime and 
active criminals, and the cultivation and management of informants. Like their 
predecessor magistrates in the old police offices, those bodies will be able to 
employ, control and direct agents to carry out those tasks. Existing professional 
detectives will no doubt provide an ample pool of trained and experienced 
investigators from which these agents can be recruited. 
Those new criminal investigators will not need the status of sworn constables, nor 
any of the individual discretionary powers of arrest, investigation or search 
presently granted to police officers. The agencies that employ them can readily 
supply, control and supervise any authority they may need to gather information, 
cultivate informants, interview witnesses, detain suspects, etc., and to search for 
and seize evidence. The final element in a properly reconstructed peacekeeping 
and criminal justice system is therefore, a government agency responsible for tile 
investigation of crime and the identification and prosecution of offenders against 
the criminal law. The one remaining need is for the appointment of a public 
prosecutor. 
The necessity for such an appointment in an emerging industrial, urbanised and 
democratic society has long been recognised. It was noticed by the 1839 Royal 
Commission on the Establishment of a Constabulary Force, and the 1845 Eighth 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Criminal Law emphasised tile damage 
done to the 'due administration of criminal justice' by the absence of such an 
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official. Both also noted the opportunities presented for corruption. Parliament 
cannot claim that the appointment of public prosecutors is unprecedented or that it 
has had no opportunity to consider the proposal. In 1856 a Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Public Prosecutors looked at the criminal justice systems in 
America, Scotland and Ireland. It recommended that, 
cagents shall be appointed ... for the purpose of preparing and conducting 
prosecutions to the time of trial, ... The duty of such agents should be to 
prepare and conduct prosecutions through the stages preliminary to trial. 
Where it comes to their knowledge that an offence has been committed, 
and that no steps have been taken to bring the offender to justice, itwillbe 
their duty to take the necessary steps for apprehending or for otherwise 
bringing the offender before a magistrate. " 
Nothing came of the Select Committee's proposal when a Bill to implement it was 
put before Parliament. The Prosecution of Offenders Act of 1879 which later 
established the post of Director of Public Prosecutions did not address the issue 
and was only a limited measure in this respect. It confined the Director to a 
mainly supervisory role in the conduct of prosecutions by the police service and 
others. Under the reforms proposed here a public prosecutor's role would be to 
undertake the investigation of all reports and allegations of crime, including those 
reported by the police where their 'quick and fresh pursuit' was unsuccessful. 
The public prosecutor's duty will be to identify and detect offenders, and to 
prepare and undertake all criminal prosecutions in which there is a public interest. 
Present-day police officers will not readily abandon functions and duties that, by 
long use, have become their exclusive domain, and which the public instinctively 
looks to them to provide. Nor will government easily accept that a public 
prosecutor, or some other agency subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, should take 
responsibility for the investigation of reports of crime and the identification, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offenders. Yet the proposal that the police 
should hand their detective function to a public prosecutor is not as revolutionary 
asitmayseem. Recent developments in the British criminal justice system have 
all been in that direction. 
Report from the Select Committee on Public Prosecutions (1856) Parliamentary Papers (1856) Vol 
VIlpage 351 
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The Crown Prosecution Service 
The emergence of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the creation of 
national criminal investigative and intelligence bodies has already removed large 
areas of criminal investigation, intelligence and detection from the hands of local 
chief police officers. Units controlled, directly or indirectly, by government 
ministers already have many of those functions. The penetration of the CPS back 
down the line of investigation into the offices of local police detective 
departments grows ever deeper. It would be a bold, or foolish, detective today 
who did not ensure that he had cleared his methods with his local CPS office 
before embarking on any major investigation. 
A report on the CPS by Sir lain Glidewell in May, 1998 clearly sought to move 
the British prosecution service further in exactly that direction. Sir lain and his 
Committee recommended the amalgamation of some of the functions of the CPS 
with police administration units. The aim was that the laying of a formal charge 
against an offender would mark the point at which responsibility for the case 
passed to the CPS. His Report says; 
'Such a single integrated unit, which we have called a Criminal Justice 
Unit, could be either a police unit with one or more CPS lawyers working 
permanently in it, or a CPS unit with some police staff. Wefirmly 
recommend the second option. ' I 
Following a recommendation by Lord Justice Auld, 'the Crown Prosecution 
Service conducted an experiment in May 2003 involving six police force areas in 
which Crown Prosecutors took responsibility for charging suspected offenders, 
rather than allowing those decisions to be made by police officers. Conviction 
rates rose and the number of cases that collapsed or were abandoned at trial fell. 
The experiment is now to be extended to the whole of England and Wales. ' These 
proposals of the CPS, and their associated developments show that the British 
criminal justice system is already moving in the direction proposed here. 
As a postscript to this section of my Recommendations, it was reported during the 
last stages of preparation of this account of my research that the Home Secretary 
proposes to rename the Crown Prosecution Service, the 'Public Prosecution 
2 The Times 28h May 1998 page 12 
3 Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (200 1) Chapter 10, para. 162 
4 The Times 13'h May 2003 page 9 
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Service'. The reason given was that the new name was likely to make the 
purpose of the organisation clearer in the public mind. 
A Renewed Police 
The proposed new structure for British criminal justice will simplify and clarify 
the system. It will remove a major source of corruption from a vital public 
service. At the same time a clear distinction will be created between the agencies 
responsible for the prevention of crime and disorder and the protection of the 
public, and those charged with the identification and punishment of criminal 
offenders. It will thus provide a better basis on which to develop measures of the 
efficiency of the criminal justice system as a whole. Both government and the 
public should be able to judge whether the police service makes effective use of 
the growing sums of public money entrusted to it. No such judgement is possible 
while the police are required to pursue the conflicting aims of protecting citizens 
from crime, and of detecting and prosecuting them when they commit it. 
The sequence of events leading to a reform of the police must begin with an open 
discussion whose aim should be to establish a new consensus on the functions and 
purposes of the modem police service. No such public discussion has taken place 
since the 1840s. Government ministers and those who advise them can give 
structure to the debate by reopening the work abandoned by the Home Office 
Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks. The purpose will be to produce a 
clear and agreed statement of the proper duties and functions of a reformed police 
service. That is likely to trigger some interesting exchanges, particularly in view 
of the effects of government's continuing Comprehensive Spending Review. 
Because it must be clear by now that no-one can expect the police to bear 
responsibility for both peacekeeping and the punishment of crime and criminality 
inoursociety. Nor can the value of the work of police officers be judged by their 
effect on levels of crime. 
The way forward 
The way forward in the control and reduction of crime in British society lies in tile 
removal of the police service from its present position as primary agency in the 
identification, detection and prosecution of criminal offenders. Exactly what 
might then be expected of a newly focussed police devoted solely to peacekeeping 
and the protection of citizens awaits the conclusion of the debate and discovery 
process just advocated. 
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However, whatever may be the outcome of that public debate, reform of policing 
should never go further than that required to bring it fully into line with the needs 
of the public it serves. The Royal Commission of 1839 better than any later 
commentator understood the purposes and functions of a truly preventive police. 
Among the Conclusions to its First Report the Commission says, 
'the main purpose of a preventive police [is) the protection of private 
individuals in the enjoyment of their rights against infractions by 
depredators and others" 
In our times the inclusion of 'and others' should strike an especially resonant note. 
It reminds us of the vital importance to the health of our form of democracy of the 
operational independence of the police service from any outside influence other 
than the law itself. Including and especially government and its agents. 
Royal Commission on the Establishment of an Efficient Constabulary Force (1839) First Report, 
page 185: and Parliamentary Papers (1839)vot NX. page]71 
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Publication 
On the advice of my supervisors and with their encouragement and support I have 
taken steps to expose the main themes, findings, conclusions and 
recommendations of my thesis to review by informed practitioners of policing and 
others academically or otherwise active in the field. 
The Criminal Law Review. 
In 2002 a two part article outlining my main ideas was published in the Criminal 
Law Review under the title 'Detecting Crime'. 
Part I; 'Detection and the Police' appeared in the May edition on pages 
379 to 390, and 
Part 11; 'The Case for a Public Prosecutor' in the July edition on pages 
566 to 577. 
I am not aware, as yet, of any adverse or dissenting comment arising from either 
article. Copies of those articles, as published, are attached. 
Centre for Studies in Policing, Canterbury Christchurch University College. 
As a consequence of the appearance of my articles I was invited by Dr. Dominic 
Wood to address students taking a Batchelor of Science degree in Operational 
Policing at the Centre for Studies in Policing at Canterbury. I attended a week- 
end study course on 31' May2003 and spoke to some 20 to 30 students. Most 
were serving police officers or members of police civil and support staffs. I 
understand that my talk was well received, and while questions were asked no 
serious objections to my research firiding or conclusions were raised either by 
students or members of the staff of the Centre. I am informed that my articles are 
included in reading lists for the course. 
National Police Trainine Centre. Bramshill. 
Bramshill House near Hook, Basingstoke in Hampshire is the site of what was 
formerly called the National Police College, and remains the premier training 
centre of the British police service. Selection for and attendance on its Command 
course is a requirement for promotion to the highest ranks of the service. On 19"' 
February 2003 1 spoke to the Librarian at Bramshill, Peter Levay, and confirmed 
that my articles were available in the National Police Library. He told me that 
they were 'very popular' with students attending the Centre. Again, as yet I have 
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not been made aware of any adverse reaction to my articles either from officers 
aftending courses at the Centre or from its staff. 
White Paper on Police Reform (2002) Cmnd. 5326 
On 20th January, 2002, during the consultation period on the White Paper on 
Police Reform entitled 'Policing a New Century: a Blueprint for Reform. ', I 
submitted comments on the proposed Police Reform Bill based on my research. 
My submission was acknowledged by Mr. Ben Bradley of the Police Reform & 
Bill Unit who informed me that my 'comments have been noted and will be given 
careful consideration by Ministers. ' A copy of my comments, as forwarded, is 
attached. 
There is however, nothing in the Police Reform Act, which received Royal assent 
on 24h July 2002, to indicate that my comments had any effect on the drafting of 
the Bill. 
Letters to 'The Times', London 
During the period of my research letters based on my findings were published in 
the London 'Times' on: 
291h December, 2000 
30'h January, 2002 
18 th February, 2002 
20 April, 2002 
27'h April, 2002 
25'h September, 2002 
22 nd September 2003 
240'January, 2ý64, and 
I oth April, 2004. 
Apart from the irrelevant and incoherent correspondence such letters seem to 
attract, reaction has been generally supportive and, as yet, neither critical nor 
dismissive of the points made. 
PAG ; 
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Detecting Crime Part 1: Detection 
and the Police 
By Lawrence T. Roach, QPM 
Summary: The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 specifically precluded Robert 
Peel's New Police from any involvement in the investigation and detection of 
crime. It is contended in this article that the subsequent imposition of those 
duties on the Metropolitan Police by the Home Office in the 1860s and 1870s 
was both improper and an error. In particular, a pattern and precedent was 
thereby setfor the British police service with damaging consequences. 
Peel's New Police 
When Robert Peel rose in the House of Commons at 3 pm in the afternoon of 
Wednesday April 15,1829 to speak in support of his Metropolis Police Improve- 
ment Bill, he did not intend to disturb the power and prerogative of the magistrates 
of the metropolis. The Bow Street Chief Magistrate, Henry Fielding, had first 
recruited six Westminster householders in 1750 to act as his agents in his 
responsibilities under the common law to investigate crime and detect criminal 
offenders. The Bow Street Runners, as they quickly became known, developed a 
considerable reputation in the identification, detection and pursuit of criminals, and 
Magistrates Police Offices on Fielding's model were established throughout London 
following the passage of the Middlesex Justices Act in 1792. The Offices and their 
plainclothes officers enjoyed a monopoly as tile only professional detectives 
available in the capital. Peel's Metropolis Police Improvement Bill did not touch 
that monopoly, or the special position of the detective officers acting under tile 
magistrate's authority. 
This is made abundantly clear; first, by the preamble to the Metropolitan Police 
Act (10 Geo IV cap. 44), which identifies the capital's system of parochial 
watchmen as its target, saying: 
"Whereas Offences against Property have late increased in and near tile 
Metropolis; and the local establishments of Nightly Watch and Nightly Police 
have been found inadequate to the Prevention and Detection of Crime. ... And whereas it is expedient to substitute a new and more efficient system of 
Police in lieu of such Establishment of Nightly Police within tile limits herein- 
after mentioned, ... Be it therefore enacted ... " (etc. etc. ); 
and second, in section 42 of the Act which: 
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"Provided ... that nothing in this Act contained shall affect or alter ... (3 Geo IV cap. 55) ... or ... (6 Geo IV cap. 21) ... 11, 
Le the statutes renewing, continuing and expanding the investigative and detec- 
tive powers of the magistrates of the metropolis and their officers first set out in the 
Act of 1792. 
Peel intended to apply a unified body of full-time paid constables to the problems 
of peace-keeping and crime prevention in the capital. His speech to Parliament in 
support of his Bill shows that he meant to substitute his new body for the 
disorganised and disreputable rabble of locally appointed watch and ward. His was 
not therefore, the revolution in policing subsequently attributed to him. He neither 
intended, nor did he achieve, a radical alteration in the pattern of peacekeeping and 
crime control in the capital. He merely reformed one failed part of it-the system 
of parochial watch and ward. 
Indeed, if there can be any doubt about Peel's intentions in this respect in 1829, 
10 Geo 4 cap. 45 dispels them. That Act emanated from his Home Department and 
passed into law on the same day (June 19,1829) as his Metropolitan Police Act. Its 
purpose was to continue uncharged for yet another three years the Police Offices Act 
which was the successor to the original 1792 Middlesex Justices Act. Parliament 
thereby preserved and continued all the rights, status and privileges of the 
Magistrates Police Offices in the metropolis at the very moment it introduced the 
New Police. 
By their actions the first joint Commissioners appointed by Peel to command the 
new Metropolitan Police Force, Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne, confirm that 
the New Police had no role in the identification, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offenders. In their first Instructions to the Force in 1829, issued with the 
". .. approbation of the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department. .. 11, they 
adopt an entirel7 preventive view of the purposes of a professional police establish- 
ment. They say 
"It should be understood, at the outset, that the principal object to be attained 
is 'the Prevention o Crime 
To this great end every effort of Police is to be directed. The security of 
person and property, the preservation of public tranquillity and all the other 
objects of a Police establishment, will thus be better effected than by the 
detection and punishment of the offender; after he has succeeded in commit. 
ting the crime. " 
They then go on immediately to make their intentions and ambitions unmis- 
takable: 
"This should constantly be kept in mind by every member of the Police Force, 
as the guide for his own conduct. Officers and Police Constables should 
endeavourto ... render it extremely difficult for any one to commit a crime 
within that portion of the town under their charge ... The absence of crime 
will be considered the best proof of the complete efficiency of the Police ... 
Metropolitan Police Instructions Orders etc. (September 1829) pages I and 2. Metropoli- 
tan Police Museum. 
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Identical versions of that definition of policing appear in the 1836,1851 and 1862 
revisions of those Instructions. 2 Nothing in the wording trespasses on the functions 
of the magistrates and their officers. The Magistrates Police Offices continued to be 
responsible for "... the detection and punishment of the offender after he has 
succeeded in committing the crime ... ", a function that Rowan and Mayne 
explicitly excluded from the activities of their Force. 
The Royal Commission of 1839 
Confirmation of the legal position of Peel's New Police in the criminal justice 
systems is also to be found in the work of the Royal Commission appointed in 1836 
"to inquire as to the best means of establishing an efficient Constabulary Force in 
the counties of England", whose First Report was published on March 27,1839,10 
years after the foundation of the Metropolitan Police Force. Among many other 
things that report told Members of Parliament was that, due to the passage of time, 
constables, including those employed in London by Rowan and Mayne, no longer 
had any independent legal power to make even "preliminary inquiries" into cases 
appearing before the magistrates. Under the heading "Abandonment of the 
principle of preliminary inquiry", 3 it said that: 
it appears to be highly desirable that additional powers for securing 
important evidence should be given (to constables) by the legislature, and that 
the principle should be uniformly put into practical operation by virtue of a 
legislative enactment. " 
If therefore, Parliament ever intended Rowan and Mayne's constables to take up 
the "inquires" into criminal cases performed by officers acting under and with the 
authority of the magistrates, the findings of the 1839 Royal Commission showed 
that legislative action was required to give them the power to do so. 
In addition the same Royal Commission said that, if police forces on the Peel 
model were to be generally established in Britain, they strongly recommended "the 
appointment of public prosecutors ... to prosecute those cases in behalf of 
the community at large 'in which no individual has any special interest, and in which 
the community has a special interest of its own, superadded to that of individuals '. " 
The Royal Commission clearly considered the new constabulary forces they 
proposed to establish on the Metropolitan model to have no role in those 
matters. 
1839 - Acts and consequences 
While the Royal Commission was at work and before it produced its First Report, 
the policing arrangements for the Metropolis once more came onto the Parliamen- 
tary agenda. This time the emphasis was on the legislation supporting the activities 
of the Magistrates Police Offices of the Metropolis, and the detective officers they 
controlled. By now the constables of Rowan and Mayne's Metropolitan Police 
2 Metropolitan Police Instructions Orders etc. (February 1,1836 et seq. ) Public Record 
3 
Office MEPO 8/2, and Metropolitan Police Museum. 
First Report of the Royal Commission on the Establishment of an Efficient Constabulary 
4 
Force (1839) page 95 para. 116. Parliamentary Papers (1839) vol. XIX page 10 1. 
ib id, page 100, at page 94 para. 114. 
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Force had gained the support of the vast majority of Londoners and their 
Parliamentary representatives, while the Bow Street Runners and the other magis- 
trates' officers had developed an unsavoury reputation for corruption and collusion 
with criminals. When, in 1837, a Select Committee was appointed to inquire into 
the Police Offices its remit was to do so "... with a view to improvement of the 
same. "s 
The changed circumstances created by the success of the Peelers, the decline of 
the Runners and the imminent expiry of the Police Offices legislation allowed the 
1837 Select Committee to embark on a comprehensive review of the whole of the 
policing arrangements for the Metropolis. The members determined to raise the 
status of the magistrates, confine them to purelyjudicial functions, and to do away 
with their investigative and detective officers. They found an ally in Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, Esq. whom they "... called in; and Examined ... " on June 1,183 7. Wakefield thought the Metropolitan Police Force to be effective in, 
maintaining order, in preventing nuisances, in driving out of sight many evils which 
still exist ...... 
6 But he did not think it had had any effect in rooting out the, 
prompters of crime ... ", The Chairman asked 
Wakefield: 
"There being, therefore, so many fertile sources of crime in the metropolis, is 
it not desirable that some much more efficient means of detection should be 
afforded? -(Makefield) Most desirable, as it appears to me; for although one 
cannot say that the detection of crime in London is exactly nobody's business, 
still it is very difficult to point out whose business it is; if a person is robbed in 
London, it seems to be nobody's business but his own; at least there seems to 
be no public functionaries whose business it is to detect the person who 
commits that crime ... the new system (i. e. Peel's New Police) appears to me 
to be almost as deficient as the old one as to the means of detection; ... 
0 
Rowan and Mayne confirmed Wakefield's account of the role of their constables 
in their evidence to the Committee on March 9,1838.8 However, they then 
injudiciously and unnecessarily added their personal view that the uniformed 
patrolling activity of their "street police" was both preventive and detective in its 
effect. They told the Select Committee that their patrolling officers not only 
deterred criminals, but that they also often arrested offenders at the scenes of crime 
or shortly afterward. Unfortunately, the Select Committee put these somewhat 
boastful remarks together with Wakefield's evidence to conclude that it could safely 
do away with the magistrates' offices and leave the whole of the control of crime and 
criminality in the capital to Rowan and Mayne's men. 
Accordingly, with the support of Parliament, that is what the Committee set out 
to do. The outcome was the passage of two Acts in 1839, the Metropolitan Police 
Act and the Metropolitan Police Courts Act. Critically, section 5 of the Metropoli- 
tan Police Courts Act transformed the officers employed by the magistrates into 
door keepers and security guards, with no detective or investigative powers. 
Unfortunately, as will shortly appear, sections II and 12 of the Metropolitan Police 
Act merely directed Rowan and Mayne to ensure the attendance of a"... sufficient 
, Select Committee on the Metropolis Police Offices (1837) Parliamentary Papers 
6 
(1837/38) (451) Vol. XVpps. 309 etseq. 
7 
ibid, page 433 at para. 1192. 
8 
ibid, page 437 at para. 1205. 
ibid. (1838) page 462 at para. 1088. 
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number ... " of their constables to attend on the magistrates "... for the purpose 
of executing such Summonses and Warrants as may be directed to them ... ". These sections also provide that only constables of the Metropolitan Police could 
execute such warrants and summonses in the metropolitan police district. By 
neutering the magistrates' detective officers these provisions consigned Henry 
Fielding's innovations, including the Bow Street Runners and their imitators, to 
history. 
The problem with this legislation is that neither the Metropolitan Courts Act nor 
the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 deal with the issues raised by the First Report 
of the 1839 Royal Commission on the need for wider powers for constables if they 
were to replace the magistrates officers, and for the appointment of a public 
prosecutor should they do so. This was despite publication of the Royal Commis- 
sion's First Report during the passage of the Acts, and in defiance of Mr Wakefield's 
evidence, generously quoted by the Select Committee. No preliminary or prepara- 
tory legislative action therefore took place to empower Rowan and Mayne's men to 
carry out inquiries into reports of crime, or for them to undertake the investigative 
and detective duties hitherto performed by the Magistrates officers, before the Bow 
Street Runners and their imitators were "discontinued" in 1839. That error was 
compounded when no-one troubled to tell Rowan and Mayne they were now the 
only ones left to carry on that vital, and troublesome, duty in the capital. For their 
part the joint Commissioners of the Metropolis made no move to do so. Three years 
later that problem began to come to a head. 
The "experiment" of 1842 
In 1842 the near-revolutionary Chartist movement reached one of its periodic 
peaks. Against that background Mayne wrote a Memorandum dated June 14,9 to 
the then Home Secretary Sir James Graham, as a response to some quite fierce 
criticism of the Metropolitan Police Force. However, his subject was not the 
performance of his Force against the public order threat posed by the Chartists. It 
was its handling of a sensational murder case. 
The offender, Daniel Good, had escaped after having been briefly in the custody 
of one of Mayne's constables. He then remained at liberty for two week despite his 
guilt and identity being widely known. Mayne complained that the publicity given 
to the case had; "... assumed to show a want of skill in the Metropolitan Police and 
a defect of general organisation applicable to detective duties ... "10 In particular 
Mayne wished to rebut assertions of the: "... greater efficiency of the Bow Street 
tin officers ... He pointed out, in a passage that is as relevant today as it was in 1842, that the 
employment of his officers on such duties would bring into his Force the corruption 
associated with the activities of the old Bow Street officers. He said: 
"... That these (Bow Street) officers had advantages in tracing out some sorts 
of cases is true: the Commissioners believe it is well known, that, by at least 
some of them, a communication was kept up with thieves or their associates, 
9 Memorandum relative to detective powers of police (June 14,1842). Public Records 
Office H045/OS. 292/1. 
ibid, page 2. 
ibid, page 10. 
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from who, occasionally they received information that led to detections, that 
might not otherwise have taken place ... (however) ... such an understanding between the officers of the Police and criminals in practice, causes the officers 
to allow a number of cases to remain unnoticed in order that now and then in 
a case of great notoriety, the parties or their associates whose cases have been 
connived at on other occasions, may be induced to give the information. 
That the thieves will not continue to act on such a system, unless theyfind 
it upon the whole for their common advantage, will readily be believed it 12 
(emphasis added) 
Having made that powerful, and still relevant, point Mayne went on to raise a 
second important issue. He said that: 
"... The Commissioners are aware that there is some danger in establishing 
such a Branch of Police, to whom the duties of a detective character would 
more immediately belong; of causing a relaxation of the exertions of the Police 
in general for the same purpose, which have hitherto been successful to so great 
an extent; -and it may be difficult to define the exact point of time and the 
exact circumstances under which the advantage of pursuit by the whole body 
of the Police is to be abandoned-, ... 
it 13 
In this passage Mayne raised a second fundamental difficulty created by the 
formation of a full-time, specialist detective branch within the professional police 
service. Mayne asked how he was to decide, in any particular case, when the 
preventive effort of his officers should stop and their detective work start. In so 
doing he also raised a wider and still unresolved question. How much time, effort 
and resources should the professional police service put into peacekeeping and 
protecting citizens from harm, and how much into investigating reported crimes in 
order to identify and prosecute the criminals responsible? 
In sum, Mayne's letter told his Home Secretary that detective duties would bring 
the corruption associated with the old Bow Street Runners into his Force. At the 
same time it would make it impossible ever again to focus his constables on their 
peacekeeping role. Nevertheless, as a result of the errors and omissions of the 1839 
Acts, he now had no option other than to propose that he should set up a small, and 
strictly controlled, full-time detective branch at Scotland Yard. It was a proposal 
that: 
"... the Commissioners submit for the decision of Sir James Graham, how far 
it may be desirable as an experiment to try the effect of such a plan 04 
(emphasis added) 
The Fergusson Committee of 1868 
There matters rested for some 25 years. In that period Mayne, who became sole 
Commissioner shortly after the retirement of Rowan in 1850, developed and 
enhanced a "Divisional" system of crime investigation in which local Super- 
intendents were given discretion to employ a few of their constables in the detection 
12 ibid, pages II to 12. 13 ibid, page 15. 14 ibid, page 17. 
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of local crime on a temporary (normally monthly) basis, as and when circumstances 
demanded. 
Then, in 1867 with public agitation over the growing threat of the Fenians at its 
height, Gathome Hardly (later Earl Cranbrook), the Home Secretary, was "bearded 
in his office" by protesters pleading for commutation of the death sentences of three 
condemned members of the movement. He immediately determined to increase the 
Metropolitan Police Force by one thousand constables, and to use the opportunity 
to strengthen its ability to identify, detect and prosecute those engaged in 
"treasonable conspiracies", particularly the Fenians. Unfortunately Mayne's oppo- 
sition to his Force having any involvement with such work was predictable, well 
known and immovable. He had once promised a Select Committee, on his honour, 
never to employ his men in plain clothes as "... spies to pry into people's private 
actions. .. ". 
15 
Hardy found a solution to his problem by appointing Sir James Fergusson, MP, 
to head an inquiry ostensibly concerned only with the structure and organisation of 
the Metropolitan Police. He made the inquiry an internal or Departmental 
committee directly under his control, reporting to him rather than to Parliament. 
Fergusson's 1868 Home Office Departmental Committee noted the existence of 
Mayne's small group of headquarters detectives and his "Divisional" system of 
crime investigation. However, it found no statutory or other formal regulatory basis 
for the performance of any of these duties by the constables of the Metropolitan 
Police Force. The Committee reported that; "In the original constitution of the 
police no provision was made for the establishment of such a force ... " 
16 However, 
the Committee went on to accept that what it called; "... Obviously necessity 
07 
... had led to a gradual increase in the level of crime 
investigation and detection 
activity undertaken by the Metropolitan Police. 
The Departmental Committee did not explore or set out the nature or extent of 
that "obvious necessity". It simply reported Mayne's reluctantly introduced head. 
quarters branch as a result of his 1842 letter, without further explanation. The 
conclusion is inescapable. As late as 1868 both the Home Secretary of the day and 
the officials who supported him were aware that there was no legal or statutory basis 
for the permanent employment of Metropolitan Police constables in any form of 
plain clothes detective work, let alone the specialised investigative and detective 
duties formerly performed by the magistrates' officers. 
Nevertheless, the bulk of Fergusson's Report went on to deal with its covert 
purpose; the creation of a centralised detective branch to combat conspiracies, 
insurgency and the Fenian threat. Despite there being nothing in their formal 
instructions ftom the Secretary of State to authorise it, and without adducing any 
substantial argument or evidence to justify it, the Committee recommended" 
that: 
"... The detective police, having regard to their number, appear to the 
Committee to be very efficient for the detection of ordinary crime, ... 11 
15 Select Committee on the Petition of Frederick Young and Others (1833) paras 3917/8. 
16 
Parliamentary Papers (1833) (627) vol. XII p. 407 et seq. 
Report on the Metropolitan Police Force (1868), page 14. Public Record Office 
H045/A49463/2. 
ibid. , page 15. 8 ibid, pages 21-22. 
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but that: 
"... their constitution scarcely adapts them to cope with conspiracies and 
secret combinations ... ". 
Accordingly the members baldly stated that: 
"... the detective police should form a separate division under the control of 
a special superintendent and under the immediate command of the head of 
police ... " 
The Committee went on to contradict the only General Order ever issued by Sir 
Robert Peel, the political progenitor of the Metropolitan Police. They said that: 
"... The officer in command of the detective force should have the power to 
recommend men for his division, whether or not they have filled the office of 
constable ... " 
There can be little doubt Richard Mayne found the outcome of Sir James 
Fergusson's inquiry both hurtful and unacceptable. Whether the resultant stress 
was a factor in his untimely death at home on December 26,1868, seven months 
after the publication of the Report, is impossible to determine. Subsequent 
commentators have, however, alluded to his feeling subject to unfair attack toward 
the end of his life. 
The death of Mayne and Hardy's replacement by a new Secretary of State, Henry 
Bruce, in the same month overshadowed Fergusson's Report. But those circum- 
stances did not dilute or delay it. In the untimely and unexpected absence of Mayne, 
and after the departure of the Hardy from Home Office, the newly appointed 
Commissioner, Lt. Colonel Edmund Henderson, carried into effect much of 
Fergusson's 1868 Departmental recommendations for the detective branch of the 
Metropolitan Police. No copy of Fergusson's report is to be found however, in the 
records or Parliament. 
The "Primary Objects" of 1873 
Some time after his appointment as Mayne's successor in 1868, Henderson put 
in hand work to codify and consolidate the growing number of instructions issued 
to the Metropolitan Police Force. Why he did so is unclear. Copies of Henderson's 
new Instruction Book for constables, first issued in 1873, have survived. 19 it 
contains a fundamental departure from Rowan and Mayne's 1829 definition of the 
role of the professional police. Significantly, the new definition does not form part 
of the main body of the Instructions. It appears as a Preface to them, a feature 
unknown to any of the earlier versions. Its status as a formal Instruction to the Force 
is therefore, ambiguous. 
Rowan and Mayne's original definition of the purpose of the New Police has 
already been noted. Theirs was clearly a General Institution to the Force, and 
appeared in its proper place among the other Instructions. It will be remembered 
that it said, unequivocally: 
19 Metropolitan Police histruction Book for the Government and Guidance of the Metropolitan 
Police Force (1873) Public Records Office MEPO 8/80. 
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"... It should be understood, at the outset that the principal object to be 
attained is "the Prevention of Crime ... all the ... objects of a Police establish- 
ment, will thus be better effected, than by the detection and punishment of the 
offender, after he has succeeded in committing the crime (emphasis 
added) 
By a subtle process of rewording and rearrangement, however, the Preface to 
Henderson's new version of the Instructions in 1873 abandoned the principle that 
the prevention of crime is always better than the detection of offenders. In its place 
it adopted the view that the purpose of policing is both the prevention and the 
detection of crime. 
So was bom the phrasing that every recruit to the professional police service was 
subsequently required to learn by rote. It was, and is, universally known to them as 
the "Primary Objects". 
"The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime, the next 
that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. 
To these ends all the efforts of Police must be directed. The protection of life 
and property, the prevention of public tranquillity, and the absence of crime 
will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful and whether the 
" 20 objects for which the Police were appointed have been attained. 
There are three grounds on which to argue that, at the time, both the publication 
of the "Primary Objects" and the employment of full-time detective officers within 
the Metropolitan Police which they represent were questionable if not actually ultra 
vires. First, the power to initiate and issue the necessary General Instructions to the 
Force was confined solely to the Commissioner(s) by section 5 of the Act of 1829. 
In 1873 full-time detectives were already at work in the Force and, in any event, 
their presence was due to a report of a Home Office Committee rather than as the 
result of any initiative of the Commissioner. Secondly, section I of the 1829 Act 
strictly limited the power of the Secretary of State to change the duties of the 
Commissioner(s) and hence the activities of Metropolitan Police constables they 
employed. Specifically, it precluded him from directing them, or their constables, to 
take up the detective and investigative functions of the magistrates of the metrop- 
olis. 
Finally, neither the Secretary of State nor the Commissioners had the power to 
give directions to the constables of the Metropolitan Police that they should take up 
any duty other than those laid down in the Act of 1829. The independence of both 
the Commissioner and his constables in this respect has been frequently confirmed, 
particularly in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn, 21 and 
Fisher v. Oldham Corporation? 2 However, from these same cases it could be argued 
that Commissioner Henderson's issue of the necessary instructions to give effect to 
the decisions of the Home Office legitimised those changes in the functions of the 
police, if only retrospectively. Provided that is, he had authority under the relevant 
statues to do so. Thankfully, that is a question this article can leave open for further 
research. 
20 ibid. Preface. 
21 (196 8) (1 All ER, page 769 at D/E). 22 (1930)(2 KB. 364). 
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Because whatever the outcome of that further inquiry, it is enough to note for the 
purposes of this article that, despite there being contemporary common law and 
statutory provisions to the contrary, by 1873 criminal investigation had emerged as 
an integral part of the structure of the Metropolitan Police. As a consequence of the 
annual inspection system by Home Off ice appointed Inspectors of Constabulary 
introduced by the County and Borough Police Act of 1856, the Home Office was 
able to impose the Metropolitan model on every police force in Britain. 
The lbbetson Committee of 1878 
The final stages of the process of transferring the investigative functions of the 
magistracy to the professional police service took place in 1878. In the previous 
year, and in confirmation of Richard Mayne's worst fears for the consequences of 
imposing detective duties on his Force, a scandalous case of corruption erupted 
involving the full-time detectives of the Metropolitan Police. In August 1877, with 
committal proceedings going on at Bow Street against some of the highest ranking 
detectives in the Force, Disraeli's Home Secretary, Sir Richard Assheton Cross, 
appointed another internal Home Office inquiry. Assheton Cross selected Sir Henry 
Selwyn lbbetson Bt., MP as Chairman. 
Sir Henry's report went to the Home Secretary on January 25,1878.23 By April 
Henderson had incorporated its main recommendations into the Instructions to the 
Metropolitan Police Force and a full scale Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID) had been created. By 1886, at the end of Henderson's reign as Commis- 
sioner, the Metropolitan Police employed 313 officers wholly on criminal investiga- 
tion duties. They included a headquarters CID unit at Scotland Yard composed of 
32 officers under the command of a Chief Superintendent. Divisions had a further 
281 full-time detective officers nominally attached to them. In practice, those 
officers acted independently of local superintendents and answered directly to 
Scotland Yard. 
As with the earlier Fergusson report of 1868, MPs gave no scrutiny to these 
fundamental changes in the structure and purposes of the New Police. No mention 
of the Report appears in either the proceedings or the records of Parliament. 24 
Finale - Sir Charles Warren and the Home Office, 1888 
Henderson lost his post in March 1886 following the failure of his Force to 
control a riotous meeting in Trafalgar Square. His successor was General Sir 
Charles Warren, a military member of the Select Committee whose Report had 
brought Henderson down. However there was an immediate problem. Warren took 
a combative attitude toward the involvement of "civilians" in the running of his 
Force, particularly the officials of the Home Office. It was unfortunate therefore, 
that on his appointment Warren found James Monro, a former Indian Civil Service 
high official, under his command as Assistant Commissioner of the Criminal 
Investigation Department. 
23 Report on the State, Discipline and Organisation of the Detective Force of the 
24 
Metropolitan Police (1878) Public Records Office H045/66692. 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (1878) Third Series, vols. CCXXXIX, CCXI and 
CCXLI. 
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The importance of Warren's view of "civilians" is that it led to the indignant 
departure of Monro in 1888, prompting Warren to embark on a root and branch 
review of his large Criminal Investigation Department. As part of that review, Warren 
wrote to the Home Secretary, Henry Matthews, on November 5,1888 25 referring to 
Ibbetson's radical transformation of the detective branch into a fullblown criminal 
investigation department during Henderson's Commissionership. 
In his letter Warren said: 
"... I have to say that this (Ibettson's) Report appears to be quite unknown in the 
Commissioners Office as a document, and never appears to have been brought to 
the notice of the Commissioner for any action to take place on it. Yet for all this 
the greater part of the recommendations has been more or less carried out. So far 
as this office is concerned a new Criminal Investigation Department sprang into 
being without any action on the part of the Commissioner, and its origin is 
involved with mystery. Under the Statute the whole ofthe changes ought to have 
heenfirstproposed hy the Commissioner... " (emphasis added) 
The Warren episode demonstrates that as late as 1878 the origins and provenance 
of criminal investigation departments in the modern police service, and the detectives 
they employed, were open to doubt. 
Three days after sending his letter Warren's dispute with the hated "civilians" came 
to a head causing him to resign in what looks very much like a fit of exasperated 
pique. He took the opportunity of his resignation letter to revisit and inflame, the 
debate about his relationship with the Home Office. Quite unnecessarily, he included 
the belligerent, but perfectly justified, assertion that the Secretary of State, "... had not 
06 the power under the Statute of issuing orders for the Police Force ... concluding 
with an offer to resign that the Home Office were more than grateful to accept. 
With the departure of Warren, never again would the question of the validity or 
usefulness of Criminal Investigation Departments in policing be raised. CID officers 
quickly became, in their own estimation as well as that of the public, the elite of the 
police service, a position they occupied up to and beyond the scandals of the 1960s. 
Postscript 
Commissioner Henderson's action in issuing the necessary instructions to carry the 
recommendations of the Fergusson and Ibbetson committees into effect abrogated any 
impropriety by the Home Office. Under the statute, as his successor pointed out, 
Henderson ought to have initiated the changes in the functions and activities of tile 
professional police service that his "Primary Objects" and the emergence of the full- 
time professional detective represent. He did not do so, and made no issue of it at the 
time. His neglect effectively undid all the good work Peel and Parliament had put into 
assuring the independence of the new police from government control. 
But although Henderson's pusillanimity may have retrospectively legitimised the 
actions of the Home Office, it could not, and does not, absolve government from 
25 Public Record Office H045/A49463/item 2. 
26 Public Record Office H0144/A48043 letter at item 4. 
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responsibility for the long-term consequences of the dual peacekeeping and criminal 
detection role so created for the emerging police service, or for the adverse effect the 
presence of criminal investigators and prosecutors had on the structure and 
development of policing in Britain. 
(Part II of Mr. Roach's article will appear in a forthcoming issue: Ed. ) 
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Detecting Crime Part 11: The Case 
for a Public Prosecutor 
By Lawrence T. Roach, QPM 
Summary: This is the second part of an article on "Detecting Crime'ý The first, 
"Detection and the Police", described the addition of the detection of crime to the 
original peacekeeping function of the police by the Home Office during the 1860s 
and the 18 70s, thereby creating the present dual peacekeeping and crime detection 
role of the modern British police service. This part examines the consequences of 
that dual role on levels of corruption among police officers; on police management 
structures; on police performance measurement, and on police1public relationships. 
It is contended that all those effects are adverse, generating continuing difficulties 
for the management and control ofpolicing. It is argued that, contrary to the present 
intentions of the Police Reform Bill, those problems can best be resolved by the 
appointment of a public prosecutor, so returning the professional police service to 
its originalpurelypeacekeeping andprotective role. 
The Dual Role of the Police 
Part I of "Detecting Crime" was published under the sub-title "Detection and the 
Police". It described how, in the decades following the foundation of the modern 
British professional police service in 1829, crime detection was added to its original 
preventive and protective function to create its present dual peacekeeping/crime 
detection role. 
"Peacekeeping" is best expressed in the oath of office currently taken by every British 
police constable on appointment. It is substantially unchanged from that sworn by 
Robert Peel's New Police at their first creation in 1829: 
I do solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm that I will well and truly serve our 
Sovereign Lady the Queen in the office of Constable; without favour or affection, 
malice or ill-will, and that I will to the best of my power cause the peace to be kept 
and preserved and prevent all offences against the persons and properties of Her 
majesty's subjects; and while I continue to hold the said office I will, to the best of 
my skill and knowledge, discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to 
law. " 
"Crime detection" duties were subsequently and, it is contended, improperly added 
to the original peacekeeping function of the police by the Home Office in tile 1860s and 
1870s, thereby creating the present-day dual role of the police. Those 
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additional duties consist of the identification, investigation and detection of criminal 
offenders with a view to their prosecution and punishment. 
Part Il of "Detecting Crime" now examines the impact of a dual peacekeeping/ crime 
detection role on the modern police service, and contends that it has had, and continues to 
have, adverse and damaging consequences in urgent need of correction. 
The predictions of Richard Mayne 
Thirteen years after the foundation of the modem British professional police service by 
the establishment of Robert Peel's London Metropolitan Police, Richard Mayne, one of 
the first joint Commissioners of the Force, was pressed to appoint a few of his constables 
to be full-time plain-clothes detectives. Hitherto professional policing had been confined 
to uniformed preventive and protective patrolling ("peacekeeping") both by statute and 
by the will of Parliament. Mayne's prognosis in a "Memorandum relative to detective 
powers of police" written in June, 1842 was that the addition of detective duties to the 
peacekeeping role of his Force would bring two major problems. First, it would import 
the corruption associated with the detective officers formerly employed by the 
Magistrates of the metropolis (the Bow Street Runners and their imitators) into his 
organisation. Secondly, the additional function would create irresolvable dilemmas for 
the management of professional policing. He argued that it would be difficult to reconcile 
police actions designed to keep the peace and protect the public from harm, with those 
aimed at the detection of criminal offenders. For both reasons he only very reluctantly 
agreed to form a small detective unit "as an experiment". His pessimistic expectations 
have proved perceptive. 
The Origins of Police Corruption 
As Mayne pointed out in 1842, there is considerable potential for corruption in a 
police detective role, both in terms of perversions to the course of justice and in 
opportunities for personal gain and abuse of authority. Mayne's view was that the 
addition of the detective duties formerly performed by the old Bow Street Runners and 
their imitators to the functions of his Force would bring with it an "... understanding 
between the officers of Police and thieves in practice ... 
" which, from "... a moral point of 
,n view... has been repeatedly denounced ... 
His prediction of a link between detective work and corruption has proved only too 
accurate. Major scandals associated with the detection of criminals began with the "Turf 
Fraud" case against the most senior Metropolitan Police detectives in 1877, and show no 
sign of ending. 
Even the normally supportive London 'Times' gave early warning of the corrupting 
effect detective duties were likely to have on professional policing. In a leader on August 
15,1877,2 while theTurf Fraud' conspiracy case was before the courts, 'The Times'said: 
"... A Detective Force may be necessary, but, we repeat, it is a very unpleasant 
necessity, and the danger that attends its employment is clear ... 
if 
Memorandum relative to detective powers of police (June 14,1842). Public Records Office 
H045/0S. 292/l. 
2 The Times, August 15,1877 p. 9 col. e. 
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the temptations of his (the detective's) life are too strong for him and he forgets to any 
degree his true allegiance, the mischief he may do is well nigh incalculable. The most 
potent weapon of justice is turned against justice. It is the rogues who escape and the 
honest men who are baffled and confounded. The want of security, the dread of the 
presence of a spy, is transferred to the wrong camp. All this may happen at any time, and 
firom the nature ofthe case must happen some time... " (emphasis added). 
In recent times Sir Robert Mark, one of the better known Commissioners of the London 
Metropolitan Police, has confirmed the truth of 'The Times' prediction in his 
autobiography published in 1978.3 Having been faced with some of the most serious 
allegations of corruption made against the professional police service, Sir Robert reminds 
his readers of his Dimbleby Lecture given at the BBC's headquarters five years earlier, on 
November 3,1973. Dealing with the criminal prosecution process on that occasion he 
said: 
"... It is hardly surprising that a policeman's belief in its fairness should decline as be 
gathers experience, or that he should be tempted to depart from the rules ... Most 
detectives have a strong sense of commitment. It would be unnatural if they did not feel 
personally involved in some of their cases and it would be untrue to suggest that they are 
not sometimes outraged by the results. All are under occasional temptation to bend the 
rules to convict those whom they believe to be guilty,... A few may sometimes be tempted 
also to exploit the system for personal gain. A detective who finds general acceptance of a 
system which protects the wrongdoer can come to think that if crime seems to pay for 
everyone else, why not for him? ... oo4 
Regrettably, neither government nor the leaders of the police service seem aware that 
the dual role of the service lies at the root of police corruption. Instead, Mayne's 
successors and their political masters seem irrevocably committed to a 'bad apples' theory. 
In that view, corruption can be eliminated from policing by the identification and 
elimination of the few officers who bring the police service into disrepute by their failure 
to resist the temptations of their work. No connection is made between corruption and the 
duties performed by the 'bad apples', who are too often found to be officers engaged in 
detective work of various kinds. And so, episodes of corruption continue to shake public 
confidence in the police. 
The dual peacekeeping and detective role of the modem police service exacerbates and 
magnifies the damaging effects of corruption. Any disrepute associated with detective 
work inevitably contaminates every police officer, not only throwing doubt on the 
credibility of all police evidence in cases before the courts, but also discrediting, and thus 
weakening, the peacekeeping and protective activities of the service. 
Management ofthe Police 
Mayne's prescience about the adverse effect a dual peacekeeping and detective role 
would have on management of the emerging police service was most notably 
3 In the Office of Constable (Collins, 1978). 4 ibid. 157. 
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confirmed by Lord Scarman in his Report of an inquiry into the Brixton Disorders in 
198 L' 
In that Report Lord Scarman discusses the dual role of the modem police service. At 
paragraph 4.57 he says: 
"... the primary duty of the police is to maintain 'the Queen's Peace' which has been 
described as the 'normal state of society#6 ... since it is inevitable that there will be 
aberrations from normality, his second duty arises, which is, without endangering 
normality, to enforce the law... " 
Lord Scarman describes the second of the two roles of the police as "law enforcement" 
rather than "crime detection". However, his "aberrations from normality" will include, 
and indeed largely consist in, breaches of the criminal law. The view of the dual role of 
the police developed in this article is therefore consistent with Lord Scarman's. 
In the next paragraph of his Report, at 4.58, Scarman emphasises and reinforces the 
disparity between the two roles of the police. 
"The conflict which can arise between the duty of the police to maintain order and 
their duty to enforce the law, and the priority which must be given to the former, 
have long been recognised by the police themselves, diough they are factors to 
which commentators on policing have in the past often paid too little attention... " 
The conclusions of the Scarman Report then go on fully to substantiate Mayne's view 
that serious problems are caused by requiring the police both to keep the peace and to 
detect and prosecute criminals. Lord Scarman's finding in relation to the Brixton 
disorders was that a perfectly proper police operation to identify, detect and arrest street 
robbers was the principal cause of a three-day riot which caused widespread destruction 
of buildings and other property, as well as hundreds of injuries to police and public. The 
Scarman Report is therefore, a most authoritative account both of the inherent conflict 
between the police activities of crime detection on the one hand and peacekeeping on the 
other, and of the priority of peacekeeping in the role of the service. 
In its internal structure the modem police service further illustrates the perceptiveness 
of Scarman's findings and Mayne's earlier advice. In Scarman's light every police force 
can be seen to be divided into two friendly but competing camps. One, the uniform 
branch, is composed of officers engaged in peacekeeping, crime deterrence, and 
community protection. The other, the criminal investigation department (CID), holds 
plain clothes detectives waging war on crime and criminals. The problem is that the two 
groups have conflicting objectives, tactics and strategies. Detection as an objective can 
only be achieved if criminals commit, or are allowed to attempt to commit, crimes. Public 
protection and peacekeeping on the other hand, aims to deter or prevent all crime in any 
circumstances. As a result, behind a public front of unity the two camps engage in 
incessant inter-departmental competition for influence and access to resources. This is not 
just an example of corporate politics. It is a surface manifestation of the deep structural 
divide identified by Lord Scarman. 
Crand. 8427/1981. 
6 Sir Frank Newsam, The Home Office (2nd ed., Allen and Unwin, 1955). 
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Chief police officers thus face complex decisions on manpower deployment 
and resource allocation as they attempt to strike a balance between the competing 
demands of peacekeepers and crime detectors. And, to pose a question first put by 
Richard Mayne, if both are to be pursued when should one activity stop and the 
other start? 7 
Difficulty in transferring police officers between their differing roles 
complicates such decisions. The duties of peacekeeping and crime detection are 
so disparate, requiring such differing training, skills and deployments that 
constables can neither be engaged in both at the same time, nor can they readily 
move from one to the other. Indeed, on a day-to-day basis constables must in 
general be posted either in uniform as peacekeepers, or deployed in plain-clothes 
to detect offenders. 
In all, management of the dual role of the police presents an array of 
interlocking yet conflicting tasks and objectives, which must be met using highly 
inflexible manpower and resources. Few will sensibly envy the task faced by 
modem police managers. 
Contemporary Issues 
The problems presently caused by the dual role of the police have ramifications 
far beyond those imagined by Richard Mayne, and merit further research. Their 
extent and complexity are such that space permits the discussion of only two of 
the more important here. 
Valuefor money andperformance measurement 
The Thatcher Government of the 1980s sought to apply "value for money" to 
expenditure on the police, requiring that measurable performance should be 
obtained from all public funds allocated to policing. Every subsequent administra- 
tion up to the present day has adopted that policy. However, a major and as yet 
unresolved problem has emerged in its implementation. As yet, no agreed or 
acceptable measures of police performance have been developed or established. 
Every effort to do so (and there have been several) has failed, at least in part 
because no allowance is made for the dual role of the police and for the impact of 
increased emphasis on one policing role on progress in the other. 
Failure to understand the dual role of the police not only slows progress in the 
development of reliable police performance indicators, it also produces confused 
thinking on the effectiveness or otherwise of police activity. An example can be 
seen in the White Paper on Police Reform (December, 200 1). 8 In Chapter 1, 
paragraph 1.24 describes recent police successes in the detection of crime. 
However, paragraph 1.25 then complains that "Although recent crime figures 
should (emphasis added) provide considerable reassurance, public fears about 
crime remain high", adding in the next paragraph, 1.26, that "The persistence of a 
high level of fear of crime is not caused by the public simply refusing to believe 
the crime statistics. Unruly youngsters, anti-social behaviour and environmental 
neglect can all create a sense of local disruption and insecurity that feeds the fear 
of crime. " In paragraph 1.29, the White Paper identifies all this as a cause for 
concern saying, "Over the next few years we must tackle these problems and 
create a real sense of order and security 
Memorandum relative to detective powers of police June 14,1842). Public Records Office 
H045/OS. 292/1, p. 15. 8 Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform (Cmnd. 5326). 
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in local communities so that the fear of crime can fall in line with crime itself. " 
(emphasis added) 
However, an understanding of the duality of the role of the police reveals a simple 
explanation for the apparently complex problem identified by the White Paper. An 
improvement in police performance against crime may well have been, and almost 
certainly was, achieved by diverting resources from peacekeeping into crime detection. If 
that is so, then such a shift in police priorities can be predicted to have the adverse effect 
on public insecurity and fear of crime noted by the White Paper. It should also be said 
that it is highly likely that any such general shift in police resources, whether from 
peacekeeping into crime detection or vice versa, will be a response to outside pressure on 
the service - in all probability, from the Home Office itselP 
Crime Prevention and Police Performance 
A more fundamental source of confusion in the discussion of police performance and 
its assessment arises from the misuse and abuse of the concept of 'crime prevention'. In a 
policing context 'crime prevention' is indistinguishable from crime reduction and/or 
deterrence. Used in that omnibus sense crime prevention is often regarded as a unifying 
objective to which all police activity, whether it be peacekeeping or crime detection, 
contributes directly, and hence as a potential measure of the efficiency of, or value for 
money obtained from, the police service. However, whatever its value may be as a 
definition of social policy in relation to policing, no variety of the concept of crime 
prevention will serve as a reliable measure or test of any aspect of police performance. 
In the first place, any estimate of the number of crimes prevented by police action is an 
attempt to measure what has not happened. That requires two very high hurdles to be 
cleared. First, an accurate and reliable calculation has to be made of the difference 
between the number of crimes actually committed in the period or place under review, 
and those which would otherwise have occurred in that period or place. There are good 
grounds to doubt that any such calculation has ever been made or is possible, but for the 
purposes of this article it is enough to note that, in common with many another suggested 
measure of police performance, no reliable or agreed method of estimating the non- 
occurrence of crime presently exists. The second, and even more testing hurdle, is to 
calculate how many of those nonexistent crimes can be shown to have failed to occur as a 
result of any form of police activity, whether it be peacekeeping or crime detection. 
This presents insurmountable obstacles as the Home Office implicitly recognise in an 
important circular on crime prevention issued in 1984.9 The first paragraph of the circular 
says, 
"... A primary objective of the police has always been the prevention of crime. 
However, since some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control or direct 
influence of the police, crime prevention cannot be left to them alone. Every 
individual citizen and all those agencies whose policies and practices can influence 
the extent of crime should make their contribution. Preventing crime is a task for the 
whole community... " (emphasis added). 
Crime Prevention Home Office Circular 8/1984. 
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The rest of the circular is devoted to advice and guidance on how best to organise and 
coordinate crime prevention activities between police and other local and voluntary 
organisations and agencies. 
The circular has had a powerful effect on police managers and has drawn a wide range 
of other agencies into crime prevention work. As a result, police action aimed at crime 
prevention is almost invariably taken in parallel or in cooperation with other bodies and 
agencies, adding another layer of complexity to the already extremely difficult task of 
connecting police activity to an identifiable crime prevention effect. 
Not only is it necessary to assess the influence of those other "... factors affecting 
crime which are admitted to be not under "... the control or direct influence of the 
police but as a result of the "Crime Prevention" circular, the impact of police action 
on levels of crime must now be distinguished from that of a wide range of other bodies 
and organisations. The Home Office's own advice and guidance on the issue therefore, 
has contributed to the impossibility of using crime prevention as a reliable means to 
assess either the value for money obtained from policing or the efficiency of the police, 
whether as a whole or in respect of any of its units or activities. 
In sum, the conflicts inherent in the dual role of the police created by the Home Office 
in the 19th century are a fundamental cause of the difficulty in now assessing the value 
for money obtained from policing, and in setting accurate and useful measures of police 
performance. It is also clear that those problems cannot be avoided by using crime 
prevention, reduction or deterrence as a measure of the effect of any form of policing. 
It may be possible to find a solution to these complex performance measurement 
difficulties in relation to one or other of the present peacekeeping and crime detection 
functions of the police. But while the police service is required to pursue the contrasting, 
and indeed conflicting, objectives of peacekeeping and crime detection, and to select, 
train, organise and deploy its officers into two disparate and competing parts in order to 
do so, no satisfactory resolution of the problems of the overall value for money the police 
service provides, or of its general efficiency and effectiveness, can reasonably be 
expected. 
Community Confusion 
A dual peacekeeping/detective role has potentially serious consequences for 
police/community relations, especially among disadvantaged sections of our society. 
Examples are the recent difficulties faced by the Metropolitan Police in dealing with the 
murders of Stephen Lawrence and Damilola Taylor and their continuing aftermaths, and 
those still affecting the Royal Ulster Constabulary (now the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland) as a result of its investigation of the Omagh bombing. The problem is that the 
dual role of the police requires the service to present itself as responsible both for the 
protection and support of all citizens, and for the detection and punishment of those same 
citizens if and when they commit crime. The two functions are, understandably, difficult 
to reconcile by both police officers and the public they seek to serve, creating formidable 
obstacles to mutual trust and the free flow of information. 
In several respects the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry conducted by Sir William 
Macpherson of Cluny, whose Report was presented to Parliament in February 
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1999,10 is a good illustration of the complex, interlocking community relations 
difficulties created for the police service by its dual role. Sir William's terms of reference 
were: 
"To inquire into the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence on April 
22,1993 to date, in order particularly to identify the lessons to be learned for the 
investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes. " 
Two issues arise from the Inquiry of relevance to this article. First, the Inquiry is an 
example of the negative effect the dual role of the police can have on its relationship with 
the diverse communities with which it deals. It shows that damage can be done to the 
peacekeeping role of the police by an adverse feedback from a failure in its crime 
detection activity, especially where such activity relates to crime across social and/or 
ethnic divisions. 
Secondly, the Lawrence inquiry seems not to have taken account of the duality of the 
police role in reaching its conclusions and recommendations. This is surprising since the 
Inquiry quotes the Scarman Report extensively, and indeed, uses Lord Scarman's 
observations and conclusions to sharpen and justify many of its criticisms of police action 
in the Lawrence case. " It is unfortunate therefore, that Sir William seems not to have 
heeded Lord Scarman's warning that the dual role of the police and the conflicts that can 
arise from it "... are factors to which commentators on policing have in the past paid too 
little attention... " 
That oversight must raise the possibility that the Lawrence Inquiry may have made 
judgments about the conduct of the Metropolitan Police as a whole, as well as of its 
individual officers carrying out their crime investigation and detection function, without 
taking full account of the problems of the dual role described both herein and by Lord 
Scarman. If that is so, the Inquiry Report must lose some of the impact it might otherwise 
have had. 
The Case for a Public Prosecutor 
The police service is faced with a number of major long-term problems arising from 
its dual role. It remains now to suggest, however briefly, how those problems might best 
be solved. Unfortunately, existing academic literature on police and policing provides 
little assistance. 
Research into the police and policing has tended to focus on its social and political 
context in order to explain why the police service takes its present form. Much less 
interest has been shown in how changes in the service take place or the processes 
involved. As a consequence, the importance of the reports of the Fergusson and Ibbetson 
Home Office committees of 1868 and 1878 respectively, which are the source from 
which police criminal investigation departments sprang, has not been much noticed. 
Indeed, a leading authority on policing, Professor Robert Reiner, recently published a 
comprehensive review of the literature on policing 12 which found no need to discuss the 
impact of those committees; or to examine the effects of the resulting dual role of the 
police as they are described in 
10 Cm4262-1. 
11 Cmnd. 8427(1981), Chap. 6paras. 6.7to6.15. 
12 The Politics of the Police, Robert Reiner (3rd ed., OUP, 2000). 
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these articles, or to include that development in a chronology of significant events in 
police history. 13 
An End to the Dual Role 
In its two parts 'Detecting Crime' identifies the creation of a dual peacekeeping/ crime 
detection role by the improper imposition of a responsibility for crime investigation and 
detection on the police by the Home Office in the late nineteenth century, as the source of 
the major, continuing and seemingly insoluble problems now facing the service. The 
primordiality and priority of peacekeeping in the role of the modem British police service 
has also been authoritatively established. Taken together these two findings strongly 
suggest that any long-term solution to the problems presently facing the police service 
should end its dual role by removing its responsibilities for the investigation and 
detection of criminal offenders. 
Clearly, the investigation, identification, detection and prosecution of criminal 
offenders is a vitally important part of our system of criminal justice. It cannot be 
altogether abandoned. If therefore, the police withdraw from those activities alternative 
arrangements must be made. 
Fortunately, this is by no means a novel proposal. The need for the appointment of a 
public prosecutor to undertake the criminal investigation, detection and prosecution 
duties now performed by the police service was noticed by the 1839 Royal Commission 
on the Establishment of a Constabulary Force. The appointment of public prosecutors 
with investigative and detective powers was also advocated in 1845 by the Eighth Report 
of another Royal Commission, on the Criminal Law. 
Parliament cannot claim that it has never had an opportunity to consider the idea. In 
1856 a Select Committee on Public Prosecutors looked at the criminal justice system in 
America, Scotland and Ireland. 14 It recommended that; 
"... agents shall be appointed ... for the purpose of preparing and conducting 
prosecutions to the time of trial, ... 
... Where it comes to their 
knowledge that an offence has been committed, and 
that no steps have been taken to bring the offender to justice, it will be their duty to 
take the necessary steps for apprehending or for otherwise bringing the offender 
before a magistrate... " 
An attempt to legislate on the Select Committee recommendations foundered. 
The proposal that the police should hand their present detective duties to a public 
prosecutor is also not as revolutionary as it may seem. Recent developments in the 
criminal justice system have all been in that direction. 
The Crown Prosecution Service 
The emergence of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in 1985 removed large areas 
of criminal investigation and prosecution from the responsibilities of local chief police 
officers. Consequently the CPS has penetrated ever deeper back down the line of 
investigation into the offices of local police detective departments (ClDs). 
13 ibid. Appendix, pp. 221-223. 
14 Report from the Select Committee on Public Prosecutions (1856) p. viii. Parliamentary 
Papers (1856) Vol. VHp. 351. 
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A review of the CPS by Sir lain Glidewell published in June, 1998 illustrates the 
extent of that development. " Sir lain and his Committee recommend the amalgamation 
of some of the functions of the CPS with police adminstration units. The Review says; 
"Such a single integrated unit, which we have christened a Criminal Justice Unit, 
could be either a police Unit with one or more CPS lawyers working permanently in 
it, or a CPS Unit with some police staff. We firmly recommend the second option. . 
vv16 
Earlier, in the main body of the Review, Sir lain and his colleagues say; 
"Such a unit will need to be able to call on the police to take action in obtaining 
more evidence and so a senior police officer will need to be part of the unit, which 
would be housed in or near the relevant police station. " 17 
The CPS plan to have 73 such "... co-located Criminal Justice Units... " open by March 
31,2002.18 These developments are a very short step from the proposals made here. 
A renewed Police Service 
In sum, a long-term permanent solution to the problems facing the police requires the 
service to withdraw from the investigation of crime, and the identification, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offenders. In its place a national public prosecution department 
should be created within the Crown Prosecution Service under the direction of a public 
prosecutor supported by a staff of full-time crime investigators. 
Benefits and Precedents 
The proposal is firmly rooted in the British criminal justice system, and does not draw 
upon, or imitate, other legal traditions. As such it has many beneficial side-effects and is 
by no means unprecedented. It would, for instance, provide an immediate reservoir of 
highly trained and experienced police detectives to staff the new prosecution department. 
The people presently engaged in the investigation and detection of criminal offenders 
would continue to do so, but under new management. There is an abundance of precedent 
for such a non-police criminal investigative body. 
Detective work is not, and never has been, solely confined to the professional police 
service, as Professor Reiner and others helpfully note. The Atomic Energy Authority, 
British Transport, the Armed Forces and many other bodies such as parks constabularies, 
independently maintain bodies of detectives. Other organisations, such as the Inland 
Revenue, Customs and Excise, the Post Office and the immigration and benefits services, 
carry out criminal investigation, detection and prosecution activities indistinguishable in 
practice from those of police detectives. A CPS public prosecutor department will find a 
wide range of established precedents. 
15 The Review of the Crown Prosecution Service (June 1998) Cm 3972. 16 ibid. Recommendation 14. 
17 ibid. Summary of the Main Report, etc., para. 29. 18 Annual Report of the Crown Prosecution Service 2000-200 1, p. 1 1. 
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On the other hand, effective peacekeeping by the police does not require the service to 
be involved in the detection and prosecution of crime, as Peel's New Police amply 
demonstrated during the first 40 years of their existence. The proposals of this article 
would merely refocus the police service on its original patrolling, protective and 
preventive role and relieve its officers of the onerous burden of paperwork caused by 
their present involvement in the prosecution of criminal offenders. Police officers would 
then be wholly devoted to peacekeeping and crime reduction by the proven and powerful 
deterrent effect of their visible presence in our streets and public places. All 
contemporary evidence and comment suggests that such a presence is both conspicuously 
absent and sorely missed. 
The Police Reform Bill 
Regrettably, government policy, as it is reflected in the recent White Paper and Bill on 
Police Reform, is moving in the opposite direction. Rather than seeking to reduce police 
involvement in their secondary role of the investigation and detection of criminal 
offenders, the present Police Reform Bill aims to distance the police service from 
peacekeeping in order to enhance its performance against crime. To that end the Bill 
proposes to give Chief Constables power to 'accredit' any of their existing staff with 
limited police powers, either as peacekeepers or as 'investigating offices'. 19 Significantly 
for the purposes of this article however, the Bill goes on to reveal its true intentions for 
the future role of the professional police service by extending the accreditation process to 
non-police commercial organisations and their employees, but only in a uniformed, 
peacekeeping role. 20 The Bill thereby runs the risk of resurrecting the disreputable rabble 
of local watch- and 'charley-' men contemptuously swept away by Robert Peel in 1829, 
while simultaneously ignoring the lessons to be learned from the history of policing and 
rejecting the authoritative findings of Lord Scarman and others on the proper priority of 
the role and functions of professional police officers. 
Finale 
If however, reform follows the proposals set out in this article it would give the Royal 
Commission of 1839 - that constant source of reference in this context -a final word on 
the future of the British police service. It, better than any later commentator, understood 
the purposes and functions of a truly peacekeeping police. Among the Conclusions to its 
First Report the Commission says, 21 
"... the main purpose of a preventative police ... (is) ... the protection of private 
individuals in the enjoyment of their rights against infractions by depredators and 
others ... " 
This identifies the task of a properly constituted professional police service and chimes 
well with the wording of the oath of office taken on appointment by every modern 
constable with which this article began. In our times the inclusion of and others 
in the words used by the 1839 Royal Commission should 
19 Police Reform Bill 200 1, cl. 33. 20 ibid. cl. 34(2). 21 First Report of the Royal Commission on the Establishment of an Efficient Constabulary 
Force(l 839) p. 185 para. 301. Parliamentary Papers (1839) vol. XIX p. 171. 
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strike an especially resonant note. It reminds us of the vital importance, to the health of 
our form of democracy, of the operational independence of the professional police service 
from any outside influence other than the law itself. Including and especially, as both 
Robert Peel and Richard Mayne wisely recognised, government and its agents. 
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POLICING A NEW CENTURY: 
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(Cmnd. 5326) 
Comment 
by 
Lawrence T. Roach, Esq. QPM 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner (1990-1996) 
Metropolitan Police Service 
(Retired) 
Secretary of State 
1. My comments will fall under two main heads: 
a) the validity of the evidence presented in Chapter I on'The need for Police 
Reform', and 
b) the appropriateness of the programme of reform proposed in subsequent 
Chapters. 
My main purpose is to draw attention to sources of relevant information which 
may either not have been available, or have been overlooked for some reason, in 
the drafting of the Paper. A subsidiary objective is to suggest a beneficial shift of 
emphasis in the proposed police reforms, to more accurately and effectively focus 
them on the White Paper's aim to improve the standard of security and protection 
provided by government to all citizens. 
Two sources are drawn on in these comments; 
i) the Report of an enquiry into the Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981, by 
Lord Scarman, O. B. E. (Cmnd. 8427) 
ii) an unpublished paper, on the history and significance of criminal 
investigation departments in the British Police Service. The paper is based 
on an examination and analysis of Parliamentary and public records, and is 
presently under consideration for publication by the Criminal Law Review. 
Validity of evidence in Chapter I on 'The Need for Police Reform' 
2. The Foreword to the White Paper states its purpose. Paragraph 3 says that the 
intention is to'.. substantially improve the standard, reliability, consistency and 
responsiveness of the (police) service.... ' Paragraph 6 says two things, 
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a) 'Our task is clear. We want to prevent, detect, apprehend and convict the 
perpetrators of crime. ', and 
b) 'We need and will have a process that enables those undertaking the basic task 
of protecting our homes, our streets, and our persons to do the job more 
effectively'. 
3. Since the White Paper deals at various points both with the responsibilities of 
the police service in relation to crime, and with its duty to deal with 'anti-social 
thuggish behaviour', disorder etc., I have taken these sentences in paragraph 6 of 
the Foreword to the White Paper to be its view of the functions of the police 
service (i. e. its role) for the purposes of the reforms it proposes. I therefore 
accept and shall use this definition of the role of the police in these comments. 
For convenience I shall refer to the function 'prevent, detect, apprehend and 
convict the perpetrators of crime' as 'crime reduction', and shall use 'peace 
keeping' when referring to the function 'protecting our homes, our streets, and 
our persons'. 
4. The White Paper follows Lord Scarman in making a distinction between these 
two main functions of the police role. The existence of a division in the role of 
the police, and the problems that arise from it, were authoritatively identified 
and discussed in his Report of an enquiry into the Brixton Disorders mentioned 
at 1) above. In his Report Lord Scarman said: 
4.57 '.. Ahe primary duty of the police is to maintain'the Queens's Peace', 
which has been described as the'normal state of society"... Since it is 
inevitable that there will be aberrations from normality, his second duty 
arises, which is, without endangering normality, to enforce the law... ' 
Yhe Home Office, Sir Frank Newsarn, Allen and Unwin, 1955 (2 nd edition) 
However, and materially for the purposes of these comments on the White 
Paper on Police Reform, Lord Scarman went on to set out the importance and 
significance of this division in the role of the police. In the next paragraph of 
his Report he says: 
4.58 'The conflict which can arise between the duty of the police to 
maintain order and their duty to enforce the law, and the priority which must 
be given to the former, have long been recognized by the police themselves, 
though they are factors to which commentators on policing have in the past 
often paid too little attention.... ' 
5. Lord Scarman concludes that the Brixton Disorders which were the subject of 
his enquiry were an example of conflict between the peace-keeping duties of the 
police, and their obligation to reduce crime. He found that a perfectly proper 
police operation to prevent street robbery and to detect and arrest the offender 
was a major cause of an outbreak of urban rioting. Paragraph 4.21 of the Report 
is of particular interest in this respect. Lord Scarman notes that uniformed 
officers were deployed in Brixton to prevent crime and deter criminal offenders. 
However, despite the intentions of the local police commanders, that action did 
not reduce street robberies in the area over the long term, but was itself a 
significant factor in the later outbreak of disorder. 
6. Lord Scarman's Report shows that crime reduction and peace-keeping are 
distinct and even conflicting tasks for the police, requiring different. 
ii 
Comment by: 
Lawrence T. Roach, QPM 
deployments, policing skills and tactics. That creates a constant problem for police 
managers who have to decide how to divide their available officers between these 
differing activities. The Report also found that if police, either individually or as a 
unit, are required to achieve both objectives, they must be given clear directions on 
which task has priority. 
The Scarman enquiry Report and its findings have an impact on the validity of the 
evidence presented by the White Paper on the need for reform of the police. In 
particular, Chapter I describes recent police success in the detection of crime, adding 
however that (paragraph 1.24)'... we must reverse the trend for the crime rates that 
are rising, and continue to drive down the rates for other crimes.... In the next 
section, at paragraph 1.25, the Paper says that'Although recent crime figures should 
provide considerable reassurance, public fears about crime remain high. ', going on to 
say (paragraph 1.26) that'We expect the police at every level.. to clamp down on 
thuggish, brutal and uncivilised behaviour wherever it occurs'. 
My comment on this part of the Report is that, in the light of Lord Scarman's Report 
it should be apparent that the recent success of the police in reducing crime is, in all 
probability, a cause of continuing high public insecurity and fears of crime. What the 
White Paper presents as puzzling, i. e. that police success in reducing crime has had 
little or no effect on levels of fear of crime, is, in fact, no more than might be 
expected. Crime has been reduced by police activity, but public fear of crime and/or 
insecurity has been adversely affected by the consequent shift of policing resources 
from peace-keeping into crime reduction. Crime reduction and peace-keeping are not 
complementary either in principle or in the practice of policing, as Lord Scarman 
pointed out This is an interpretation of the evidence put forward in the White Paper 
for which there is also a good deal of anecdotal evidence, and to which credence is 
given by the'Average percentage satisfaction' charts set out in paragraph 1.48. 
This conclusion has some interesting consequences. It leads for instance, into a search 
for the reasons for the general or wide-spread shift in policing priorities identified by 
the White Paper. One such obvious avenue of enquiry is the extent to which priority 
and resource allocation decisions by chief police officers are influenced by ministerial 
priorities and objective setting. In effect, Lord Scarman's Report indicates that the 
Home Office itself may be the cause of the problems it identifies in its White paper. 
In addition, this alternative interpretation of the facts presented in the White Paper 
extenuates the criticism of undue variability in performance as between different 
police forces set out in paragraphs 1.39 to 1.42. It raises the possibility that such 
variations in success against crime targets may not be the result of differing levels of 
competence or efficiency in combating crime, but merely the outcome of legitimate, 
defensible and even commendable differences in local priorities as between crime 
reduction and peace-keeping. 
The White Paper's failure to take account of priorities when criticising the 
performance of police units is compounded by its disregard of the importance Lord 
Scarman attaches to establishing a priority between peace-keeping and crime reduction 
where the police are required to pursue both. The White Paper proposes to impose just 
such a dual requirement on the police service as a 
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Comment by: 
Lawrence T. Roach, QPM 
whole, yet it neither discusses nor recognises the issue of priorities, nor does it 
give any advice or guidance on it. 
12. In all, the absence of any discussion in the White Paper of the authoritative 
conclusions and findings of Lord Scarman in his Report on the Brixton 
Disorders is surprising. The omission seriously undermines the case on which 
the argument for radical refonn in the police service is based. Equally the 
White Paper requires the police service to improve its performance in the 
reduction of crime and in the maintenance of order, yet it fails to give any 
guidance on the priority to be given to those very different, and potentially 
conflicting, tasks. 
The appropriateness of the proposed prol! ramme of police reform 
13. The Parliamentary and public record, as it is set out and examined in my 
unpublished paper, makes it abundantly clear that, at their origin, Peel's New 
Police were intended to be a purely protective and preventive force, specifically 
excluded from any involvement in criminal enquiries or procedures, i. e. 'peace 
keepers'within the definition used in the White Paper. The founders of British 
professional policing may have used the words'the prevention of crime' when 
describing their objective in their Instructions to their newly appointed 
constables, but their evidence to a Select Committee in 1833 shows that their 
actual contribution to that end was confined strictly to the deterrent effect 
caused by the visible presence of their patrolling officers. 
14. The public record then goes on to show that the 'crime reduction' activities 
associated with police criminal investigation departments were subsequently 
imposed on the police service in the late nineteenth century by the indirect and 
concealed means of Home Office internal committees, often in the face of fierce 
objection from the early leaders of the police. My paper concludes from the 
evidence of the public record that the action of the Home Office in this matter 
was almost certainly ultra vires, and probably unlawful. 
15. Against that background, the White Paper on Police Reform proposes to solve 
the present difficulties of the police by reducing their involvement in the duty to 
which they were originally dedicated, i. e. that of peace-keeping and protection 
of the public, in order to refocus them on their later, and secondary, role of 
crime investigation and detection. The White Paper thereby flies in the face of 
the intentions of the first founders of the police service and the Parliamentarians 
who were so careful to specify the task Peel's New Police were to perform. It 
also contradicts the interpretation of the priory of the differing roles of the 
police consistently given by the Law Lords, and best articulated by Lord 
Scarman. 
16. That being so, if radical reform in the duties of the police must be made, it will 
more consistently accord with the tradition of the service, and more accurately 
reflect the common law and the history of (and recent developments in) 
policing, if it is the crime investigation and detection work of the service that is 
reduced rather than its peace-keeping function. My unpublished paper expands 
on and fully argues the case for the conclusion that the best solution to the 
present difficulties of the police will be to transfer all the crime investigation, 
detection and prosecution duties presently performed by the police service to an 
executive arm formed within the Crown Prosecution Service, leaving the police 
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with the sole task of keeping the peace and protecting citizens from harm. 
Under that system, the contribution of the police to the prevention of crime 
would be the deterrent effect of their visible, active presence in public places, as 
was the case at their first foundation. 
17. The benefits of that approach to the reform of the police are many and 
considerable. They not only include compliance with the traditions of policing 
and coherence with modem developments in the criminal justice system, but 
will leave fully trained and experienced professionals engaged in every aspect 
of crime prevention (i. e. a truncated and refocused existing police service), and 
crime investigation, detection and prosecution (i. e. an enhanced and expanded 
Crown Prosecution Service). It will also simplify performance measurement 
and value for money assessment in the police service, and improve relations 
between the police and local communities, especially ethnic and other 
disadvantaged groups, since the police will no longer be seen as the agency by 
which members of the community are prosecuted and punished through the 
criminalcourts. My unpublished paper more fully examines and assesses the 
beneficial consequences of this alternate approach to police reform. 
Conclusion 
18. Much of what is said in these comments arises because there is, at present, 
neither an agreed list of the proper functions of the police service, nor a 
generally accepted definition of its role. A great deal has been done in recent 
years to try to correct that omission, but nothing of substance has emerged. If 
recent experience with the problems of developing accurate and useful 
performance measures for policing has any relevance to the matter, the White 
Paper's proposals for a new National Policing Plan and a complementary 
Standards Unit will come to nothing unless these questions are answered 
authoritatively. As the Home Office minister, Alun Michael MP, said in 
August 1998, 'We can only measure the success of the police if the service 
knows the outcomes it is trying to achieve... '. Regrettably, the White Paper 
neither recognises the weakening effect on its criticisms of the police caused by 
that lacuna in public policy, nor does it deliver on that crucial issue. 
20d'January 2002 L. T. Roach 
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